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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETIY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
Case No. CV -08-941 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This memorandum is filed in support of Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment, which seeks judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiffs' 
allegations in their Verified Complaint and as to Defendants' remaining Counterclaims. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff has previously supplied the Court with an extensive Statement of Facts in its 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed on October 5, 2009. 
Consequently, Plaintiff will not repeat these facts here. However, Plaintiff provides the 
following facts which are pertinent to this Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On August 30, 2007, Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC (hereinafter "Plaintiff' or 
"Buku") entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement with Defendants Raoel H. Clark and 
Janet C. Clark (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Clarks") (the "Clark Agreement") for 
the purchase of approximately 80.17 acres of property located in Jefferson County, Idaho, 
owned by the Clarks (hereinafter the "Clark Property"). On or about August 30, 2007, 
Plaintiff also entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement with Angus Jerry Peterson and 
Betty Jean Peterson (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Petersons") (the "Peterson 
Agreement") for the purchase of approximately 73 acres adjacent to Defendant Clarks' 
property (hereinafter the "Peterson Property"). 
The Clark Agreement denoted a purchase price for the Clark Property in the amount 
of$1,044,075.18. (Magera Aff., ~ 5, Ex. A). The Clark Agreement provided Buku with a 
four-month due diligence period for Buku to ensure it was satisfied with the condition of the 
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property prior to closing. (Magera Aff., Ex. A). The Clark Agreement specified that Buku 
would provide the Clarks with $25,000.00 in earnest money, and that such sum would be 
fully refundable until closing. (Magera Aff., Ex. A). Buku tendered the earnest money to 
Clarks. 
The Peterson Agreement was structured similarly. The Peterson Agreement denoted 
a purchase price for the Peterson property in the amount of$980,OOO.00. (Magera AfC ~ 10, 
Ex. B). The Peterson Agreement provided Buku with a four-month due diligence period to 
ensure it was satisfied with the condition of the property prior to closing. (Magera Aff., 
Ex. B). The Peterson Agreement specified that Buku would provide Petersons with 
$327,000.00 in earnest money, and that all but $10,000.00 of such earnest money was fully 
refundable until closing. (Magera Aff., Ex. B). Buku tendered such earnest money to 
Petersons. 
Pursuant to the Clark Agreement and Peterson Agreement, closing was to occur on 
December 21,2007. However, no such closing occurred due to Buku's concerns with the 
zoning of the properties. Buku demanded its earnest money back from Clarks and Petersons, 
but Clarks and Petersons refused to return the funds. As a result, Buku filed suit against 
Clarks and Petersons. Defendants brought various causes of action against Buku in a 
counterclaim, including a cause of action under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
Plaintiff filed its prior Motion for Summary Judgment on October 6, 2009. In its 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff sought dismissal of all of Defendants' 
counterclaims, and return of the earnest monies to which it was entitled under the Clark and 
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Peterson Agreements. Plaintiffs causes of action included (1) Refund of Earnest Money 
Under Contract, (2) Conversion, and (3) Unjust Enrichment. Defendants' counterclaim 
included (1) Specific Performance, (2) Breach of Contract, (3) Unjust Enrichment, (4) 
Estoppel, (5) Promissory Estoppel, and (6) Consumer Protection. The Court heard Plaintiff s 
Motion for Summary Judgment on December 14,2009. The Court issued its Memorandum 
Decision with regard to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on January 27,2010. The 
Memorandum Decision held that: 
[T]he written contracts between the parties are unambiguous and definite; 
however, issues of fact remain as to Buku's entitlement to the earnest money 
under the contracts. The behavior of the parties after the December 2007 
closing date persuades the Court that the "agreement" between the parties may 
not have ended after the closing date. After the failed closing, the parties' 
behavior suggests that an arrangement possibly still existed between the parties 
for the sale and purchase of the property. It is unclear what that arrangement 
was or what it means. Nevertheless, it seems clear to the Court that the 
parties' behavior subsequent to closing could be due to a later agreement that 
might affect Buku's entitlement to earnest money under the earlier 
Agreements. 
(Memorandum Decision, p. 8-9). Additionally, the Memorandum Decision directly 
dismissed Defendants' cause of action under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
The only contractual agreement alleged in Defendants' Counterclaim are the written 
Agreements entered into between the parties. (Counterclaims ~~ H through X). Defendants 
have not alleged an oral agreement separate and apart from the written Agreements. Plaintiff 
now seeks to resolve, as a matter of law, the remaining issues in this case with regard to 
whether any alleged agreements or arrangements between the parties after the closing date 
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had any material effect on Plaintiffs entitlement to a return of the earnest money under the 
terms of the Clark and Peterson Agreements, plus interest. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court should grant 
summary judgment based on the pleadings and affidavits where "there [are] no genuine 
issues as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." 
I.R.C.P. 56(c); see also Idaho Building Contractors Assoc. v. City o/Coeur d'Alene, 126 
Idaho 740, 742,890 P.2d 326,328 (1995). The Court will construe all disputed facts in favor 
of the non-moving party as well as all reasonable inferences. Hayward v. Jacks Pharmacy, 
Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 625, 115 P.3d 713, 716 (2005). 
B. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE CLARK AND PETERSON 
AGREEMENTS PROVIDES THAT ANY AMENDMENTS OR WAIVERS TO 
THE AGREEMENTS MUST BE IN WRITING AND SIGNED BY THE 
PARTIES TO BE VALID 
The Court delayed ruling on whether Buku is entitled to the return of its earnest 
money because it had concern that there may have been subsequent agreements between the 
parties after the Clark and Peterson Agreements failed to close. However, by the very terms 
of the Clark and Peterson Agreements themselves, such an alleged additional, unwritten 
agreement is not valid and would not have affected the terms of the contracts entered into 
between Plaintiff and Defendants. Further, Defendants have alleged in the Counterclaim 
only the written Agreements enter into by the parties. (Counterclaim ~~ H through X). 
5 - MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Paragraph 21 of the Clark and Peterson Agreements states as follows: 
21. Amendments and Waivers. No amendment of any provisions of this 
agreement will be valid unless the same shall be in writing and signed by the 
parties. No waiver by any party of any default, misrepresentation or breach of 
warranty or covenant hereunder, whether intentional or not, shall be deemed 
to extend to any prior or subsequent default, misrepresentation, or breach of 
warranty or covenant hereunder or effect in anyway [sic] any rights arising by 
virtue of any prior or subsequent such occurrence. 
(Magera Aff., ~ 10 & 11, Ex. A & B). This paragraph specifically states that no amendments 
to the Agreements will be valid unless "in writing and signed by the parties." Although 
Plaintiff attempted to amend the agreement by offering an extension of the closing date to 
both parties (see Magera Aff., ~ 20, Ex. E and Ex. F), neither Clarks nor Petersons executed 
the memorandum to extend the closing date, and in fact outright rejected the offer to extend 
the closing date. (Magera Aff., ~ 23, Ex. G). No other attempts were made in writing to 
amend or modify the Clark or Peterson Agreements, and, further, no written agreements 
amending or modifying the agreements were ever executed. Because the agreements were 
never amended or extended in writing and the closing date was never extended, closing had 
to happen on or before December 21, 2010, for the transaction to occur. However, that date 
went by without closing occurring as a result of Buku's concerns after its due diligence 
review. Clarks and Petersons knew the only way to amend their agreements with Buku was 
to have a writing signed by the parties. "When the terms of a contract are unambiguous, 
interpretation of the contract and its legal effect are questions oflaw." Iron Eagle Dev., LLC 
v. Quality Design Sys., Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 491, 65 P.2d 509, 513 (2003). Even if 
Defendants could prove the parties had a new oral agreement or the parties' course of 
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conduct suggested an orally revised agreement, such agreements are invalid according to the 
clear and unambiguous terms ofthe Clark and Peterson agreements. Further, it is the written 
Agreements that govern the return of the earnest monies. Pursuant to paragraph 2(a) of the 
Agreements, Buku is entitled to a full refund of the earnest money it paid to Clarks and a 
refund of all earnest money but $10,000.00 it paid to Petersons, plus prejudgment interest. 
C. ANY ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT PERTAINING TO THE SALE OF 
THE PROPERTY IS PROHIBITED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Even if Clarks and Petersons can assert claims beyond the unambiguous express 
contract terms, the statute of frauds prohibits their claim of a "new" deal. Pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 9-503: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than for leases for a term not 
exceeding one (1) year, nor any trust or power over or concerning it, or in any 
manner relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or 
declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a conveyance or other 
instrument in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized 
in writing. 
This proposition has been further reiterated in Idaho case law. See, i.e., Lawrence v. Jones, 
124 Idaho 748, 750, 864 P.2d 194, 197 (Ct. App. 1993) (stating "a contract for the sale of 
real property is not enforceable unless it is in writing"). None of the parties involved contend 
that there are any additional written contracts regarding the sale of the property at issue and 
Defendants have not alleged a separate oral contract. Defendants' Counterclaim alleged 
specific performance and breach of the written Agreements. Even if Defendants had alleged 
an oral contract in the Counterclaim, pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-503 and Idaho case law, any 
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alleged oral agreement between the parties regarding the sale of the property would be 
invalid and unenforceable. Such an agreement could not affect the terms of the Clark or 
Peterson Agreements. Consequently, the terms of the Clark and Peterson Agreements must 
be enforced as written, and Plaintiff is entitled to a refund of its earnest monies and interest. 
D. DEFENDANTS CANNOT RELY ON EQUITABLE CLAIMS TO DEFEAT 
THE WRITTEN AGREEMENTS 
Because the Court has already determined that the written Agreements are clear and 
unambiguous, Defendants cannot rely on equitable claims for their alleged damages as a 
result ofthe Agreements. "Equitable claims will not be considered when an adequate legal 
remedy is available." "When parties enter into an express contract, a claim based in equity 
is not allowed because the express contract precludes enforcement of equitable claims." Id. 
(citing In re Estate of Boyd, 134 Idaho 669, 673, 8 P.3d 664, 668 (Ct. App. 2000)). Iron 
Eagle Dev., LLC v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487,492, 65 P.3d 509,514 
(2003) (citing Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 404-05,690 P.2d 333,339-40 (1984)). 
"Only when the express agreement is enforceable is a court precluded from applying the 
equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment in contravention of the express contract." Bates v. 
Seldin, 146 Idaho 772,776-77,203 P.3d 702, 706-07 (2009). 
The purpose of a written contract is so that the obligation and expectations are known 
to all parties. As a result of the written Agreements, Clarks and Petersons were both put on 
notice that any revisions to the Agreements had to be in writing. Both refused to extend the 
closing date in writing as requested by Buku so the zoning issue identified as part ofBuku's 
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due diligence efforts could be potentially resolved. As a result, Clarks and Petersons cannot 
bring claims of unjust enrichment, estoppel, and promissory estoppel to defeat the clear 
language of the Agreements. The unambiguous Agreements govern the dispute and Buku 
should have its earnest monies returned. 
E. ANY INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES AFTER THE CLOSING 
DATE DID NOT ALTER THE TERMS OF THE CLARK OR PETERSON 
AGREEMENTS SO AS TO INVALIDATE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO A 
RETURN OF THE EARNEST MONIES 
Assuming arguendo that the unambiguous language of the Agreements does not 
resolve the dispute, Defendants' claims fail. Defendants have asserted that actions which 
occurred after the Agreements terminated for failure to close somehow entitle Defendants 
to retain the earnest monies which should have been refunded pursuant to the terms of the 
Agreements. Defendants have asserted, among other things, that Plaintiff exercised 
dominion and control over their properties based upon Defendants' allegations that Plaintiff 
leased out the Clark Property to a third party, or that Plaintiffs agent farmed the Clark 
Property in 2008, and/or that Plaintiff or Plaintiffs agent controlled the Peterson home. 
Defendants have further asserted that Plaintiff orally promised to purchased the Clark and 
Peterson properties after the Clark and Peterson Agreements terminated, although such an 
agreement is clearly banned by the statue of frauds and the express language of the written 
Agreements. 
However, Defendants' own testimony and the testimony of Brad Foster, Kipp 
Archibald and Jaramie Magera prove these allegations untrue. Regarding Defendants' 
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assertion that Plaintiff somehow farmed the Clark property in 2008 or exercised dominion 
and control over the property, Defendant Clark admitted in his deposition that he allowed 
F oster Land & Cattle to run his farm ground, he allowed his son to use the house, and he 
received the proceeds: 
Q. . ... But with regard to your allegation that Buku somehow exercised 
dominion and control over your property, what are you asserting that 
they did? 
A. The whole property? 
Q. The whole property. 
A. Well, maybe I assumed this, but I felt that where he's made an offer to 
buy my property, that that was so. I was going to sell it to him to 
become his. 
Q. But you received the benefit of the tax assessment that was paid by Mr. 
F oster, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you received the benefit of the water assessment payment? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you received the benefit of whatever leasing arrangement you had 
with your son. I don't know whether you required him to pay you or 
not, correct? 
A. That's okay. I understand that. 
Q. SO how did Buku control that property after the agreement did not close 
in December. 
A. Well, I was hoping that it would continue on. But as to whether - I 
don't know who owned what. The property never left my ownership, 
and it wouldn't until it was paid for. 
Q. Okay. And you agreed to allow Mr. Foster to farm that land, correct? 
A. Sure. You know, if you let it go, it turns to weeds. Somebody had to 
make a call on it. 
Q. And you agreed you were the person that did that? 
A. I did. I mean, I was told by Brad that Mr. Magera asked him to call me 
and see if it was all right. 
Q. SO you're not alleging that Buku actually received any profits off of 
you property, correct? 
A. I don't know that they did. I don't see how they could. 
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(Casperson Aff., ~ 2, Ex. A ("Clark Depo."), p. 24-31). Defendant Clark's testimony 
indicates that Plaintiff never exercised dominion and control over the property. Foster Land 
& Cattle farmed the property after getting approval from Clark, not Plaintiff. (Foster Aff., 
'6-9). Plaintiff received no compensation for any of the Clark property. (Foster Aff., ~ 6-9). 
Rather, as Defendant Clark stated in his deposition, and Mr. Foster is his affidavit, Foster 
Land & Cattle paid the water assessment and taxes on the Clark property pursuant to the 
arrangement Clark had made with Mr. Foster. This arrangement also was corroborated by 
Mr. Magera. Mr. Magera provided in his deposition that Brad Foster approached him about 
farming the Clark property, but that he informed Mr. Foster that the deal with the Clarks fell 
through and that he could contact Mr. Clark directly if he were interested in farming the 
property. (Casperson Aff., ~ 4, Ex. C ("Magera Depo."), p. 31, In. 6-24).1 Additionally, 
Defendant Clark admitted that he leased the home located on the property to his son during 
the time period in question and that at no point did Buku exercise dominion and control over 
Q. [MS. CASPERSON] Did any fanners ever approach you about farming the Clark 
property? 
A. [MR. MAGERA] Yes. 
Q. And who was that? 
A. Brad Foster. 
Q. And what infonnation, if any, did you give to Mr. Foster? 
A. Brad Foster took me to lunch, asked me ifhe could fann another piece of ground we 
have in Hailey Creek. And he said - he asked me too if - I heard you bought Raoel 
Clark's piece, could we fann that. And I said no, we didn't buy it. The deal fell through, 
I said, but here's Raoel Clark's number, if you want to call him you can ask him to farm 
it. 
Q. Did you receive any - you meaning Buku Properties or any entity that you have an 
interest therein, receive any money from Brad Foster? 
A. For the Clark property? 
Q. Correct. 
A. No. 
(Magera Depo., p. 31, In. 6-24). 
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the home. (Clark Depo., p. 28-29, In. 22-8, p. 35, In. 20-24). Buku never leased the Clark 
Property to any third party, nor did any agent ofBuku ever farm the Clark Property. Buku 
never exercised dominion and control over any portion ofthe Clark Property, as admitted by 
Mr. Clark, Mr. Foster, and Jaramie Magera. Further, Mr. Foster denied that Foster Land & 
Cattle has any agency association with Mr. Magera or Plaintiff. (Foster Aff., ~ 12 & 13). 
As a result, Clark's previous assertion that Plaintiff exercised dominion and control over their 
property is unsupported. 
Defendants also have asserted that Buku exercised dominion and control over the 
Peterson property. However, Mr. Peterson testified his son ran the farm and Buku had no 
control over it. (Casperson Aff., ~ 3, Ex. B (Peterson Depo., p. 57, In. 7 - p. 59, In. 5)). In 
fact, Mr. Peterson testified as follows: 
Q. And specifically tell me what you can recall Mr. Foster told you. 
A. Mr. Foster said that Jaramie called him and wanted him to rent the farm. 
He asked me if it was in pasture. I said yes, but J aramie hasn't bought the 
place yet. He said oh, he hasn't. He said I understand he's going to. I said, 
well, when he buys it, he can do what he wants, but ifhe don't buy it, why, I'm 
going to let Steve run it. 
Q. And that's what you did, correct? 
A. That's what I did. 
Q. SO any profits that were made with regard to that farmland came to you, 
correct? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Why didn't you take actions to lease the house out if you were no longer 
living there? 
A. Because I didn't want to lease it out. It was in good shape, and I didn't 
want people to move in. If he didn't take it and we got it back, why, then I 
would sell it. 
Q. SO you were concerned that any renters would damage the property? 
A. Yes. 
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(Peterson Depo., p. 57, In. 7 - p. 59, In. 5). Consequently, Petersons' claim that Buku 
exercised control over the farm ground is untrue. 
More particularly, Petersons claim Buku exercised control over the residence on the 
Peterson property which is a small portion of the total Peterson Property. Defendants have 
claimed that Plaintiff actively marketed the property through ERA real estate agent Kipp 
Archibald and that Defendant Peterson had no involvement with the marketing of the 
property and no control over the property. However, Defendant Peterson's deposition 
testimony reflects a different scenario. Defendant Peterson testified that Kipp Archibald 
called him on January 3,2008, to ask him what he wanted to do regarding the continued 
marketing of the property. Defendant Peterson instructed Mr. Archibald to speak with his 
attorney, Robin Dunn, or with Jaramie Magera. (Peterson Depo.,p. 47, In. 2-8; Archibald 
Aff.,~11-17). Further, Mr. Peterson testified he did not want to rent the house because he 
was concerned about damage from renters. (Peterson Depo.,p.57,In.7-p.59,In.5). Thus, 
Peterson clearly had authority to direct the marketing of the Peterson Property and simply 
opted not to make any decision themselves with regard to the continued marketing of the 
Property. Kipp Archibald called Defendant Peterson in August 2008, to again inquire as to 
what he wanted to do regarding the sale of the property. Defendant Peterson again told Mr. 
Archibald to speak with Mr. Dunn or Mr. Magera, apparently opting not to make any 
decision. (Peterson Depo., p. 53-54, In. 22-2: Archibald ~ 16). 
Defendant Peterson acknowledged that throughout this entire time period, he still held 
title to the property and that if the property had sold, he would have had to execute all 
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Defendant Peterson acknowledged that throughout this entire time period, he still held 
title to the property and that if the property had sold, he would have had to execute all 
documents transferring title to the property. (Peterson Depo., p. 57, In. 2-5). Further, 
Defendant Peterson admitted that the only evidence he relied upon in asserting that Plaintiff 
had dominion and control over the Peterson property was his assumption that Mr. Archibald 
was acting on behalf ofBuku, even though he never had any discussions with Mr. Archibald 
as to whom he understood he was representing. (Peterson Depo., p. 66, In. 4-11; p. 67, In. 12-
16). In his deposition, Mr. Magera noted that, although he asked Kipp Archibald to help sell 
the Peterson home when the Peterson property was under contract, he never asked Mr. 
Archibald to take any other action, he never had any kind of listing agreement with Mr. 
Archibald, and he never received any payment of any kind for the lease of any ofthe Peterson 
property. (Casperson Aff.,~4,Ex.C (Magera Depo., p. 30, In. 5-24; p. 48, In. 16-19)). 
Additionally, Mr. Magera testified that he never gave Mr. Archibald any instructions during 
2008 (after the Peterson Agreement terminated without closing), and that if Mr. Archibald had 
called him and asked if he could still show the house after the Peterson Agreement had 
terminated, that Mr. Magera directed him to call the Petersons. (Magera Depo., p. 37, In. 4-
11 ). 
Finally, Plaintiffnever benefitted monetarily or otherwise from the Peterson Property. 
As mentioned above, Defendant Peterson's property was farmed by Peterson's son Steve 
during the 2008 farm season. Plaintiff received no rent payments or any other form of 
payment from the lease of the Peterson property to Defendant Peterson's son. Defendant 
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Peterson acknowledged he could have rented out the home but did not want to because of 
damage from renters. Plaintiff did not receive any financial benefit from the residence located 
on the Peterson property. (Peterson Depo., p. 58-59, In. 22-5). Further, no offers were 
received during the time Mr. Archibald marketed the Property. (Archibald Aff. ~ 20). If an 
offer had been received and accepted, any proceeds would have gone to the Petersons. Buku 
did not exercise dominion or control over the Peterson Property. 
None of the above-described interactions between the parties in anyway indicated that 
there was a "new agreement" reached with regard to Plaintiff purchasing either Property, nor 
did any of those interactions indicate that Defendants were somehow entitled to retain the 
earnest money deposits which should have been returned pursuant to the terms of the Clark 
and Peterson Agreements. Plaintiff did not exercise "dominion and control" over either the 
Clark or Peterson properties. Even ifPlaintiffhad exercised "dominion and control" over the 
property, the Clark and Peterson Agreements expired without closing and pursuant to the 
terms of the Agreements, Plaintiffwas entitled to a refund of its earnest monies when the sales 
did not close. 
Any modifications or amendments to the Clark Agreement and Peterson Agreements 
had to be in writing to be valid. Such an amendment was never executed. Further, any 
agreement for the sale of real property not in writing violates the statute of frauds and is 
invalid. Thus, any alleged oral agreement to continue with the transaction after the Clark 
Agreement and Peterson Agreements expired has no bearing or effect on the terms of the 
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Clark Agreement and Peterson Agreement and could not have materially altered the terms of 
those contracts. Buku is entitled to the return of its earnest monies, plus interest. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff complied with all terms and conditions ofthe Clark and Peterson Agreements. 
Because the earnest monies deposited by Plaintiff for the purchase of the Clark and Peterson 
Properties was fully refundable until closing, and because such closing did not occur because 
a condition found during the due diligence period was not cured, Plaintiff is entitled to the 
return of the earnest monies. Defendants have no viable causes of action against Plaintiff 
because the written Agreements control the dispute, and, as such, they should be dismissed. 
~"'-./­I, \ 
DATED this tlo day of November, 2010. 
rfeXiine CasperFc;!;, Esq. 
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Deposition of: Raoel Clark April 13, 2010 
Page 22 Page 241 
1 MR. DUNN: Objection to the fonn of the 1 $25,000. 
'; 
2 question, and misstating as this document has no 2 Q. Did you understand based on the 
3 mention of the Clarks on it. 3 purchase and sale agreement that if the agreement 
4 Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: You can go ahead 4 for some reason did not close that you would have 
5 and answer. 5 to give back that 25,000? 
6 A. I don't know on this one. I mean, I 6 A. I think that's what this case is over. 
7 knew that Buku was -- I've gone to Mr. Magera on a 7 Q. Did you understand that? 
8 number of occasions and asked him ifhe would give 8 A. Yes. 
9 me some money, and he said that there was none. 9 Q. Mr. Clark, in paragraph 16 of your 
10 When we first signed the one with Jab, he said I'd 10 affidavit you state: The plaintiff exercised 
11 get -- after closing I would get a third payment on 11 dominion and control over the real properties 
12 it. But I never received any money. 12 contained in the written contract of the 
13 I had - I had gone to Texas. My wife 13 defendantslcounter-p lain tiffs. 
14 had a health problem. We had gone to Texas for 14 Can you explain to me how Buku 
15 her. And maybe I speculated, but I arranged to buy 15 exercised dominion and control over your property? 
16 us a home based on the fact that we were going to 16 A. I considered this case to be in kind 
17 receive some money. And I borrowed -- it's in 17 of a limbo thing. I frankly didn't know what to do 
18 records, I borrowed $150,000 to make down payment 18 with the thing. And Brad Foster called me and said 
19 on a home. And then I -- subsequently when I 19 what are we going to do with it. And whether --
20 couldn't get any funds from whomever, I borrowed ~O whoever ran the thing has to pay the water system 
~1 another to pay for the house. 21 on the taxes on the property. 
~2 And then in doing so I had to 22 Q. Let me go back. You said that Brad 
23 surrender some different funds I had. And then 23 Foster called you? 
24 they -- the people that gave me the money from that 24 A. And said that Jaramie had asked him to 
25 considered it as cash or -- anyway, I had to borrow 25 ask me. 
Page 23 Page 25 
1 more money to payoff the additional amount of 1 Q. To ask you what? 
2 money that increased my earnings for the year, 2 A. What to do with it. I said, this 
3 doubled it. I had to borrow money to pay that off. 3 property is in the process of being sold, and 
4 And, anyway, the whole thing has 4 therefore I don't feel that that's my decision. I 
5 caused me quite a bit of embarrassment and grief 5 mean, he's offered to buy the thing. It's in 
6 I approached Mr. Magera on a number of 6 limbo, and I'm going to leave it to him to make 
7 occasions asking him what we could do, but I never 7 that decision. 
8 did receive anything. We'll leave it at that. 8 Q. When did you say that Brad Foster 
I'l 9 Q. Did you expect Buku to go through with 9 contacted you? 
10 an agreement if the value of the property was not 10 A. About the time that -- about the time .; 
11 the same as when they entered into the contract? 11 that he called Mr. Magera. .j 
12 A. I don't know that I did. I knew that 12 Q. SO the spring of2008? ,j 
13 Buku wasn't going to pay me, so I left it at that. 13 A. I'm not sure when it was. But he came ri 14 Q. And you heard Mr. Magera's testimony 14 and asked me if it was all right for him to run the i.i 
15 where he indicated that he was at a meeting with at 15 property. 
!] 16 least the Petersons and counsel in which they were 16 Q. Was it shortly before the fanning 
17 advised of the risk of using the earnest money 17 season would have begun? .. 
18 prior to having the agreement closed? 18 A. I'm not sure of it. I'm not sure when ! 
19 A. Yes. But I went to Mr. Magera, and I 19 it was. It would have to be somewhere around 
20 said when can we do this. Can you advance me the ~O there. 
21 25,000. I'll put it down on this home, and it will 21 Q. Do you know whether it was past when 
22 save you that much money to pay interest. And he l22 the contract was supposed to close? 
23 wrote me a check. 23 A. No, I don't. 
~4 Q. And that was the 25,000 earnest money? 24 Q. Did you have any kind of written 
~5 A. I guess it was earnest money. It was 25 agreement with Mr. Foster to fann the land? 
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Page 26 Page 28 c 
\ 
1 A. No. 1 works for Buku? 
, 
2 Q. Did you receive any payment from 2 A. He indicated that he had -- I don't I:' 
3 Mr. Foster? 3 know whether Mr. Magera approached him for use of !j 
4 A. In the amount of the -- he paid. I 4 that property or whether it was the other way) 
5 think he paid for the water assessment. I think 5 around. But Brad indicated to me that it was okay 
6 that's correct. And my son was involved in this 6 with Mr. Magera ifhe rented that property. 
7 too. And also the taxes on that property. 7 Q. What specifically did Brad Foster tell 
8 Q. And had you negotiated an agreement 8 you in that conversation that you had with him? 
9 with Mr. Foster as to what he would pay for that? 9 A. It wasn't very much. He talked to me 
10 A. It was the going rate, whatever it 10 on the phone. 
11 was. 11 Q. Isn't it true he simply told you that 
12 Q. SO in addition to the water assessment 12 Jaramie had directed him to contact you with regard 
13 and the taxes he also paid you whatever the value 13 to whether or not he could rent that farmland? 
14 of the lease was? 14 MR. DUNN: Object to the form of the 
15 A. No. I think he paid the -- he just 15 question. 
16 paid the taxes and the water, and it came to about 16 THE WITNESS: Let me say this. Brad did 
17 the same. 17 call me and he said -- I don't know which one of 
18 Q. Oh, and it came to about the same as 18 the other approached the other. But when Brad 
19 if he had paid you for just farming the property? 19 spoke to me, he said that Mr. Magera -- it was all 
'; 20 A. Yes. 20 right with him if I let Brad farm the thing, that 
21 Q. SO you're not asserting that you 21 Mr. Magera had no care either way. i 
22 didn't get paid for the use of your land that year? 22 Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: And with regard to 
23 A. I didn't, but someone did. 23 the remainder of the property, which as I 
24 Q. You didn't get paid? 24 understand consists of the house and a little bit 
25 A. Well, he paid Brad Foster or Brad 25 of acreage, are you asserting that Buku had some 
Page 27 Page 29 j 
1 Foster paid it. But -- all right. We received 1 kind of control or dominion over the house? 
2 some kind of remittance, yes. All right. 2 A. No. ,1 :: 
3 Q. Because on your behalf he paid your 3 Q. And who did have control and dominion 
4 water assessment, correct? 4 over the house? 
5 A. Yes. 5 A. Me. 
I] 6 Q. And he paid the taxes on your behalf? 6 Q. And isn't it true that it was your son 
7 A. Yes. 7 who was living in that property? 
8 Q. And as far as you're aware, Brad 8 A. That's right. 
9 Foster didn't make any kind of payment to Buku? 9 Q. Are you aware of any way then in which 
10 A. I don't know that he did. 10 Buku controlled that property, your property --
11 Q. And if! understand your testimony 11 A. The house itself or the whole thing? 
12 correctly is that the value of the water assessment 12 Q. The whole thing. 
13 and the taxes equaled essentially what the going 13 A. I don't know what to make of it. When 
14 rate would have been to farm the property? 14 I read the name on that after I got studying it a 
15 A. Yes. It's not very much. 15 while, it was some kind of a shame. That's the way 
16 Q. SO you're not asserting that there are 16 I felt about it. 
17 damages that you incurred as a result of Brad 17 Q. The name on what? 
Ii 18 Foster leasing that property? 18 A. Buku. It sounded phony to me. That's 19 A. Correct. 19 all rm going to say. 
! 
20 Q. Now, in paragraph 17 it states that 20 Q. Okay. I understand that. But with 
Ii 21 Brad Foster, agent of Mager a, and one of the 21 regard to your allegation that Buku somehow 22 plaintiffs farmed the real property in the 2008 22 exercised dominion and control over your property, 
23 year. Did I read that correctly? 23 what are you asserting that they did? I 24 A. I think so. 24 A. The whole property? 
25 Q. Are you asserting that Brad Foster 25 Q. The whole plvpvlly. I 
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Page 30 Page 32 1 
i 
1 A. Well, maybe I assumed this, but I felt 1 Q. Well, you understand that we had cross i , , 
2 that where he'd made an offer to buy my property, 2 motions for summary judgment? 
3 that that was so. I was going to sell it to him to 3 A. Yes. 
4 become his. 4 Q. And do you understand that the court 
Ii 5 Q. But you received the benefit of the 5 ruled that the contract was not ambiguous? 
6 tax assessment that was paid by Mr. Foster, 6 A. Legal terms are ambiguous in any way 
" 
7 correct? 7 you look at it. I; 
8 A. Yes. 8 Q. But you do understand that there has : 
9 Q. And you received the benefit of the 9 been a ruling from the court on this case? 
10 water assessment payment? 10 A. Some ruling. I don't know what it 
11 A. That's correct. 11 was, but yes. 
12 Q. And you received the benefit of 12 Q. Let me go to these miscellaneous costs 
13 whatever leasing arrangement you had with your son. 13 and billings that you claim to have lost. What I) 
14 I don't know whether you required him to pay you or 14 lost revenues on farming practices are you 
15 not, correct? 15 claiming? ; 
16 A. That's okay. I understand that. 16 A. None. '1 " 
17 Q. SO how did Buku control that property 17 Q. What lost interest are you claiming? 
18 after the agreement did not close in December? 18 A. On the farm itself? Not the agreement 
19 A. Well, I was hoping that it would 19 to buy? 
I) 20 continue on. But as to whether -- I don't know who 20 Q. Yes. 
21 owned what. The property never left my ownership, 21 A. I don't know that I've lost anything. 
22 and it wouldn't until it was paid for. 22 Q. SO the lost interest that you're 
23 Q. Okay. And you agreed to allow 23 referring to in this paragraph is only associated 
24 Mr. Foster to farm that land, correct? 24 with the contract, correct? 
25 A. Sure. You know, if you let it go, it 25 A. With the farm. 
j 
Page 31 Page 33 
1 turns to weeds. Somebody had to make a call on it. 1 Q. Let me separate those out. Are you 
2 Q. And you agreed you were the person 2 claiming lost interest as a result ofBuku doing 
3 that did that? 3 something to control that farm after the contract 
4 A. I did. I mean, I was told by Brad 4 didn't close? 
5 that Mr. Magera asked him to call me and see if it 5 A. I'm not quite getting where you're 1 
6 was all right. 6 wanting me to go. 
7 Q. SO you're not alleging that Buku 7 Q. Well, you've indicated in your 
8 actually received any profits off of your property, 8 affidavit that you're claiming damages for lost 
9 correct? 9 interest, and all I'm trying to do is fmd out what 
10 A. I don't know that they did. I don't 10 lost interest is it you're claiming? 
11 see how they could. 11 A. This is the farm or the whole i 
12 Q. If you look at paragraph 21 of your 12 contract? 
IJ 
13 affidavit, it indicates that -- well, let me read 13 Q. Well, you're going to have to tell me. 
14 it to you. It says your affiant has been damaged 14 I don't know. It's your affidavit. 
15 monetarily in the remaining sum of the contract and 15 A. Well, based on -- based on my talking 
16 other miscellaneous costs and billings, including 16 with Mr. Magera, I asked him upfront, I said I need 
17 but not limited to lost revenues on farming 17 to get my wife out of this country. And we had a 
18 practices, lost interest, expenses of upkeep and 18 daughter that lives in Texas, and that's where we 
19 utilities, tax assessments, attorney fees and 19 went. And we studied a lot of the homes back there 
20 costs. 20 that we liked. It's a very modest little home, but 
21 Now, you understand that the court has 21 it cost a lot of money. And I borrowed some money 
22 already ruled on a portion of this litigation, 22 based on what I hoped Mr. Magera was going to do. 
23 correct? 23 He talked like he would to me. And after I had 
24 A. Would you explain that to me, please. 24 made the loan, I asked him for money, and he said 
25 What part? 25 Buku's broke. I paid some interest on a lot of 
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Page 46 Page 48 "! 
1 instruct the deponent how to answer. 1 I'm asking you is you said that you had a deal 
2 THE WITNESS: No. Say that again. 2 indicating that they were going to close on it, I 
3 Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: Are you aware of 3 think is what you said. What are you talking " 




5 meaning you and your wife, and Buku Properties that 5 A. Mr. Magera told me that -- I had it " ,j 
6 altered or changed this purchase and sale 6 down here somewhere. He called me and asked me on ", ~ 
7 agreement? 7 early December if we would take a payoff early. He ~ j 
8 A. No. 8 said he had a buyer for the house and it would be ~ 'iJ 
9 Q. You will agree with me that this 9 soon. We said yes. I checked with the title ~j J 
?1 
10 purchase and sale agreement did not close on 10 company. And he told me to go check with the title ~1 
~ 
11 December 21st and has never closed; correct? 11 company. And I went and checked with the title ~ 12 A. That's right. 12 company. They said they had it set up, but then ~ 13 Q. And you have stiII retained all of the 13 when the date come to do it, they said no. They W 
14 earnest money, correct? 14 wasn't - it had been canceled. J j 
15 A. That's right. 15 Q. Okay. Well, let's skip now forward to " '1 
~ 
16 Q. Now, if we take a look at your notes, 16 January 3rd of2008. At this point in time you ;1 
,j 
17 which was previously marked as Exhibit *-1, you 17 understand that Buku has not closed the property on 1 
18 state on January 3rd of2008 that Kipp Archibald 18 December 21st, correct? j ~ 
19 called to ask what you wanted to -- what we wanted 19 A. That's right. J 
~O to do with the house; is that correct? 20 Q. And you understand based on the letter ;1 
21 A. That's right. 21 that your attorney sent that you were insisting 
! 22 Q. Is that a correct statement of what 22 that the property be closed, otherwise you would 23 Mr. Archibald said? 23 institute legal action, correct? 24 A. That's right. 24 A. That's correct. 
25 Q. And your response to him was to direct 25 Q. And on January 3rd, your testimony is i 
Page 47 Page 49 I 
1 him to your attorney; is that correct? 1 that Mr. Archibald called you and asked you what ;] 
2 A. He asked me if! wanted to sell it and 2 you wanted to do with the house, correct? 
1 
3 put part of the payment on -- put the payment on -- 3 A. Yes, he did. i 
4 on part payment. I told him I sold the house and 4 Q. And at that time you were still the 
, 
5 farm together, so to call our attorney, Rob Dunn. 5 owner of that property, correct? 11 
6 I said -- and I also said that Mr. Magera was in 6 A. That's right. 'I )J 
7 charge of it. He was the one that still was 7 Q. And as the owner of the property, you 1 
8 holding the thing on the property. 8 would be the only one who would have authority to 1 
9 Q. Mr. Peterson, why wouldn't you have 9 decide whether or not to sell that property, 
'I , 
10 reflected that in your note that you prepared? 10 correct? 
11 A. I don't know. But that's what I told 11 MR. DUNN: Objection. Legal conclusion. 
12 him. 12 And leading again. 
13 Q. Now, tell me again what you claim you 13 THE WITNESS: I was the owner of the 
14 said about Mr. Magera? 14 property. But we were still figuring on selling 
15 A. I told him, I says, you have to see 15 it, because he said if it would -- the zoning was 
16 Mr. Magera. He's the one that wants to sell the 16 changed. And the zoning wasn't changed. And so I 
17 house, because I've already sold it to him. 17 told him to get ahold of Mr. Magera and Mr. Dunn, 
18 Q. Had you closed on that property? 18 because it wasn't up to me, because I had already 
19 A. No, I hadn't. But I had a thing that 19 had a thing that was supposed to be in place, and 
20 they were going to close on it. 20 it was -- still hadn't -- completely hadn't gone, 
21 Q. In January 3rd of2008 you had 21 because he had wanted to go to the 31 st of March. 
22 something that said they were going to close on it? 22 Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: But this was past 
~3 A. On January 3rd Kipp Archibald called 23 the 31 st of March even -- I'm sorry. You refused 
24 and asked what we wanted to do with the house. 24 to sign that document, correct, extending the 
25 Q. Let me stop you, Mr. Peterson. What 25 closing date? 
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A. I didn't sign it, no. 
Q. SO as it existed that date, there was 
no document extending the closing, correct? 
A. Only that he still wanted the 
property. 
Q. What document can you show me that he 
still wanted the property on that date? 
A. I haven't got a document. 
Q. And you haven't indicated any kind of 
conversation during that time frame that indicated 
that Mr. Magera still wanted the property, correct? 
A. Yes, I did. Because Brad Foster 
called me, and he said that Jaramie wanted him to 
operate the farm this year. 
Q. Let's back up. That happens in March, 
correct? 
A. You're talking about March here too, 
aren't you? 
Q. I'm talking about January. 
A. January. 
Q. Of2008. 
A. I don't recall anything about that 
other than the thing was still in limbo, because I 
knew -- I knew that he still wanted it if the 
zoning didn't get changed, and it didn't get 
Page 
changed. 
Q. How did you know he still wanted it? 
A. He told me that. 
Q. When? 
A. Well, he told me here, and he told me 
on that meeting, that meeting we went to. 
Q. Now, we've specifically been over your 
statement that you prepared for December 12th, and 
during that meeting you had already testified that 
he specifically said that they wouldn't pay if the 
zoning went to five-acre lots, correct? 
A. That's right. But it didn't go to 
five-acre lots. Is that correct? 
Q. And you didn't know that in December, 
did you? 
A. What? 
Q. You didn't know whether it had or had 
not in December of2008, correct? 
A. I didn't know that it had. 
Q. You didn't know that it hadn't either? 
A. No. So that's why we were waiting on 
this -- it wouldn't make any difference. 
Q. Mr. Peterson, you would agree with me 
that at the time you made these notes your memory 






















































A. It probably would. That's why I made 
these notes. 
Q. Prior to Mr. Archibald calling you on 
January 3rd, asking what you wanted to do with the 
house, had you had prior discussions with 
Mr. Archibald? 
A. None. He come out -- him and 
Mr. Magera come out before we moved, and they went 
through the house. He took him through the house, 
and they put it up for sale. 
Q. Were you there? 
A. I was there when they went through the 
house. I wasn't in any of their negotiations. I 
didn't know how much they were going to get or 
anything like that. 
Q. You're saying that you never signed 
the listing agreement with Mr. Archibald? 
A. Never. Never talked to him about it. 
Never signed nothing. 
Q. Did you approve the listing of the 
house with Mr. Archibald? 
A. No. 
Q. But you were there? 
A. I was there when he brought it out. 
And then there was no signing done there. He 
brought Mr. Archibald out, and they went through 
the house and looked it over. 
Q. How could Buku list a property that 
they didn't own? 
A. I don't know. But when he called me 
up, Jaramie said that he had the house up for sale, 
and he says would you sign it over, because he said 
I need to -- I need you to sign it. I said, yeah, 
sure, I would. 
Q. That you would essentially give Buku 
Properties the authority to market the house? 
A. No. I never give authority to do 
anything until he asked me on early in December. 
But this was before December that they come out the 
first time and put a sign out. 
Q. Did you ever tell Mr. Archibald to 
take that sign down? 
A. Never told him to take the sign down. 
Q. Did you ever tell him to remove the 
lock box? 
A. I never told him to remove the lock 
box. But he called me and in -- he called me -- he 
called me August 6th. He called me on his cell 
phone, asked about selling the house. I told him 
to talk with Jaramie and said we don't know what's 
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going on right now. We've turned everything over 
to our attorney, Rob Dunn. Kipp said Jaramie still 
wanted the farms, ours and Clarks, and the bank had 
cut down on the loaning percentages. 
Q. Mr. Peterson, let me take you back to 
your January 3rd conversation that you had with 
Mr. Archibald. When he asked you what you wanted 
to do with the house and you told him to go talk to 
your attorney, Mr. Dunn, do you have any knowledge 
of whether Mr. Archibald had a conversation with 
your attorney? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. SO you have no idea what Mr. Archibald 
did after that? 
A. No. 
Q. But you do know that he continued to 
have a sign in front of the house? 
yes. 
A. He had a sign in front of the house, 
Q. And he had a lock box on it? 
A. He had a lock box on it. 
Q. And was he giving you notification of 
any showings that took place? 
A. No. He wasn't giving me any showings. 
But I went out there and -- on June 27th, 2008, I 
Page 55 
went out there, found a cell phone in the master 
bedroom of the house. And according to a neighbor, 
Earl Coles, the house was stilI being shown. The 
blinds in the front rooms were open, which I have 
kept closed. The for-sale sign was stilI up. 
Q. SO you have no idea when that cell 
phone was left, correct? 
A. No. 
Q. You have no idea when the blinds were 
allegedly moved? 
A. No. 
Q. Mr. Peterson, ifMr. Archibald had an 
agreement with Buku Properties to sell the house, 
why would he call you on January 3rd of2008 and 
ask you what you wanted to do with the house --
MR. DUNN: Objection, speculation. 
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: -- to the extent 
that you can testify. 
MR. DUNN: Objection, speCUlation. How is 
he supposed to know --
THE WITNESS: I don't know but I'll tell 
you what I thought. I thought Mr. Magera was 
standing right there beside him wanting him to 
call. 





















































evidence of that, correct? 
A. No. No, I don't. 
Q. Did you ever ask Mr. Archibald who he 
was taking his directions from for purposes of 
selling the house? 
A. No. 
Q. And you never asked him to remove the 
lock box, correct? 
A. No. 
MR. DUNN: Objection. Asked and answered. 
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: And you never asked 
him to remove the sale sign? 
MR. DUNN: Objection. Asked and answered. 
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: Correct? 
A. No. I never asked him to remove it. 
Q. And if Mr. Archibald had sold that 
property, who would you have expected to get the 
proceeds? 
A. Well, if the property was -- if the 
farm and that would have sold, I would have 
expected him to get the proceeds. But the farm 
wasn't sold, so the house wouldn't have been sold. 
To me, I wouldn't -- I wouldn't have got any 
proceeds because I wouldn't -- I didn't have it up 
for sale. Jaramie is the one that put it up for 
sale. 
Q. Who would have had to sign the 
documents in order to transfer title to that 
property? 
Page 57 
A. I would have. But ifhe wasn't going 
to buy the farm, it wouldn't have been sold. I 
didn't have anything to do with seIling the 
property -- selling the house. I had nothing to do 
with that. Never talked to Mr. Archibald. He 
called me twice. That's the only times that I 
talked to him. 
Q. SO without any understanding as to why 
Mr. Archibald was trying to sell it, you just 
continued to let the sign stay there and the lock 
box stay on it? 
A. I thought that he was trying to sell 
it for Mr. Magera. 
Q. But you never had a conversation with 
him about that? 
A. No. No. 
Q. Now, during this time frame that the 
property, you say, had the sign out front, you were 
taking care of the property, correct? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And, in fact, you leased the fannland 
',,' .... :., ...... """ ... ' 
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to your son for pasture, correct? Is that a yes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You indicate that in March, you don't 
have a date, that Brad Foster called you; is that 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And specifically tell me what you can 
recall Mr. Foster told you. 
A. Mr. Foster said that laramie called 
him and wanted him to rent the farm. He asked me 
if it was in pasture. I said yes, but laramie 
hasn't bought the place yet. He said oh, he 
hasn't. He said I understand he's going to. I 
said, well, when he buys it, he can do what he 
wants, but ifhe don't buy it, why, I'm going to 
let Steve run it. 
Q. And that's what you did, correct? 
A. That's what I did. 
Q. SO any profits that were made with 
regard to that farmland came to you, correct? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Why didn't you take actions to lease 
the house out if you were no longer living there? 
A. Because I didn't want to lease it out. 
It was in good shape, and I didn't want people to 
Page 59 
1 move in. If he didn't take it and we got it back, 
2 why, then I would sell it. 
3 Q. SO you were concerned that any renters 
4 would damage the property? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. You indicated in your prior testimony 
7 on August 6 of2008 that Kipp Archibald again 
8 called you and asked you about selling the house, 
9 correct? 
10 A. That's right. 
11 Q. And, again, you referred him to 
1 2 laramie and Mr. Dunn, correct? 
13 A. That's right. 
1 4 Q. And, again, did you have an 
1 5 understanding as to why Mr. Archibald would be 
1 6 calling you as to what you wanted done with the 
1 7 house? 
18 A. He called me, and I told him 
19 everything was turned over to our attorney, Robin 
20 Dunn. And he said laramie still wanted the farm, 
2 1 along with the Clarks', but the bank had cut down 
22 on the loaning percentage. 
23 Q. Isn't it true that later in 2008 that 
2 4 there were proposals going back and forth between 




















































with regard to the sale ofthe property? 
MR. DUNN: Objection. Form of the 
question. 
Page 60 
THE WITNESS: There was a letter written to 
us, I guess, yes. 
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: And isn't it true 
that that contained different terms than the 
original terms in the purchase and sale agreement? 
MR. DUNN: Objection. Leading. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: What did you 
understand was the difference between the terms 
that were proposed in the letters as opposed to the 
terms in the original purchase and sale agreement? 
A. They wanted to make payments on it. 
Q. And was there ever any contract signed 
as a result of those negotiations? 
A. Not with me. 
(Exhibit *-J marked.) 
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: I'll hand you what 
was previously marked as Exhibit *-l. Do you 
recognize that document? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you identify it for me? 
A. Well, it's a letter for the 
defendants. 
Page 61 
Q. If you look to the right-hand side of 
this document, it says affidavit of Jerry and Betty 
Peterson in support of defendants' position re: 
summary judgment; is that correct? 
A. Yes, that's right. 
Q. And if you'll look to the back page of 
this document -- or the second to last page, is 
that your signature? 
A. That's my signature. 
Q. And is that also your wife's 
signature? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And you understand that this document 
I 
I 
was your sworn testimony that was submitted to the I' 
court in this matter? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you testified, you asserted that 
this was true and correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you'll go to paragraph 12 of your 
affidavit. The first portion of the first sentence 
of paragraph 12 states: The purpose ofthe I 
purchase by the buyers was never communicated to 
the undersigned affiants. 
~ ....... ) , . '. ., ' .. " 
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agent ofBuku was on your property after this 
purchase and sale agreement failed to close? 
A. Well, only Archibald. 
Q. And you never had any discussion with 
Archibald as to who he understood he was 
representing? 
A. Well, I just assumed he was 
representing him because he brought him out to our 
place and went through the house. And they was 
taking notes down and size of the rooms and what 
was done down in the basement and everything else. 
Q. And isn't it true that that all 
happened prior to the contract being closed, 
correct? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And after that happened on January 
3rd, Mr. Archibald specifically called you and said 
what do you want me to do with the property? 
A. Yes. He said -- and I told him he had 
to talk to Magera and to Rob Dunn. 
Q. And you don't have any knowledge as to 
whether he did any of those things? 
A. No. I talked to him twice is all I 
ever talked to him. 
Q. Isn't it true that you specifically 
Page 67 
1 gave your son the right to use the pastureland? 
2 A. That's right. 
3 Q. SO you're not asserting that Buku --
4 A. No. 
5 Q. -- had any kind of dominion or 
6 control--
7 A. No. 
B Q. -- over the pasture land -- let me 
9 finish. You're not asserting that Buku had any 
1 0 kind of control over the pastureland, correct? 
11 A. That's right. 










































phone that you found in there, the blinds being in 
a different position, and then this statement that 
you have from your neighbor that it was shown; is 
that correct? 
A. I've never seen anybody in there 
myself, no. 
Q. And it was true during this time that 
you and your wife were still maintaining and caring 
for the property, correct? 
A. That's right. 
Q. You specifically testified that you 
told Brad Foster that until Buku actually paid you 
the money they weren't going to get to use that 
pastureland, correct? 
A. Yeah. And Brad said he didn't want to 
get in -- I said Magera hadn't bought it yet. When 
he bought it, he could do whatever he wanted with 
it, but until then Steve would run it. And he 
says, well, I don't want to get involved in it 
then. 
Q. Why didn't you tell Mr. Archibald the 
same sort of thing? 
A. Well, I didn't know Mr. Archibald was 
selling the ground. 
Q. But you knew he was trying to sell the 
house? 
A. That's a different property. It was 
different. 
Page 69 
Q. What do you mean it was different? 
A. Selling the house, but he wasn't 
selling the property. 
Q. But the house was still to be sold in 
the original purchase --
A. That's right. 
Q. -- contract, correct? 
A. And he asked me, he says is it all 
I 
13 controlling the house was your assumption that 
14 Mr. Archibald was acting on behalf of Buku, 
15 correct? 










right if we sell this. They thought they had a 
buyer. And if they sold it, the house would get 
out of -- the house would be part payment on the 
properties. 
Q. And that was all prior to the closing 
date of the purchase and sale agreement? 
I: 
1 7 Q. And any profits that were made with 
1 B regard to the pasture land came to you, correct? 
19 A. That's right. 
20 Q. And you're not aware of any payments 
2l that Buku received as a result of having any kind 
2 2 of control or dominion over that property? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. And you never observed anyone actually 
2 5 going through the property other than the cell 
A. That's right. 
Q. If you would look to page 27 -- or 
paragraph 27 of your affidavit, this paragraph 
specifically states: Your affiants have been 
damaged monetarily in the remaining sum of the 
contract and other miscellaneous costs and 
24 billings, comma, including but not limited to, 
25 comma, lost revenues on farming practices, comma, 
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Page 30 Page 32 ~ 
.j 
1 A. No. 1 money for the Peterson property? 
2 Q. Did you ever have a contract with a 2 A. No. I' 
3 Realtor on the Clark property? 3 Q. Did you indicate to Mr. Foster that 
4 A. No. 4 the Peterson property may be available for farming? 
5 Q. What happened to the property of 5 A. No. 
6 Petersons during the 2008 year? 6 Q. Did you or your attorney ever meet 
7 A. I don't know. 7 with the Petersons in March of2008 concerning the 
8 Q. Did you ever have the property listed 8 contract? 
9 with a Realtor? 9 A. No. 
10 A. No. 10 Q. Did you or your attorneys ever meet 
11 Q. Did you ever have a contract with a 11 with the Clarks concerning your contract in March 
12 Realtor to sell the Peterson property? 12 of2008? 
13 A. No. 13 A. No. 
14 Q. Has ERA via Kipp Archibald or any 14 Q. Did you ever make any inquiries of 
15 other Realtor ever represented you in this 15 anyone whether the contract was to be -- contracts 
16 particular transaction? 16 that were to be closed in December of2007 were 
17 A. I don't know if they represented me, 17 still viable after December of2007? 
18 but when we put the property under contract, I 18 A. Repeat that question again. 
19 asked Kipp to try to sell the house. 19 Q. Did you believe the contracts were 
20 Q. And what house are we referring to? 20 viable after the closing date of2007? 
21 A. The Petersons' house. During the due 21 A. Did I believe our contracts that were 
22 diligence period I asked him to sell the house. So ~2 supposed to close in December were viable after 
23 maybe we could sell it and do a one-time close when 23 that? 
24 we close with the Petersons. 24 Q. Yes. 
25 Q. Did you ever ask Kipp Archibald to try 25 A. No. 
Page 31 Page 33 
1 to sell any of the Clark property? 1 Q. Did you believe the contracts had 
2 A. No. 2 completely been terminated as of the closing date 
3 Q. Did any farmers ever approach you 3 in December of2007? 
4 about farming the Clark property? 4 A. Those particular contracts, yes. 
5 A. Yes. 5 Q. Are there any other contracts 
6 Q. And who was that? 6 outstanding with the Clarks or Peterson properties? 
7 A. Brad Foster. 7 A. No. 
S Q. And what information, if any, did you 8 Q. Were there any attempts to revive the 
9 give to Mr. Foster? 9 contracts of2007 in 2008 with the Clarks or 
10 A. Brad Foster took me to lunch, asked me 10 Petersons? 
11 ifhe could farm another piece of ground we have in 11 MS. CASPERSON: rm sorry. Did you say 
12 Hailey Creek. And he said -- he asked me too if -- 12 revive or revise? 
13 I heard you bought Raoel Clark's piece, could we 13 MR. DUNN: Revive. Come back to life. 
14 farm that. And I said no, we didn't buy it. The 14 TIlE WITNESS: I don't know if we ever tried 
15 deal fell through, I said, but here's Raoel Clark's 15 to revive the existing contracts. I can't remember 
16 number, if you want to call him you can ask him to 16 for sure. I think we made them another offer, 
17 farm it. 17 another contract. 
18 Q. Did you receive any -- you meaning 18 Q. BY MR. DUNN: And are there any 
19 Buku Properties or any entity that you have an 19 documents that reference that offer? 
20 interest therein, receive any money from Brad 20 A. If there are, they're in the -- all 
21 Foster? ~1 your paperwork. I think we sent a letter and you 
22 A. For the Clark property? 22 denied it, demanded us to close. I can't remember 
~3 Q. Correct. 23 for sure. 
24 A. No. 24 Q. And if you had any offers to revive or 
25 Q. Did you receive from Brad Foster any 25 revise the vVUU<1vl:>, where would we fmd those 
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1 documents? 
2 MS. CASPERSON: Objection. It misstates 
3 his prior testimony. 
4 Q. BY MR. DUNN: You can answer. 
S A. In your paperwork. 
6 Q. Do you have any copies of documents 
7 that would indicate your attempts to revive or 
8 revise the contracts of2007 with the Clarks and 
9 Petersons? 
10 MS. CASPERSON: I'm going to object to the 
11 extent that misstates his prior testimony again. 
12 THE WITNESS: I'm sure you guys have 
13 everything. 
14 Q. BY MR. DUNN: The question is do you 
15 have any documents left in your files on the 
1 6 Petersons or the Clarks? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. What, ifany, documents exist 
19 concerning this transaction? 
20 MS. CASPERSON: I'm going to object to the 
2 1 extent it's vague and ambiguous. 
22 Q. BY MR. DUNN: We'll make it more 
23 specific. 
2 4 There were two contracts presented by 




























Q. There were two contracts for Clarks 
and Petersons with Buku Properties that were 
actually signed, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Were there any documents or letters 




Q. And how many, if you know? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. I'm just trying to find out what's out 
there. You don't know? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did you ever see a copy of the closing 
of Peter sons' home in Idaho Falls? 
A. No. 
Q. Were you ever made aware of any 
documents on their closing of property in Idaho 
Falls? 
A. No. 
Q. The earnest money that was provided to 
the Clarks, how was it paid to them? 
A. In a check. 
Page 36 
1 Q. Through where? A title company? To 
2 them directly? To what location, if you know? 
3 A. I don't know for sure. IfI remember 
4 right, I just wrote it to Raoel Clark, the name, I 
5 think. 
6 Q. And that was drawn on the Buku banking 
7 account? 
8 A. I'm pretty sure. 
9 Q. The $327,000, how did that money come 
10 into the possession of the Petersons, if you know? 
11 A. In the form of a check. 
12 Q. And was that from the Buku bank 
13 account that you wrote to them? 
14 A. If I remember right, yes. 
15 Q. Was it made -- well, I guess the 
16 better question I'm trying to ask is did the 
17 327,000 ever get deposited with a title company, or 
18 was it made directly to my clients? 
19 A. It was made directly to them. 
20 Q. And whatever they did with the money, 
21 you knew that it was going to a house, but you 
22 didn't have any further context; is that a fair 
23 statement? 
2 4 A. Correct. ! 
25 Q. What, if any, instructions did you 


























give to Kipp Archibald in the year 2008? 
MS. CASPERSON: Objection. That misstates 
his prior testimony. Lacks foundation. 
Q. BY MR. DUNN: Go ahead. 
A. None. He might have called me and 
asked me can I still show the house. I said call 
Jerry. I don't know. I think he had somebody that 
wanted to look at the house. I said call Jerry. I 
don't know. Our deal was done. I can't remember 
what date it was, if it was 2007 or 2008. It had 
to be 2008 because our deal was over. 
Q. In your affidavit for summary judgment 
you relied upon various newspaper clippings. Where 
did you obtain those newspaper articles? 
A. From the newspaper. From the 
Jefferson Star. I don't know what you're asking. 
Q. That's pretty much it, where you got 
them. You also relied on various statements from 
your banker that you indicated. Were those 
statements that he or she made to you? I assume it 
was a he, but I don't know that you didn't speak to 
more than one person. 
A. Yes. 
Q. In your affidavit you referred to 
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that you heard from them? 
Page 38/ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if you know, who was the county 
planning and zoning coordinator during 2007/2008? 
A. I don't know if DaNiel Jose was still 
here or if it was Naysha Foster. I can't remember 
when DaNiel left. 
Q. Did you ever deal with Naysha Foster 
at any point in time on these two particular 
contracts? 
A. I can't remember. 
Q. Now, you've dealt with planning and 
zoning on a number of occasions with many of your 
other businesses; is that a fair statement? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Are you familiar with their policies 
and procedures in a general sense? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you've made applications for plats 
and subdivisions through other entities, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that's with the county? I should 
be more specific. 
A. Yes. 
Q. You've obtained building permits from 
Page 39 
the county on occasion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And who do you work with on building 
permits currently with the county? 
A. The girls in the office and Jim Lynch, 
building official. 
Q. I don't have a real good copy of the 
Clark -- you probably have a better copy of the 
Clark purchase and sale agreement. But I'll hand 
you, and we'll mark it in a second here, Deposition 
Exhibit *-A. Does this appear to be the purchase 
and sale agreement that was signed by the Clarks? 
A. Yes. 
(Exhibit *-A marked.) 
Q. BY MR. DUNN: When was the agreement 
with the Clarks which has been marked Deposition 
Exhibit *-A signed? Date? 
A. It looks like August 30th, 2007. 
(Exhibit *-B marked.) 
Q. BY MR. DUNN: Handing you what's been 
marked as Deposition Exhibit *-B. Do you recognize 
that particular document? It's not a very good 
copy. Yours is probably better. 
A. Yes. 





















































A. It's a purchase and sale agreement for 
Jerry Peterson. 
Q. What date is it signed? 
A. August 30th, 2007. 
Q. And you signed on behalf ofBuku 
Properties; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And likewise with Deposition 
Exhibit *-A you signed on behalf of Buku 
Properties? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And who prepared Deposition Exhibit 
*-A and Deposition Exhibit *-B? 
A. My attorney. 
Q. And who was that? 
A. Jim Archibald. 
(Exhibit *-C marked.) 
Q. BY MR. DUNN: Handing you what's been 
marked as Deposition Exhibit *-c. What is that? 
A. The letter we sent to Jerry Peterson 
and Raoel Clark. 
Q. When you say we, who is that? 
A. Buku. 
Q. And who drafted that letter? 
A. Jim Archibald. 
Page 41 i 
Q. And you signed that letter; is that 
correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And what was the intent of that 
letter? 
MS. CASPERSON: I'm going to object to the 
extent it calls for a legal conclusion. 
Q. BY MR. DUNN: You may answer. 
A. What was the intent of this letter. 
The intent was -- after the contracts were void in 
December, it looks like we're asking them to 
continue -- to do another deal, to try to make it 
work with the banker and try to get the financing. 
Q. Were these ever signed by anyone other 
than yourself? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Deposition Exhibit *-C, is it signed 
by anyone other than yourself? 
A. No. 
Q. When you spoke with the Clarks and the 
Petersons, did you always refer to yourself as the 
manager for Buku Properties? 
A. I don't understand the question. 
Q. When you had conversations with 
Clarks, did you refer to yourself as the manager of 
..... .. -.' .. , .... ) .. , ,', -.. 
I 
: 
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Q. Do you recall that they were 
specifically advised that they would have to pay 
back the earnest money if the deal did not go 
through? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who advised them of that? 
A. Robin Dunn. 
Q. You were asked some questions about 
the zoning that took place in Jefferson County and 
your understanding of the zone changes that 
eventually took place. Were the Petersons or 
Clarks involved in any of the meetings that the 
county had to discuss the zone changes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Tell me what meetings they were 
specifically involved in. 
A. The county announced however they did 
it that they were thinking about that proposed 
countywide zone change. So I called Raoel Clark 
and Jerry both and said, hey, this is what the 
county is thinking about. If this happens, the 
deal is off. We can't buy R-5 ground for R-l 
prices. We better go to the meeting. So we went 
to a meeting. They came with me or I met them 
there at the county building. I don't know if it 
46/ 
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was in October or November of 2007. 
Q. When you say they, who are you 
referring to? 
A. Raoel Clark and Jerry Peterson carne to 
the meeting. 
Q. Do you recall what was specifically 
discussed at that meeting? 
A. Yeah. It was basically a public 
hearing. And every farmer, every landowner, every 
developer -- not every. Many in the county stood 
up and told the county what a dumb idea they 
thought it was, how bad it would affect the 
property values. 
Q. You indicated in your testimony that 
R-l property is not worth the same as R-5 property. 
Can you explain that? 
A. At the time in the summer of2007, R-l 
property was worth about anywhere between 9- and 
10,000 an acre. R-5 ground is not worth anything. 
It's farm ground. It's worth 1,500, 2 grand an 
acre, maybe 2,500. We have an R-5 5-acre lot 
subdivision and they're worthless. Nobody wants 
them. If they do want them, they have horses and 
they aren't willing to pay what it's worth. You 




















































ground and subdivide it into five-acre lots. 
Q. You were asked some questions about a 
real estate agent by the name of Kipp Archibald. 
What is your understanding as to who can enter into 
an agreement to have a real estate agent sell their 
property? 
MR. DUNN: Objection. Legal conclusion. 
Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: You can go ahead 
and answer. 
A. My understanding of who can enter into 
-- the landowner, the property owner, the 
homeowner. 
Q. And at any time was Buku ever the 
owner of the Peterson or the Clark property? 
A. No. 
Q. And as far as you were aware did Buku 
ever enter into any kind of listing agreement with 
Mr. Archibald? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you have discussions with 
Mr. Peterson about possibly trying to sell their 
home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What were those discussions? 
A. The discussions were if we could 
Page 49 
sell-- if Buku could sell -- Buku or Jerry could 
sell -- if we could sell his house during the due 
diligence period, that there was -- if there was 
some way we could do a one-time close when we 
closed on his property. 
Q. You previously testified that you had 
informed both Clarks and the Petersons that Buku's 
intention was to develop their land into one-acre 
lots. Can you tell us what those discussions were 
or how you put them on notice that that's what 
Buku's plan was? 
A. I don't remember the specific 
discussion. We talked about it a lot of times. 
Raoel and Jerry, they knew exactly what we were 
going to do with the property. I think in Raoel's 
contract we even -- we went to the extent of -- I 
think we were going to name a park after his 
brother. 
I have the utmost respect for Raoel 
Clark, and so it was very important to him and to 
me that we develop his ground in a respectful 
manner. So I put Raoel and Jerry in my truck, and 
we drove around and looked at some other 
developments that we'd done so that I could assure 
them we'd do a good job. They full well knew that 
TandTReport@ida.net T&T Reporting 





DEPOSITION OF JARAMIE MAGERA - o4/~3/20~O 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
~~~------------------------- SS. 
COUNTY OF 
I, Jaramie Magera, say that I am the witness 
referred to in the foregoing deposition taken April 
13, 2010, consisting of pages numbered 1 to 54i that I 
have read· the said deposition and know the contents 
thereof; that the same are true to my knowledge, or 
with corrections, if any, as noted. 
Line Should Read Reason 
7 2 331 North 4425 East Incorrect address 
Subscribed and sworn to b Iore me this l~~ 
day of MArY 2010, at 'i2-le::.'O'f I Idaho. 
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISBNo. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO. P.L.LC. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls! ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2010 NOV 16 PH 5: 02 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH ruDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband. and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-941 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 - PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC, by and through its counsel of record, Charles A. 
Homer and DeAnne Casperson, of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., move the 
Court pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for Summary Judgment. 
This Motion is based upon the Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson, Affidavit of Brad Foster, 
Affidavit of Kipp Archibald and affidavits previously submitted and of record and the 
Motion is also supported by the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Second Motion for 
Summary JUdgment, filed simultaneous with this Motion. 
DATED this \Lt~ of November, 2010 . 
. \ (;\1 . , 'j 1Cx f (I ~_,. ~, . ~'v"----~ ________ 
IJeAnn'e Casperso'n: E~q. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
2 - PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY mDGMENT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1~ 
I hereby certify that on this ! ~ day of November, 2010, I served a copy of the 
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, 
by mailing or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Robin D. Dunn 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
( 0First Class Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( j1iacsimile 
( ) Overnight Mail 
G:IWPDATAICAHlI49181PIdgsICopy of Summary Judgment, MOT.wpd:bel 
3 - PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Charles A. Homer. Esq. (1SB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
2010 NDV 16 PM 5: 02 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
, r' f' r ", "l, ", r, 'U ~l T'~ 10' H 0 ,L o-h .:lVI~ 'vU f'i i r,! H 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANUUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RADEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES. LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-94I 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRAD FOSTER IN 
S'VPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
BRAD FOSTER, being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am over 18 years of age, have personal knowledge of the following, except to the 
extent a statement is made on information or belief, and make this Affidavit based on 
my own personal knowledge. 
2. I am a general partner of Foster Land & Cattle Co. ("Foster Land & Cattle"), an Idaho 
general partnership. 
3. In late 2007 or early 2008, Jaramie Magera and I discussed the possibility of Foster 
Land & Cattle renting a piece of property known as Hailey Creek for the 2008 
farming season. I understand the property is owned by a business associated with Mr. 
Magera and located near what is now South Fork Elementary School in Rigby, Idaho. 
4. During this meeting, Mr. Magera and I also discussed two other properties that Mr. 
Magera believed Foster Land & Cattle might be interested in farming. One property 
was Raoel Clark's farm. The other property was Jerry Peterson's farm. Mr. Magera 
told me to contact the Clarks and the Petersons if Foster Land & Cattle was interested 
in running either of those properties. I did not know the status of who actually owned 
the properties. 
5. In early 2008, I contacted Jerry Peterson by telephone and inquired as to whether he 
would be interested in allowing Foster Land & Cattle to run the property. He 
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informed me that Jaramie Magera was supposed to purchase it, but his son was going 
to run the farm that year. 
6. About the same time, I also contacted Raoel Clark and asked whether he would be 
interested in allowing Foster Land & Cattle to run the Clark property. Mr. Clark told 
me Jaramie Magera was supposed to purchase it, but there were some problems. He 
agreed that Foster Land & Cattle could run the farm to maintain it. 
7. As a result of this agreement, Foster Land & Cattle ran the Clark property that year. 
8. When it came time for payment, I was unsure who to pay. I talked to J aramie Magera 
and he said to pay Raoel Clark. When I talked to Raoel Clark, he said Jaramie 
Magera owned the land. 
9. After a few months of trying to figure out who to pay, I eventually paid Raoel Clark 
on behalf of Foster Land & Cattle. It is my understanding that Mike Clark has the 
receipts of Foster Land & Cattle's payments for taxes and water assessments. 
10. Foster Land & Cattle never had a written lease with the Clarks for the 2008 lease of 
the property. Rather, the entire agreement was an oral agreement to run the farm. We 
have continued with this arrangement for 2009 and 2010. 
11. At no point did Foster Land & Cattle make payments to anyone other than Raoel 
Clark for or related to Foster Land & Cattle's farming of the Clark Property. 
12. Foster Land & Cattle is not connected with or associated with Jaramie Magera or any 
entity for whom he might work in any way. 
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13. At no point have I or Foster Land & Cattle acted as an agent for Jaramie Magera or 
any entity for whom he might work. 
Dated this -'- day of October, 2010. ~
Brad Foster 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 0 day of October, 2010. 
~ ~"fLL 
Nota PublIc for Idaho 
Residing at: gtl>1I\l--v,lt1 c.u~1~ 
My commission expires: (;l. - I - ~if 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~-
I hereby certify that on this h.t day of November, 2010, I served a copy of the 
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, 
by mailing or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Robin D. Dunn 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRAD FOSTER IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
( ~irst Class Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
/ 
( v) Facsimile 
( ) Overnight Mail 
- -v 
DeAnne Casperson, E q. 
G:IWPDAT AICAH\14918\PldgsISummary ludgment2d.Foster.AFF.wpd:bel 
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISE No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
ZOIC NOV 16 PM 5: 02 
1000 RivelWalk Drive5 Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsim.ile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF· THE 
STATE OF IDAlIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-941 
AFFIDAVIT OF KIPP ARCHIBALD 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss 
County of Jefferson ) 
Kipp Archibald, being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am over 18 years of age and I make this Affidavit based on my own personal 
knowledge. I understand that in making this Affidavit, I am providing sworn 
testimony under oath, which may be provided to the Court in this case and under 
penalty of perjury. 
2. I reside in Jefferson County, Idaho. 
3. I am a real estate agent for ERA Archibald Real Estate located in Rigby, Idaho. 
4. In the fall of2007, I was approached by Jaramie Magera to help procure a buyer for 
Jerry and Betty Peterson's home. 
5. In approximately late September/early October of2007, Mr. Magera, Mr. Peterson, 
and I met at Jerry Peterson's home located in Jefferson County to discuss the logistics 
of marketing the home. Mr. Magera explained that Mr. Peterson and BukuProperties, 
LLC ("Buku") had entered into a purchase and sale agreement in which Buku was 
going to purchase the Peterson's property for the purpose of creating a new 
development. Both Mr. Magera and Mr. Peterson explained that the plan was for the 
Peterson home to be sold simultaneous with the remainder of the property, but that 
B uku was going to purchase the acreage (the "Development Property") and home, and 
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hopefully a third-party buyer could be found to purchase the home and a small amount 
of property surrounding the home (the "Home Site Property"). 
6. At the meeting Mr. Peterson insisted that the sale of the Home Site Property could 
only occur if the sale of the remainder of the property to Buku occurred simultaneous 
with the sale of the Home Site Property because he did not want to incur additional 
taxes or fees. 
7. Additionally, at the meeting, Mr. Peterson gave me authorization to put a lock box on 
the house, to find a buyer, and provided me a key to the house. As a real estate agent, 
I could not list a house for sale without the approval ofthe actual owner. I understood 
that Mr. Peterson gave me authorization to place the house on the market. I would not 
have listed it without his approval since he owned the house. 
8. I listed the Home Site Property on the Multiple Listing Service ("MLS") website on 
October 9, 2007. A true and correct copy of the MLS records for the Home Site 
Property are attached hereto as Exhibit A. I placed a "for sale" sign on the Home Site 
Property in order to market it as we had agreed. 
9. In early December 2007, Mr. Magera informed me that there were problems with the 
zoning of the Development Property, that the sale of the Development Property was 
not going to close, and that the contract between the parties was going to expire. 
10. After receiving this information, and knowing the direction I had been given that the 
Home Site Property had to be sold simultaneous with the Development Property, I 
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took the Home Site Property off of the market and removed the Home Site Property's 
listing from the MLS service on December 7, 2007. This is reflected in the MLS 
records attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
11. I telephoned Mr. Peterson shortly after Christmas 2007 to discuss with him what he 
wished to do with the Home Site Property. I specifically asked ifhe wanted me to 
continue marketing the property. 
12. Mr. Peterson responded that as far as he was concerned Buku had to purchase the 
Property. Mr. Peterson told me to either speak with his attorney, Robin Dunn, about 
the matter, or discuss it with Mr. Margera. 
13. I never contacted Robin Dunn about this matter because I did not think it was 
appropriate for me to do so. I did not contact Mr. Margera because he already told me 
that the purchase agreement has expired. I simply left the Home Site Property off the 
market because Mr. Peterson had not given me any authority to market the Home Site 
Property any further. 
14. Even though I took the Home Site Property off the market, I did not remove the "for 
sale" sign and the realtor's key box because I anticipated the zoning issues may get 
resolved and the parties may enter into a new purchase and sale agreement. The 
Petersons never asked me to remove the "for sale" sign or the realtor's key box. 
15. According to my records, I put the Home Site Property back on the market in April 
2008. I put the Home Site Property back on the market because I understood Buku 
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and the Peterson's were possibly working on a new purchase and sale agreement for 
the Home Site Property and Development Property. 
16. After it became apparent that the parties did not intend to enter into a new purchase 
and sale agreement, I spoke with Mr. Peterson in early August 2008 to ask him if he 
wanted me to continue marketing the home. Mr. Peterson informed me that he 
believed Buku was obligated to purchase the Property and that I should speak with his 
attorney, Robin Dunn, or Mr. Margera. 
17. I did not speak with Robin Dunn after this conversation with Mr. Peterson. Again, 
I did not think it was appropriate for me to contact Mr. Dunn. Rather, I took the 
Home Site Property off the market. 
18. I took the "for sale" sign down some time later in August of 2008. 
19. I inadvertently forgot to remove the realtor's key box from the front door of the home 
and did not remove the realtor's key box until December 16, 2009. The Peterson's 
never informed me the lock box was still there or asked that I remove it. 
20. During the entire time I marketed the Home Site Property for sale, there were no 
offers to purchase the Property. To the best of my knowledge, the Petersons had full 
access and control of the Home Site Property. I and my agency did nothing to restrict 
their use, possession, or control over the house. 
21. During the entire time the Home Site Property was listed for sale, I am not aware of 
any action taken by Mr. Magera or Buku to control or possess the Property. I never 
5 AFFIDA VIT OF KIPP ARCHIBALD IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
observed Mr. Magera or anyone from Buku at the Home Site Property other than our 
original meeting with Mr. Peterson in September/October 2007. 
22. The Petersons never contacted me to complain or assert they wanted me to do 
something different with the Home Site Property or to request that the sign or lock 
box be removed. 
Dated this.3- day of November, 2010. . (b ,/1 
.1 1////" 
KI:i1t~ibaJ p/.'(>/ ( 
/;1'--
SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to before me this --2.- day of November, 2010. 
~. ,~L(;,J )i/tA .. ~ 1!vVi1 (~t1/',(6--;0-~ 
Wary Ryblic for Id~ho . 
Residing at: irfahD h'1/1 \ 
My commission expires: /{)/;r;;:yJ/L/ 
I I ,/ 
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Case No. CV-08-941 
DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDOUM 
RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION 
COMES NOW, these answering co-defendants/ counter-plaintiffs, by and through 
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the undersigned attorney, and submit this memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiff's 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment and in support of the Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the issue of liability. The first Motion for Summary Judgment by the 
plaintiffs occurred almost one (1) year ago with briefing filed in November of 2009. Mter the 
court's decision, nothing was done by the plaintiffs and the matter has sat dormant until this 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The newest request for summary judgment does not raise any new material other 
than to attempt to detach Magera (manager of the plaintiff) from the proceedings; and to 
second guess the court on matters subsequent to the closing date on the contracts discussed 
hereafter. The co-defendants / counter-claimants attaches a major portion of their earlier 
briefing to this matter for assistance and ease of the court. The earlier information may 
assist the court. (The major arguments of these co-defendants/counterclaimants begins on 
page 11 of this brief.) The briefing is as follows: 
LEGAL STANDARD 
This Court is required to review a motion for summary judgment by applying the 
following standard: 
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, 
and discovery documents on file with the court, read in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate no 
material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. The burden of proving the 
absence of material facts is upon the moving party. The 
adverse party, however, "may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." In 
other words, the moving party is entitled to a judgment when 
the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's 
case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. 
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Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 266 (2000) (citations omitted). The Court 
should "liberally construe the record in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary 
judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in 
favor of that party. Walker v. Hollinger, 132 Idaho 172, 175, 968 P.2d 661, 664 (1998). 
Notwithstanding, the following also applies to the case herein: 
[W]hen a motion for summary judgment which has been 
properly supported with evidence indicating the absence of 
material factual issues, the burden shifts to the non-moving 
party to make a showing of the existence of a genuine material 
fact which would preclude summary judgment. This standard 
of review is not affected by the fact that both parties have filed 
motions for summary judgment. Rather, each motion must be 
separately considered on its own merits, with the court drawing 
all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is 
under consideration. 
Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A., v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485, 488-489 20 P.3d 
21, 24-25 (2001). 
Idaho law is very clear on the standard used in summary judgment proceedings 
that has been cited in numerous cases. That initial standard is as follows: 
Summary judgment should be granted if no genuine issue as to any material 
fact is found to exist after the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits 
have been construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
summary judgment motion. Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna 
Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975). 
Thereafter, the court follows often cited points, as follows: 
If the court determines, after a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, 
that no genuine issues of material fact exist, the court may enter judgment for 
the parties it deems entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Barlows, Inc. v. 
Bannock Cleaning Corp., 103 Idaho 310, 647 P.2d 766 (Ct. App. 1982). 
In summary judgment proceedings the facts are to be liberally construed in 
favor of the party opposing the motion, who is also to be given the benefit of 
all favorable inferences which might be reasonable drawn from the evidence. 
Smith v. Idaho State Federal Credit Union, 103 Idaho 245, 646 P.2d 1016 (Ct. 
App.1982). 
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When a party moves for summary judgment, the initial burden of establishing 
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests with that party. Thompson 
v. City ofIdaho Falls, 126 Idaho 527,887 P.2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1994). 
If a genuine issue of material fact remains unresolved, or if the record contains 
conflicting inferences and if reasonable minds might reach different conclusions 
from the facts and inferences presented, summary judgment should not be 
granted. Sewell v. Neilsen, Monroe, Inc. 109 Idaho 192, 706 P.2d 81 (Ct. App. 
1985). 
If an action will be tried by a court without a jury, a judge is not required to 
draw inferences in favor of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment. 
Kaufman v. Fairchild, 119 Idaho 859, 810 P.2d 1145 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Thus, the court has at least two tasks concerning a summary judgment motion. 
First, the court must determine that no material facts are in dispute. Second, the court must 
draw reasonable inferences from those facts to determine which party should be granted 
summary judgment/partial summary judgment. 
Summary judgment is defined and explained in Rule 56, IRCP as follows: 
Rule 56. Summary judgment: 
(a) Summary Judgment--For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time 
after the expiration of twenty (20) days from the service of process upon the adverse party or 
that party's appearance in the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by 
the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in 
that party's favor upon all or any part thereof. Provided, a motion for summary judgment 
must be filed at least 60 days before the trial date, or filed within 7 days from the date of the 
order setting the case for trial, whichever is later, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
(b) Summary Judgment--For Defending Party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at 
any time; move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in that party's 
favor as to all or any part thereof. Provided, a motion for summary judgment must be filed 
at least 60 days before the trial date, or filed within 7 days from the date of the order setting 
the case for trial, whichever is later, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
(c) Motion for Summary Judgment and Proceedings Thereon. The motion, 
affidavits and supporting brief shall be served at least twenty-eight (28) days before the time 
fixed for the hearing. If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavits the party must 
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do so at least 14 days prior to the date of the hearing. The adverse party shall also serve an 
answering brief at least 14 days prior to the date of the hearing. The moving party may 
thereafter serve a reply brief not less than 7 days before the date of the hearing. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of HabiHty 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. Such judgment, when 
appropriate, may be rendered for or against anyparty to the action. The court may alter or 
shorten the time periods and requirements of this rule for good cause shown, may continue 
the hearing, and may impose costs, attorney fees and sanctions against a party or the party's 
attorney, or both. 
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion for Summary Judgment. If on 
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief 
asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable 
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts 
are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the 
facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount 
of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in 
the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of Mfidavits--Further Testimony--Defense Required. Supporting 
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may 
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party. 
(f) When Mfidavits Are Unavailable in Summary Judgment Proceedings. 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court 
may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to 
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order 
as is just. 
(g) Mfidavits in Summary Judgment Proceedings Made in Bad Faith. Should 
it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented 
pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court 
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shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the 
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused that party to incur, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of 
contempt. 
IRCP Rule 56, Summary judgment 
------------ Excerpt from pages 172-173. 
UNDISPUTED /UNREBUTTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. The plaintiff entered into a contract for the sale of real estate with Raoel 
and Janet Clark, co-defendants/ counterclaimants. [Complaint, Exhibit A; 
Magera Affidavit, Exhibit A; See both Peterson and Clark affidavits]. 
2. The earnest money paid to the Clarks was the sum of $25,000. [Complaint, 
Exhibit A; Magera Affidavit, Exhibit A; Clark Affidavit, par. 7] 
3. The plaintiff entered into an almost identical contract for the sale of real 
estate with Jerry and Betty Peterson, co-defendants / counterclaimants. 
[Complaint, Exhibit B; Magera Affidavit, Exhibit B; See also Peterson 
Affidavit par. 4]. 
4. The earnest money paid to the Petersons was the sum of $327,000. 
[Complaint, Exhibit B; Magera Affidavit, Exhibit B; Peterson affidavit, 
par. 7 and 8]. 
5. The plaintiff knew that the Petersons needed the money to purchase a 
retirement home in Idaho Falls. Plaintiff reassured the Petersons that the 
sale would close. [Peterson Affidavit par. 8 and 15]. 
6. The closing date for the sale on the two (2) contracts was December 21, 
2007. [Complaint, Exhibit A and B; Magera Affidavit, Exhibit A and B;] 
7. The plaintiff had a period of inspection before the closing. The only 
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defense tendered by the plaintiff, in the facts tendered to the court, for the 
non-closing on the two (2) contracts, was that it believed the real estate was 
being re-zoned from R1 to R5 by Jefferson County. (One acre lots to five 
acre lots.) 
8. The real property was zoned R1 as of the signing of both contracts with the 
Clark party and the Peterson Party; and also zoned R1 as of the closing date 
of the contracts. [N aysha Foster Mfidavit, par. 4, Peterson Mfidavit, par. 
11; Clark Mfidavit, par. 10]. Plaintiff was well aware the property was zoned 
R1 and continued to be zoned R1 well after the closing date. [See, Naysha 
Foster Mfidavit, par. 6 with attachments of Exhibits 1 and 2; See also, 
Exhibit 3 to Naysha Foster Mfidavit]. 
9. Jefferson County reassured the plaintiff that the real property would be 
zoned R1 and was "grandfathered". [See entire Mfidavit of Naysha Foster 
with Exhibits 1,2, and 3.] 
10. The plaintiff failed to close the two (2) sales on the real estate pursuant to 
the two contracts at the time designated in the contracts. [Complaint, 
Exhibit A and B; Magera Mfidavit, Exhibit A and B;] 
CONTESTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiff exercised dominion and control over both sets of real property 
belonging to Clark and to Peterson. [Peterson Mfidavit, par. 18; Clark 
Mfidavit, par. 16]. 
2. Plaintiff hired the realtor to sell the house located on the Peterson real 
property and the realtor, at a later date, indicated plaintiff still wanted the 
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property. [Peterson Mfidavit, par. 23]. 
3. Brad Foster, a renter on the Clark property, has no bearing on the decision 
before the court. Brad Foster indicated in his affidavit he did not even 
know who owned the land. [See affidavit of Brad Foster submitted by 
plaintiff, par. 4; see also, par. 8]. 
4. Plaintiff continued to seek desire to purchase the real property from Clark 
and Peterson and to seek advice from Jefferson County after the closing 
date of the transactions for the contracts. [See, Naysha Foster Mfidavit, 
par. 6, 7 with Exhibits 1,2 and 3]. 
5. Plaintiff continued to promise payment of the remaining balance to the 
defendants/ counter plaintiffs. [Peterson Mfidavit, par. 22; Clark Mfidavit, 
par. 18; Attorney Letters, Dunn Mfidavit]. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this second motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs have not alleged any new 
facts for the court to reconsider. In fact, quite the opposite exists. The plaintiff have merely 
stated what was set forth by both parties in the original briefing and sworn statements of the 
parties. The plaintiff is trying to hang its hat on the following language from the court's 
ruling on the first summary judgment motions: 
The written contracts between the parties are unambiguous and definite; 
however, issues of fact remain as to Buku's entitlement to the earnest money under the 
contracts. The behavior of the parties after the December 2007 closing date persuades the 
Court that the "agreement" between the parties may not have ended after the closing date. 
Mter the failed closing, the parties' behavior suggests that an arrangement possibly still 
existed between the parties for the sale and purchase of the property. It is unclear what that 
arrangement was or what it means. Nevertheless, it seems clear to the Court that the 
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parties' behavior subsequent to closing could be due to a later agreement that might affect 
Buku's entitlement to earnest money under the earlier Agreements. 
A simplistic version of the facts is set forth hereafter which was stated in the first 
Motion for Summary Judgment: 
The parties hereto entered into real estate transactions for the sale of real property by 
each of the two party defendants (husband and wife) to the plaintiff. Those exhibits are 
attached to the original affidavit on the first request for summary judgment of Magera as 
Exhibit A-Clark; and as Exhibit B-Peterson. (Exhibits also attached to the complaint). Both 
properties were "tied" to the sale and the defendants had been neighbors and friends for 
numerous years. 
The Petersons received a substantial down payment on the real estate transaction as 
everyone knew that they were purchasing a retirement home in Idaho Falls. The money was 
needed to complete the purchase on their retirement town house and to allow them to begin 
the retirement process. The Petersons relied upon the representations of plaintiff in 
accepting the down payment. 
The Clarks received a modest down payment to sell their real property to the 
defendant and moved to Texas to begin their retirement plans. Neither set of defendants 
believed any contingencies existed, except for environmental issues or defects in the land, 
and that the contract was to be completed by a date certain (December 21, 2007) for them to 
begin retirement activities. 
The real estate purchase agreements state the terms and conditions. No oral 
modifications were made by either set of defendants but multiple promises of payment were 
made by the plaintiffs to the defendants-even subsequent to the closing date of the 
transactions. The defendants did not participate with the plaintiff's bank process nor were 
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the defendants involved in any actions of the plaintiff on financing. 
No conditions were placed upon the sale of the real property as it related in any way, 
shape or form as to the County of Jefferson and any zoning or building requirements. The 
intent of usage by plaintiff for the subject real properties was irrelevant to the defendants. 
No mutual agreement or understanding was made by the defendants as to the ultimate 
usage of the real property being purchased by the plaintiff. In fact, the onl,v understanding 
was that the down payment to Peter sons was critical to their purchase of a retirement home 
in Idaho Falls. 
It is true that the sale of both sets of defendants' property was contemplated by the 
plaintiff and a condition for both parties defendant. The defendants were aware that the 
plaintiff was in the business of development. Both set of defendants continued to be ready, 
able and willing to perform on the sale and were ready, willing and able to close subsequent 
to the closing date. 
Neither set of defendants signed any extensions or written documents referred to as 
Ex. E and F. to the Magera Mfidavit in his original affidavit which is already before the 
court. 
Plaintiff instituted a lawsuit for refund. Defendants answered and counter-claimed 
for damages and/or specific performance along with other defenses and claims as set forth 
in the pleadings. 
1. The plaintiff breached the contract between the parties which was Exhibit A and B to the 
Complaint and Magera Mfidavit and, therefore, is not entitled to summary judgment on its 
cause of action in the complaint. 
The breach is very straight forward. Plaintiff failed to pay the contract price to the 
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defendants/ counter-plaintiffs on or before the date of closing. No factual dispute exists 
concerning the failure of the plaintiff to pay the defendants on or before the closing date as 
contained in the written contracts labeled as Exhibits A and B to the Magera affidavit. 
Plaintiff relies upon the following language from paragraph 3 of the written contracts 
to excuse its breach: 
Prior to closing, it is Buyer's obligation to make sure that they are fully 
satisfied with the condition of the property, also any requirements, 
environmental requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer needs 
to make for its due diligence purposes. 
No factual dispute exists that any claim has or will be made that the condition of the real 
property was not satisfactory. No factual dispute exists that any claim has or will be made that 
the real property in question had any environmental concerns. Thus, the plaintiff (buyer) must 
be relying on the language "and all requirements that the Buyer needs to make for its due 
diligence purposes." 
This non-artfully drafted language is so vague that it would be impossible for any court 
to know what "buyer needs for its due diligence." Paragraph 24 of the contracts is very clear that 
the buyer drafted this agreement. As the court is well aware, the court must construe the 
language against the drafter. 
(See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 201 (agreement interpreted in accordance with 
the meaning assigned by the more "innocent" of the parties); > Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 
107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984) (where trier of fact is unable to determine the intent of the 
parties, preference is given to the meaning which operates against the party drafting the 
agreement); RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 207 (preferring an interpretation favoring the public 
interest). 
815 P.2d 469,120 Idaho 271, USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, (Idaho App. 
1991) 
------------ Excerpt from page 815 P.2d 474. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 201 
(agreement interpreted in accordance with the meaning assigned by the more" innocent" of the 
parties); > Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984) (where trier offact is 
unable to determine the intent of the parties, preference is given to the meaning which operates 
against the party drafting the agreement); RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 207 (preferring an 
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interpretation favoring the public interest). 
USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 815 P.2d 469,120 Idaho 271, (Idaho App. 
1991). 
------------ Excerpt from page 815 P.2d 474. 
The plaintiff has attempted to rely upon the County of Jefferson's zoning as its only 
defense. It believes that the subject property could not be zoned R-1. The affidavit of Naysha 
Foster in the first summary judgment motion clearly rebuts this position and the issue. The 
subject land was to be treated as R-1 purposes for this case. Thus. the only argument of the 
plaintiff fails. No other defenses or arguments are presented on the direct action of the plaintiff 
in its summary judgment motion. 
The plaintiff breached the contract and did not timely pay for the balance of the contract 
either at closing or subsequent thereto. The plaintiffs failed to fulfill the contract and simply did 
not pay the balance. The County of] efferson made it very clear that the land in question had not 
been re-zoned; and, as such, the plaintiffs have no legitimate reason to argue that the contract 
should be voided and the earnest money returned. In fact, quite the opposite exists. 
The court, in its earlier summary judgment ruling, was merely stating the obvious that 
more factual questions exist as to the true intent of Buku; and the reasons or lack of reasons why 
it demanded a refund of earnest money. 
The newest affidavits on this second motion do not shed any new light on the court's 
earlier decision. Buku continued to exert control and domination over the real properties of both 
Clark and Peterson. Those facts, even if controverted or contested by Buku, are in the original 
affidavits before the court. 
The newest motion focuses on the lack of control by Buku and tries to place the burden 
on the defendants. Those are the very facts that a fact-finder would have to determine in 
rendering a decision. Obviously, the language of the contracts can be placed before the fact-
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finder. However, the factual assertions on the failure to close by the plaintiff focus on both the 
zoning designation and the subsequent actions by the parties. 
Defendants, on the other hand, are not trying to remove or change the clear language of 
the original contracts; but rather are trying to show to the ultimate fact-finder that they 
(defendants) were lead down a path to believe the original contract would be enforced and/ or 
should be enforced as to the damages sustained by the defendants. 
2. The defendants/counter-plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on the issue ofliability 
on their counterclaims. 
Since the plaintiff breached the contract, the defendants are clearly entitled to liability on 
their counterclaim for breach of contract. The only issue remains is damages and/or specific 
performance. The court previously ruled that this matter contains facts that would have to be 
determined at trial. The defendants still believe that Buku breached the agreement without any 
kind of justification. The court agreed by stating that "issues of fact remain as to Buh..'1l's 
entitlement to the earnest money." The court did not dismiss the counter-claims except as to 
Consumer Protection. Thus, facts exist and the newest and second motion of the plaintiffs does 
not alter the court's original ruling. 
The defendants/counter-plaintiffs has been damaged monetarily in a sum to be 
established. Specific performance is an alternative for enforcement of the contract against the 
plaintiff and in favor of the defendants. 
3. Other claims in the counter-claims of the counter-plaintiffs also establish liability with the 
issues of damages to be determined at a later point. 
The court left in place the following without removing the counter-claims from 
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consideration. The plaintiff does not re-address these issues (on the counter-claims) and tries 
to indicate that the contract entitles Buku to refund of the earnest money. The counter-claim 
matters will not be re-hashed but are still in place and remain unaffected by the latest attempt 
by plaintiffs to avoid trial. Those counter-claim issues are as follows: 
A. Specific Performance 
B. Breach of Contract 
Breach of contract has been established wherein the plaintiff failed to pay the 
defendants/ counter-plaintiffs. No material facts are in dispute and the court should grant the 
counter-plaintiffs liability on this issue. 
c. Unjust Enrichment 
As the court is aware, unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy, plead in the alternative, 
to a breach of contract claim. 
D. Estoppel 
The plaintiff should be estopped from asserting rights contrary to the representations 
made to the counter-plaintiffs. Estoppel ties into the detrimental reliance theory. Estoppel is 
defined as follows: 
Equitable estoppel requires 
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact made with actual or 
constructive knowledge of the truth; 
(2) that the party asserting estoppel did not and could not have discovered the truth; 
(3) an intent that the misrepresentation or concealment be relied upon; and 
(4) that the party asserting estoppel relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to 
his or her prejudice. 
Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 22, 644 P.2d 341, 344 
(1982). 
E. Detrimental Reliance 
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Allowing promissory estoppel as a substitute for consideration is permitted in 
those situations where injustice would otherwise result. The reason for the doctrine also defines 
its limits. In order to allege the defense of promissory estoppel, it must be shown: (1) the 
detriment suffered in reliance was substantial in an economic sense; (2) the substantial loss to 
the promisee acting in reliance was or should have been foreseeable by the promisor; and (3) 
the promisee must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise as made. 
Simpson, Contracts § 42 (1954). 
See also, Restatement of Contracts, § 90. 
Mohr v. Shultz~ 388 P.2d 1002, 86 Idaho 531, (Idaho 1964) 
------------ Excerpt from pages 388 P.2d 1008-388 P.2d 1009. 
4. The defendant/counterclaimants do not indicate to the court that a "new written agreement" 
exists. 
The defendants / counterclaimants have never alleged that a new written agreement 
exists. Nor do these parties dispute the clear written language of the original contracts and, in 
particular, paragraph 21. Nor do these answering parties dispute the statute of frauds language 
as contained in Idaho Code 9-503. The law is clear on those points and it is believed that the 
plaintiffs have "missed the point" of the court's earlier ruling. The court was stating that 
various facts exist to determine whether there is justification for return of earnest money. If 
there are not sufficient facts to enable Buh"U for the return of earnest money, then the fact-finder 
needs to make such a determination. Both pre- and post- contracts, Buku has lead the 
defendant/ counterclaimants to believe the sale would occur and the balance of money would be 
paid to these answering sellers. 
It is very clear that part-performance creates various remedies under the Statute of 
Frauds. The plaintiffs began to perform on the promise to purchase. This case was not about 
zoning but in reality is about the plaintiffs lender and the willingness to provide additional 
funding to the plaintiffs. The case has never been about the inability of zoning, despite the 
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assertions of the plaintiff, or any deficiency on the real properties; or, for that matter, the good 
faith and fair dealings of the defendants/ counterclaimants. 
Quite clearly, part performance is explained in more technical terms concerning the 
Statute of Frauds as follows: 
We turn to "part" performance. When we use this term, we mean performance by either or both 
parties of less than all their respective obligations under the contract. There is no literal 
foundation in I.e. § 9-505 for the oft-made assertion that part performance takes a contract 
outside the statute. Plainly it does not. The contract is still within the statute. At least a 
portion of the contract remains "to be performed" on both sides. Compare I.C. § 9-504 
(explicitly referring to part performance ofland sale contracts under I.e. § 9-503). Rather. it is 
more accurate to say that in some circumstances. part performance may establish an equitable 
ground to avoid the strictures of the statute offrauds. 
In Allen v. Moyle, 84 Idaho 18, 367 P.2d 579 (1961), discussing contracts for personal 
services, our Supreme Court implicitly recognized this point: 
[T]he equitable doctrine of part performance is not applicable to a contract ... within the statute 
of frauds .... The mere part performance of such a contract does not take it out of the operation 
of the statute or permit a recovery under the contract for any part of the contract remaining 
executory.... [T]o hold that part performance is performance would be a nullification of the 
statute. 
Id. at 23,367 P.2d at 582 (quoting 49 AM.JUR. § 497, at 798). Similarly, in International 
Business Machines Corp. v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194,198,677 P.2d 507,511 (Ct.App.1984), we 
referred to part performance as a doctrine "grounded in equity." The doctrine of part 
performance is best understood as a specific form of the more general principle of equitable 
estoppel. Accordingly, we will return to it in the next section of this opinion. 
Hovering uneasily between full performance by both parties and part performance by 
either or both parties is a troublesome hybrid known as "full" performance by one party. 
American courts and commentators have long disagreed--with varying degrees of awareness 
and perception--as to whether such performance is akin to full performance by both sides 
(taking a contract outside the statute of frauds) or more closely resembles part performance 
(possibly allowing equitable relief from the statute). A majority of courts appear to hold the 
former view. CALAMARI & PERILLO § 19-23; CORBIN § 457; L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK 
OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 89 (2d ed. 1965) (hereinafter SIMPSON); 73 AM.JUR.2D 
Statute of Frauds § 533 (1974) (hereinafter Statute of Frauds). However, "no ... general 
principle can be derived from the decisions on this point." WILLISTON § 528. Thus. some 
courts have held that the statute of frauds does not apply to a contract fully executed on one 
side. where nothing-remains to be done on the other side except to pay money. See SIMPSON 
§ 89. Courts adopting this view may order the contract to be enforced in damages. Other 
courts, taking an approach analogous to part performance, may consider an equitable or quasi-
contractual remedy, such as quantum merit. Id. 
SECOND MEMORANDUM ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT -16-
Although the Idaho courts have not explicitly addressed this issue, our cases strongly 
point to the equity approach. The Idaho Supreme Court repeatedly has held that when one 
party has fully performed an oral contract within the statute of frauds, he is not entitled to 
collect damages for a breach. Rather, he is entitled to the equitable remedy of specific 
performance. E.g., Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 480 P.2d 896 (1971); Quayle v. Mackert, 
92 Idaho 563, 447 P.2d 679 (1968). 
These cases put Idaho among a minority of states, but we think the equity approach is 
sound. It offers greater consistency with the literal language of Idaho's 
[111 Idaho 1010] statute of frauds. For even if one side has fully performed a contract, the 
contract as a whole remains "to be performed." Moreover, it is the nonperforming party who 
seeks protection under the statute. [In the instant case, the plaintiff, Buku]. Conceptually, it 
makes little sense to allow the extent of the opposing party's performance to determine whether 
the contract is within or without the statute. It makes greater sense. in our view, to examine the 
conduct ofbothparties. and the circumstances surrounding the alleged contract. to determine 
whether the party invoking the statute of frauds is equitably entitled to do so. Accordingly, we 
hold that the doctrine of full performance by one party, like the doctrine of part performance, 
does not take the contract out of the statute of frauds. Rather, it should be treated as a form of 
equitable estoppel. 
Frantz v. Parke, 729 P.2d 1068, 111 Idaho 1005, (Idaho App. 1986) 
------------ Excerpt from pages 729 P.2d 1072-729 P.2d 1073. 
The doctrine of part performance works in conjunction with the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 
"Under Idaho law, part performance per se does not remove a contract from the operation of 
the statute of frauds. Rather, the doctrine of part performance is best understood as a specific 
form of the more general principle of equitable estoppel." Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 367, 109 P.3d 
at 1109. (citing Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 249, 92 P.3d 492, 499 (2004». Equitable estoppel 
generaUy. and the doctrine of part performance specificaUy. assume the existence of a complete 
agreement. See Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 367,109 P.3d at 1109. 
The language quoted above from cases in Idaho is precisely what the district court was 
referring to when it stated: "the behavior of the parties" and similar language as stated therein. 
This language is identical to the issues propounded by the court cases as highlighted above. 
The plaintiffs cannot rely upon mere allegations of zoning issues to defeat the contract. 
It has already been proven, through the Planning and Zoning Department, via Nasha Foster, 
that the real property would not be re-zoned. The contractual enforcement rights exist for the 
benefit of the defendants. The equitable remedies exist due to the aforementioned part 
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performance theory. Those theories are contained in the counter-claims of the 
defendants / counter-claimants. 
5. The dominion and control theories of the defendant/counterclaimants establish facts 
consistent with the partial performance of the plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs miss the point of these facts when arguing for their second summary judgment 
motion. These controverted facts show the surrounding nature of the circumstances of how the 
plaintiffs dealt; and, that such dealings were not in good faith. The controverted facts still do 
not solve the unresolved question of whether the plaintiffs could unilaterally terminate a 
contract, partially performed, by the assumption of zoning issues. The clear testimony is that 
the zoning issue was a non-issue. Such fact has not been rebutted by the plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The defendants/counter-claimants still believe and allege that they should bee 
granted summary judgment on the issue of liability as there are no material facts to defeat 
the breach of contract by the plaintiffs. 
The newest and second motion for summary judgment does not raise any new 
factual issues not already answered in the court's earlier decision. This second motion does 
not remove controverted facts; and, the equitable remedies also available to the 
defendants / counter-claimants along with the legal remedy of breach of contract. 
The second motion for summary judgment by the plaintiffs should be denied. 
DATED this 2q day of November, 2010. 
GZc~ 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
J'~ I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the.lZLl- day of November, 2010 a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following persons(s) by: 
~ Hand Delivery to plaintiff 
~ Postage-prepaid mail to judge 
Facsimile Transmission 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
a~lli 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy: Judge Gregory Moeller 
Madison County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 389 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
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AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY AND 
BETTY PETERSON IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANTS' POSITIONS 
RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Second Mfidavit on Plaintiff's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
AFFIDAVIT OF PETERSONS RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT-l-
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF JEFFERSON ) 
Jerry and Betty Peterson, being duly sworn upon oath, state as follows: 
1. They are husband and wife and co-defendants/ counter-plaintiffs in the above 
captioned matter. 
2. This affidavit is prepared in opposition to the second summary judgment request of 
the plaintiff and in support of the summary judgment request of the 
defendants / counter-plaintiffs. 
3. This affidavit is prepared with the assistance of their legal counsel and made upon 
personal knowledge and belief of the undersigned affiants. 
4. These affiants entered into a written contract with the plaintiff which is attached to 
the affidavit of Magera and labeled Exhibit B. 
5. This written contract was for the sale of real property in Jefferson County, Idaho as 
described in the complaint on file and in the contract. The written contract was 
performed in conjunction with the sale of real property of co-defendants/ counter-
plaintiffs, Raoel and Janet Clark. The Clarks have been neighbors and friends of the 
undersigned affiants for numerous years. The plaintiff desired to purchase both the 
real properties of the undersigned and of the Clarks. The Clarks written contract is 
attached to the affidavit of Magera and labeled Exhibit A. The contracts mirror one 
another in most material respects. 
6. The written contract of the Clarks was signed on August 30,2007; the written 
contract of the undersigned (Petersons) was also signed on August 30, 2007. 
7. Both parties received earnest money with the Clarks being $25,000; and the earnest 
money of the undersigned being $327,000.00. 
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8. Your affiants allege that the plaintiff breached the written contract by non-
performance of the payment on the closing date and by continued exercise of 
dominion and control over the subject real property until as late as November, 2008. 
9. The Brad Foster affidavit states that Mr. Foster contacted Jerry Peterson concerning 
farming of the Peterson property for the 2008 year. Mr. Foster indicated J aramie 
Magera had sent him to me to inquire as to the status. As such, I believed Mr. Foster 
was acting on directions from Magera as his implied agent. I explained to Mr. Foster 
that Magera could do whatever he wanted with the real property if the final payments 
were made on the contract. Ifpayments were not made, then I instructed Mr. Foster 
that my son was going to rent the ground for 2008. Mr. Foster and myself were both 
unsure who "owned the ground" as stated in his affidavit. Your affiant believed that 
Magera was still in control of the real property. I had no further dealings with Brad 
Foster. 
10. Kip Archibald, realtor, was not hired by the undersigned but was hired to sell real 
estate by J aramie Magera. Mr. Archibald, Mr. Magera and Magera's wife came to 
the real property, inspected the house, and listed the property (house) for sale. When 
Magera, via Buku, LLC paid us the $327,000 the listing came about and all parties 
knew we relied upon the earnest money for the purchase of our retirement home in 
Idaho Falls. I did not give permission to Mr. Archibald to sell the house; but, 
believed that Archibald was listed through Magera. I had no objection to Magera 
listing the property. I signed no agreements with Archibald and never had any 
conversations with Archibald concerning the sale of the house. I had no input 
whatsoever with any MLD listing and never viewed any such listing. These matters 
were all handled through Magera and Archibald. 
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11. Your affiants have seen the real property listed as of August 21, 2008 by Kipp 
Archibald. Attached as Exhibit AA is a copy of such listing which is contrary to the 
assertions of Mr. Archibald in his affidavit. 
12. Your affiants believe they had no obligation to contact Mr. Archibald, realtor, as we 
did not hire him and the agreements, if any, were between Kipp Archibald and 
Magera. We did not tell Mr. Archibald to do anything with the real property. All 
matters were between Magera and his agent, Kipp Archibald. 
13. In early December of 2007, I was contacted about an early sale of the home. Your 
affiants had no objection to the sale found by Archibald. I only spoke with Kipp 
Archibald on the early sale of the home except for the request for a key to the house 
in 2007 which I surrendered to Kipp Archibald. I did tell him to call Robin Dunn on 
January 3,2008 as the sale had nothing to do with your affiants. The property, to the 
best knowledge of the undersigned, was listed as long as August 21, 2008 because of 
the notice. 
14. Your affiants believed that the plaintiff breached the contract by not closing on 
December 21, 2007. However, we did continue to try and salvage the sale and had 
our attorney correspond with the attorney for plaintiff. Attached as Exhibit BB is 
copies of correspondence showing we continued to work with the plaintiff and were 
still ready, willing and able to sell the real property. The plaintiff would never meet 
with us and actually failed to appear at a scheduled meeting at Mr. Dunn's office to 
resolve the contract issues. 
15. Your affiants continued to work with the plaintiff because we had totally relied upon 
the sale and had already committed to the sale and needed the balance to complete 
our retirement process. 
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16. Your affiants have been damaged monetarily in the remaining sum of the contract 
and other miscellaneous costs and billings, including but not limited to, lost 
revenues on farming practices, lost interest, expenses of upkeep and utilities, tax 
assessments, attorney fees and costs. 
17. Your affiants believe and allege that the plaintiff is liable for damages and/or is 
requested to perform on the contract (Specific Performance). 
DATED this t11 day of November, 2010. 
Je~ryP~iersoql 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thisrf.<1 day of November, 2010. 
a~ 
Notary Public 
Residing at: fl, ( b "' Y , :;:'-0 
Commission: ; C l' /1 b 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theZi day of November, 2010, a true and correct 
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copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following person( s) by: 
~ Hand Delivery to plaintiff counsel 
~ Postage-prepaid mail to judge 
Facsimile Transmission 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy: Judge Gregory Moeller 
Madison County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 389 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
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EXHIBIT f:JH 
\".1\.,00"'1 V. I I\.H;&I IV IVILV '-''''lIt J~~ ~age L or j 
Snake River 
Main Menu - This box will guide you through your searching. Look for helpful tips to 
maximize your searching capability. 
~9-'';lS. tg_,~!Qi rr;;?s9 r.;;h 
Sc;r~~l1 
$~Jiqck I Currently Viewing - MLS Number: 150761 
Listing Details 
List Price: $239,000 
Total Bedrooms: 3 
Total Baths: 2 
Total Half Baths: 1 
Style: 1 Story 
County: Jefferson 
Kipp Archibald 
ERA Archibald-Reece RealEstate 
Phone: 208-200-0605/208-745-5911 
Email: ~iR bC.stCC;J.l : Q.9-'Q@ ~r5U;:9Q) 
Lot Size (Apx SqFt): 
Apx Acreage: 2 
Apx Total SqFt: 2580 
Abv Grade SqFt: 1500 
Blw Grade SqFt: 1080 
Elementary School: Jefferson 251EL 
Middle School: MIDWAY 251JH 
Public Info: Beautiful home on two acres with 
two big shops. Sunroom, large Jiving room and 
family room on the main level. Mature landscapin 
and large garden spot. 30x30 shop and 24x30 
shop, both with power and insulation. All 
surrounded by white vinyl fenCing . 
High School: RIGBY 251HS 




Heat Source/Type: Gas, Forced Air 
Air Conditioning: None 
Garage # Stalls/Type: 6+ Stalls, Attached, 
Detached, Other Type-See Remarks 
Apx Year Built: 1964 
Zip Code: 83442 
All information is deemed reliable, but is not guaranteed. Consult with your real estate profeSSional to verify the 
provided information. 
The information found on this website is provided as a courtesy to those using www.SnakeRiverMLS.com . Please verify 
any information found herein. 
, ·tfa. ~Miii: Gr 
"_ " ___ '_"""_. __ • ___ •.. ~ [QUAL HOUSI"G 
OPPORTUHIT'I 
©. SY5t,em,s ~ngiDe_erlQg, ;n<;: ~ 
http://www.rigbyidahohomes.com/search.php 
EXHIBIT BE 
SWAFFORD LA vV OFFICE, CH.4.RTERED 
525 NINTH STREET 
RONALD 1. SWAFFORD - ATTOR:-IEY-AT-LAW 
R. JAMES ARCHIBALD· ATTORNEy·AT-L .. w 
DARREN S. Rorm~s-ATTORNEY-AT-Lt\w 
LARREN K. COVERT· AT,ORNEY-AT-LAW 
December 28, 2007 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
Fax: (208) 745-8160 
RE: Jerry Peterson and Raoel Clark 
Dear Rob: 
lDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83404 
TELEPHOl'i"E: (208) 524-4002 
FAx: (208) 524·4131 
TWINKIC SWAFfORD - LEG."!. ASSIST/\NT 
Jaramie Magera received your letter this morning dared December 19, 2007. Why did it take 
nine days to receive your letter? And why didn't you send it to me'? I talked to you about this and 
don't understand why you didn't send me a copy. On December 18, 2007, Magera and Peterson and _ 
Clark were talKing about this il1fi1endl;'-te-m1's-:ldon't why your clients would think BUh'U is going to 
simply walk away from this money. 
Once rhe county passed their zone change. rhe appraiser pulled the appraisal of the property. 
The hank would not close and Buku does not have the money without borrowing. This is nothing that 
Buku or Peterson or Clark anticipated. No one could foresee Jefferson County devaluing the property 
of Peterson and Clark at the time of signing the contract. 
Buku intended to subdivide the property and install central water and sewer. If we could get a 
letter fr0111 the county thar the Peterson and Clark properties will be accepted for one aCre or smaller 
lots with a central water and sewer system. then we could take thac letter to the bank and to the 
appraiser so that the loan would close. 
Since you know the county attorney. can you get that ietter for us? With that letter. everyone 
will win. Peterson and Clark will get their money. The county will get a subdivision with central 
water and sewer. Buku will sdllots. Then we will proceed to closing. It sounds like a better option 
than you and 1 tlghting over if the contract is enforceable or voidable. Without the assurance of 
subdividing, we will sue for the return of the earnest money, as your clients have already agreed that 
the earnest money is refundable. 
J /j ?'::j 0 '3 
Sincerel~  
R'~Chibald' Esq. 
NN LAW OFFICES, 
Telephone: (208)745-9202 
December 31, 2007 
R. James .Archibald, Esq. 
525 Ninth Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Sent viafacsimile: 524-4131 
ROBI~ D. Dl':'::': 
PE~:':Y ~ORTH S!-l-\CL 
_nfELL".. _-1.. SHEETS 
PO. Box 2"7'7 
4""~ Pleasant Count::? Lane 
Rigby, Idaho 83442-0T-
em:lil: rdunn@,dunnbwoffices.com 
Re: Jerry Peterson/Raoel ClarkiBuku Properties, LLC 
Dear Jim: 
Facsimile: (208! -4)-8l6(' 
I received your facsimile dated December 28,2007. It is my opinion that your 
contentions contained therein are misplaced. I \vill explain as follows: 
1. You indicated I had not VvTitten directly to you concerning .Taramie Magera and 
his attempts to alter the contract. As you will note, I only represented [vIr. & t\;frs. 
Peterson at the time. Subsequently, Mr. & Mrs. Clark joined in the 
representation. I believe you need to have a conversation 'vvith your client and the 
manager/member of Buku Properties, LLC (Buku) since there were discussions 
between Mr. Magera, !vlr. Peterson and Mr. Clark. Mr. Magera approached them 
and tried to have them sign a document which added additional conditions to the 
contract. The document was on Buku letterhead and there was direct 
conversations between Bukultvlagera and my clients. I merely responded to the 
request on the letterhead. At no time, did Mr. Ivlagera indicate that conversations 
should be had 'with you or with any other attorney. I merely assumed he \vas 
representing himself since he used his own letterhead and had direct 
conversations \-vith my clients. Thus, please discuss this matter 'with your client 
and ifhe desires direct correspondence 'vvith you, it would cenainly be my intent 
to do so. However, your assault upon me, in a friendly fashion, was inappropriate 
given the circumstances. 
2. The four comers of the contract are very clear. The contingencies contained 
therein have been met by my clients. Thus, we fail to understand why a closing 
did not occur on the date indicated. The letter sent from my office alTived in 
Texas to the Clarks in three (3) days and to the Petersons in approximately two 
R. J 2.mes Archibald, E 
December 31, 2007 
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(2) days. I can only suggest that your client's receipt of mail and/or mailing 
practices are someV\ihat different than other individuals. I do not kno'vv why he 
did not receive the lener until nine (9) days from the mailing date since both of 
my clients received such lener. r can only suggest that either there 'vvas a mail 
problem or your client needs to check his box more regularly. 
3. You indicated there are contingencies \vith the County. Obviously, both you and 
I have clients other than those we currently represent. However, my 
representation of other clients has nothing to do with this contract nor with the 
language in the four comers of the contract. Both sets of my clients have been 
ready, willing and able to sell the property and close upon the date indicated. 
Thus, reference to my other clients in other cases has no bearing upon this 
transaction. 
4. My clients have never indicated they were willing to refund the Earnest Money 
Agreement. They have never said it is refundable and have always maintained 
they are ready, willing and able to sell the property and continue to do so. 
With the spirit of cooperation in mind, both sets of my clients indicated they would 
extend the closing date contained in the contract without altering any other tern1S 
contained therein upon the condition an additional down payment, in a sum to be 
negotiated, and 7.5% interest of their outstanding monies from the date of closing until 
the new closing is established. 
They also desire the additional money be construed as a down payment and not as earnest 
money. 
Your clients mayor may not be speculating on the propeny it is purchasing. However, 
my clients express no opinion as to the speculative value of the land in question 
contained in the contract. 
If you desire to litigate, please be infol1ned \ve feel we are on solid ground as the 
language in the four comers of the contract seem very clear and definite. Additionally, 
this would be construed as a commercial transaction and would entitle the prevailing 
party to attorney fees. Obviously, neither the Petersons or the Clarks desire to enter into 
litigation as they have always remained loyal to the contract and an attempt to sell to 
Buku and/or its manager, tvfagera. 
My clients remain on peaceable terms and would like to work out arrangements that are 
beneficial to all concerned. However, they are very willing to litigate this issue for the 
substantial sums of money that have been involved. They would not foreclose any 
remedy including specific performance and/or forfeiture of Earnest Money Agreement 
with the return of the real property. 
R. James Archibaid, Esq. 
December 31, 2007 
Page 3 




cc: Mr. & Mrs. Peterson 
lvrr. & Mrs. Clark 
I fill 11V, LVU JL'1 '1! J 1 
S'WAFFORD LA \" OFFICE, CHARTERED 
RONA!..D L. SWAFFORD" AnORNEY-AT-LAW 
R. JAMES ARCHIBM .. D - ATTORNEy-Ai-LAW 
DARReN S. ROSINS-ATTORNEY-AT-LAW 
LI\RREN K. COVERT - ATTORi'!EY-Al'-LAW 
December 31, 2007 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
fax.: (208) 745-8160 
RE: Jerry Peterson and Raoel Clark 
Dear Rob: 
525 NIi'iTH STREET 
IDAHO FAl..LS, IDAHO 83404 
TELEPHONE: (208) 524-4002 
FA.X: (208) 524-4131 
TWINKlE SWAfFORD - LEGAl.. ASSISTAr>T 
Thank you for your letter dated December 31, 2007, No personal assault upon you was 
intended. 
Your clients have a perfect understanding as to why the contract did not close. Magera, 
Peterson, Clark, me and you all attended the planning and zoning meetings. We all knew that if the 
zone change was passed, the million dollar property would be reduced in value to a third of the value. 
They are now selling something valued substantially less than what was represented [0 Buku back in 
August when it was signed. Buku had an obligation under the contract [0 perform due diligence prior 
to closing. The due diligence reveals that there is a problem. Buku simply wanted to extend the time 
to figure it out. Buku prepared a contract extension on December 18 and your letter was prepared on 
December 19. 
Your clients are ready willing and able to sell property which was not bargained for by my 
client. We all know it. J don't know why your clients are pretending that everything is the same. It 
has obviously changed. There waS a meeting of the minds as to the sale of property zoned one acre. 
There was not a meeting of the minds as [0 five acre zoned property. This makes the contract 
voidable, not enforceable. 
The contracts indicate the earnest money is refundable. Please return the money to my office 




l\iN LAW OFFICES, 
Teie~hone: C08} -45·9202 
\1arch 17,2008 
R. James Archibald, Esq. 
525 Ninth Street 
Idaho Falls, m 83404 
ROBI:\: D Dl':\::\: 
PE~:\,Y ~ORTH SH.:\L'L 
. .l,\IELL-\ .-\. SHEETS 
P.O. Box'::--
4:"7 Pleasant COUnt!"'.' Lane 
rugby, Idaho 83442·02"7"7 
email: rdunn@:dunnlawofiices.com 
Re: .Teny Peterson/Raoel Clark/Jaramie lVIagera 
Dear Jim: 
I recognize that Jaramie Magera is the owner/operator of a LLC that is attempting to 
purchase real purchase real property from Raoel Clark and J eny Peterson. This letter 
wiIi serve notice that my clients both need to dose on the transaction, which is no\-v 
delinquent approximately three (3) months, because of financial obligations. 
Upon the good faith and belief they had a contract that \-vould be closed in December, 
they have both made other arrangements for housing and have financial obligations 
\vhich are coming due. 
Also, the individuals have to plan for the upcoming months as to famling practices and or 
care of the various homes since utilities are a necessity to maintain the imegrity of the 
structures. 
Therefore, notice is hereby given if the sum of money due my clients is not paid on or 
before rv1arch 31, 2008, then they \"'ill pursue other avenues and consider the eamest 
money forfeited which \vas paid on the various contracts. 
As indicated previously, my clients have ahvays intended to work with your client and do 
desire to close this transaction. However, as mentioned abo':,ce and because of other 
commitments, they can no longer continue to commit to a contract which is delinquent. 
Please let me knov,' your client's thought process in this pmiicular action. 
~
in ely,." ' ... ; 
.' / i 
( (./ \ f 
.•. ~ \, '/ / .. " ) '~"', \/ ,/' i----
,,-.,--. -------" ,~". ,/ "-.J Robin D. DUlID, Esq.' -.. ---
DUN~ LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
RDD/jn 
cc: Mr. & Mrs. Peterson 
Mr. & Mrs. Clark 
111!;'\ ..)1 '::"'UVU llVn 1L'UU l11 rn/\ l'iV. ~UO :.;r q !.fiJI ,. U! 
Sw AFFORD LAW OFFICE, CHARTERED 
525 NIKTH STREET 
RONALD L. SWAFFORD - ATTORNEY-AT-LAW 
R. JAMES ARCHIBALD - ATTORNEY-Ai-LAW 
TR~VOR L. CA~TLETON . A TIORNEY-AT-LA W 
L .. RREK K. COVERT· ATTORNEY·AT·L.~W 
March 31, 2008 
Robin D. Dunn. Esq. 
Fax: (208) 745-8160 
RE: Jerry Peterson and Raoel Clark 
Dear Rob: 
IDAHO F.ULS, IDAHO 83404 
TELEPHONE: (208) 524-4002 
FA.X: (208) 524.4131 
T"lI'lNK1E SWAFFORD - LEGAL ASSISTANT 
Since the date of your letter of March 17, 2008, I understand that yet another new zoning map 
has been approved by Jefferson Coumy. I haven't seen the map. but 1 am told that the Peterson/Clark. 
property is zonee!. R·5. We have talked [0 our banker, appraiser, and the Jeffeison County Plafu'1ing 
and Zoning Administrator. The appraiser needs a Jetter from a county official so that we can finance 
the purchase. The administrator has responded that she believes we will be grandfarnered in under the 
old zoning map bur she wanted the county attorney [0 sign off on it. I have placed several calls to the 
county attorney and have not heard back regarding this issue. 
We still wane to purchase the property. May we have an extension to close? Once we get the 
grandfarher letter from the county or the county attorney, we can close within 30 days from the date of 
the letter. Please advise. 
Sincerely, • 
(l~J)JJ-gjJ 
\j es Archibald. Esq. 
tlill ~U L.VVU Y'i .... i..I Vl'L..J. 111 
-.-- -------_. -_ .. 1 flI\ !lV, c..UU J.':..' ~1.J! 
SWAFFORD LA \V OFFICE, CHARTERED 
525 NINTH STREE.T 
RONALD L. SWAFFORD - ArrORNEY-AT-LAW 
R. J.'MES ARCHIBALD - ATrORNEy-AT·LAW 
TREVOR L. CASTLETON. AITORNSy·AT-L,\W 
LARREN K. COVERT·ATIORNEY-AT-LAw 
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83404 
TEl..EPHONE: (208) 524-4002 
FAX: (208) 524-4131 
May 28,2008 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. fax: (208) 745-8160 
Dear Rob: 
TWINKlE SWAPFORD - LEGAL ASstSTANT 
As we discussed last week, the bank has approved financing for the purchase of the Peterson 
and Clark properties. However, since the time that the contract was signed, banking regulations have 
changed and we cannot borrow as much as was hoped. 
We therefore propose a modification and signing a promissory note with the following terms: 
Clark property: 
Closing: 
Money paid down: 







Money paid down: 









Seven Percent (7 % ) 






Seven Percent (7 %) 
To be negotiated 
Permitted 





DIJrJl"-J Li\ '\Xl OFFICES, PLl.lC 
June 3, 2008 
R. James Archibald, Esq. 
525 Ninth Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
ROBE< D. DV\':-~ 
PE~~Y NORTH Sf-L-I..CL 
,-I..:\fELL'i. ." •. SHEETS 
PO. Box 27" 
4"7"7 Pleasant (oumry Lane 
PJgoy, Id,lho 83442-0::::-" 
email: rdunn(;tdunnlawoffices .. :om 
Re: Buku Properties, LLC/Peterson/Clark 
Dear Mr. Archibald: 
I met with my clients Jerry and Betty Pete::son this date and conferenced Raoel Clark by 
telephone into the discussion. Obviously, we have received the proposal from your client 
and have discussed the same with each party expressing their individual preferences. 
Both parties \-vould like to honor the original contract and be paid in full, plus interest and 
utilities, for the intervening time. That is the best scenario for all concemed since it 
relieves the contractual oblig2tion. }Io\~;ever, your client has apparently encountered 
difficulties and desires to alter the original agreement. 
If the original agreement were altered, then we could discuss the follo\ving for Mr. & 
Mrs. Peterson: 
1. They would accept the sum of $153,000 plus accmed interest and utilities to pay 
off the balance of the home. If the home were paid off and listed, then my clients 
would expect any sale of the home which \vould bring in revenue to be applied 
directly to the balance outstanding. 
2. My clients would calTY the $500,000 balance ($980,000 - $480,000) with interest 
at eight and one-half(8.5%) percent for one (1) year. Upon the conclusion of one 
(1) year, then the balance of principal and acemed interest would be due and 
payable. 
3. My clients would definitely request a personal guaranty in addition to the LLC 
business entity. 
R. Jame:; Archibald, Esq, 
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As to l\11r. Clark, he has the follO\ving propos;}] if the contract \.\-ere not paid off in full as 
original!) contemplated: 
1. S I 25,000 plus interest 0;1 a nOle that is outstanding for the purchase of his 
home in Texas. I believe Mr. Magera has spoken w-ith fAr. Clark on that issue. 
,-\lso. he \,volIld want $200.000 additional down payment towards the , - .. '" 
concluding price. 
2. \Vith the various payments and payments previousIy received, the one million 
fony-four thousand (SL044,000)dollars is reduced to $694,000. lIthe 
foregoing is accepted. Mr. Clark \.volrld CalTY the $694,000 at eight and one-
half(8.5%) percent interest for one (1) year wherein principal and accrued 
interest would be payable in a lump sum. Once again, he would also \vant a 
personal guaranty in addition to the LLC contract. 
Thus, both of my clients have indicated their preference to honor the original contrac1, 
pay the balance due \vith accrued interest, any utility and expenses associated with 
upkeep and be done with the entire matter. The second option is their final proposal in 
this matter. This option remains opened until June 20, :2008. Thereafter, my clients 
"vould consider the original contract in total default, the sums forfeited a:1d would pursue 
other buyers. As to the Petersons, they have already tumed down offers of purchase on 
an installment basis. An installment basis has never been their preference and that is \vhy 
they have tumed downed previous offers. However, I am sure they can at least explore 
those options. 
As IO Mr. Clark, he purchased a home in Texas in reliance upon the original contract 
being fulfilled. Thus, he had to take out a note for payment to complete his transaction. 
In the event of any type of litigation, \.ve vvould seek specific performance, accrued 
interest and principal along with any utility expenses. Like\vise, we would also seek 
attomey fees and costs incurred herein. We would not waive any other remedies which 
may exist in either lav,,' or in equity. 
Hopefully, the foregoing proposals will lead to successful resolution for all concerned. 
RDD/jn 




L.I:.JU JL.0 -- ..J-lJ.O 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.c. 
P.O. Box 50130 
20100[C- to 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 




RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. CLARK, 
husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY 
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. CLARK, 
husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY 
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON, 
husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-941 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I - REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 
COMES NOW Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC ("Buku"), by and through its counsel of 
record Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and submits this Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. This Memorandum is supported 
by the Affidavits of Brad Foster, Kipp Archibald, and DeAnne Casperson, and the affidavits 
previously submitted by Plaintiff to the Court simultaneous with Plaintiff's prior Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendants' Memorandum Re: Summary Judgment Plaintiff's Second Motion 
("Defendants' Memo") fails to even remotely address the issues which Buku has brought before 
the Court in its Second Motion for Summary Judgment. Buku has asked for summary judgment 
to resolve as a matter of law the remaining issues in this case with regard to whether any alleged 
agreements or arrangements between the parties after the closing date had any material effect on 
Buku's entitlement to a return of the earnest monies under the terms of the Clark and Peterson 
Agreements, plus interest. 
Defendants have failed to address at all the fact that the Agreements require any 
amendments or waivers to the Agreements to be in writing and signed by the parties. 
Additionally, Defendants have failed to sufficiently identify any means by which any alleged oral 
agreement between the parties modified the terms of the original written agreements or would 
not be barred by the statue of frauds. In fact, Defendants continue to insist that they "are not 
trying to remove or change the clear language of the original contracts; but rather are trying to 
show to the ultimate fact-finder that they (defendants) were lead down a path to believe the 
original contract would be enforced as to the damages sustained by the defendants." 
(Defendants' Memo, p. 8). However, this is precisely the problem with Defendants' arguments-
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once the closing date came and went, the Agreements between the parties were terminated and 
Buku was entitled to the return of its earnest monies. The Agreements could not be revived 
absent a later written amendment or waiver. In fact, Buku asked Defendants to extend the 
closing and Defendants refused. Now, however, Defendants want to claim the contract somehow 
continued past the closing date and look to inapplicable equatable remedies instead of the 
language of the parties' Agreements. Defendants have provided no evidence which would entitle 
them to retain the earnest monies, which are refundable pursuant to the terms of the Agreements, 
nor have Defendants provided any evidence of separate agreements of any kind, whether oral or 
written, which would entitle them to retain the earnest monies and/or require that Buku purchase 
the Properties. Buku is entitled to summary judgment on all ofthe pending claims and a return 
of its earnest monies. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Defendants have Failed to Provide Any Evidence of Written Amendments or 
Waivers to the Clark and Peterson Agreements. 
The purchase and sale agreement between Buku and Clarks ("Clark Agreement") and tlle 
plain language of the purchase and sale agreement between Buku and the Petersons ("Peterson 
Agreement") requires that any amendments or waivers to the Agreements be in writing and 
signed by the parties to be valid. Because no such written amendments or waivers exist as to the 
Agreements, the Agreements must be enforced as written. Defendants' have provided no 
evidence of any written amendment or waiver modifying the Agreements. Rather, Defendants 
merely argue that Buku breached the Agreements and therefore "is not entitled to summary 
judgment on its cause of action in the complaint." (Defendants' Memo, p. 10). 
In SUppOlt of its argument that Buku breached the Agreements, Defendants argue that 
Buku's reliance upon the language of paragraph 3 of the Agreements ("Prior to closing, it is 
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Buyer's obligation to make sure that they are fully satisfied with the condition of the property, 
also any requirements, environmental requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer 
needs to make for its due diligence purposes") does not excuse its alleged breach because the 
language "and all requirements that the Buyer needs to make for its due diligence purposes" is 
"so vague it would be impossible for any court to know what 'buyer needs for its due diligence.'" 
(Defendants' Memo, p. 11). However, in making this argument, Defendants ignore the previous 
ruling by the Court in which the Court unequivocally stated that such wording "is unambiguous 
and not so indefinite as to make the contract illusory." (January 27,2010, Memorandum 
Decision, p. 8). Further, Defendants' Counterclaim alleges the "contracts were clear and 
unambiguous .... " (Counterclaim ~~ K and S). Consequently, any arguments made by 
Defendants with regard to this language being vague to the extent that it must be construed 
against Buku, and that, therefore, Buku cmmot rely upon such language in opting not to close on 
the transaction based on its due diligence efforts should be disregm'ded by the Court. The issue 
has already been decided by the Court and Defendants judicially admitted the Agreements were 
clear and unambiguous. 
Additionally, the Court impliedly decided the issue of breach of contract for failure to 
close the transaction, as now argued by Defendants, in its Memorandum Decision on Buku's first 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court specifically stated: 
Buku was given four months to conduct due diligence concerning the properties. 
Potential zoning changes and their impact on financing are precisely the type of 
issues typically dealt with during the due diligence phase of a real estate 
transaction. In short, under the facts ofthis case, it is reasonable that Buku would 
look into potential zoning problems, and that uncertainty regarding the properties' 
zoning would affect its "interests and concerns." 
(January 27,2010, Memorandum Decision, p. 8). Buku has always contended that its reason for 
opting not to close on the Agreements was the potential zoning change to the Clark and Peterson 
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Properties, and the associated impact on Buku's ability to obtain financing for the purchase of the 
Properties. Defendants do not disagree with this fact. (See Defendants' Memo, p. 12). The 
Court recognized in its Memorandum Decision that Buku's reason for opting not to close on the 
Agreements fell under the umbrella of the language of paragraph 3 of the Agreements. (January 
27,2010, Memorandum Decision, p. 8). Buku provided Defendants with notice of the zoning 
defect, and gave Defendants the opportunity to cure the defect. (Magera Aff., '122, Ex. E and 
F). Further, Buku even requested that Defendants consent to extending the closing dates for the 
Agreements in writing. (Magera Aff., ~ 22, Ex. E and F). Defendants rejected that request. 
(Magera Aff., ~ 23, Ex. G). Buku was entitled to opt not to close on the Agreements if it was 
unable to "satisfY its interest and concerns regarding the purchase." (Magera Aff. Ex. '13 A and 
B, ~ 3). This is precisely what Buku did when it discovered, during its due diligence 
investigation, that the zoning of the Clark and Peterson Properties was in question and 
additionally that Buku would be unable to obtain the necessary financing for the purchase of the 
Properties due to this issue. (Magera Aff., ~ 24).' The Court fully recognized the legitimacy of 
this action by Buku pursuant to the terms ofthe contracts. (January 27,2010, Memorandum 
Decision, p. 8). Consequently, Buku did not breach the Agreements in any way, and Defendants' 
argument should be disregarded. Furthermore, because Defendants have failed to produce any 
written amendments or waivers which would modifY the Agreements in any manner to entitled 
Defendants to retain the earnest money, Buku's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of 
I Defendants repeatedly state that Buku's citing of the zoning problems as the 
reason for not closing on the Agreements fails because, based on the Affidavit ofNaysha 
Foster, "[t]he subject land was to be treated as R-1 purposes [sic] for this case." 
(Defendants' Memo, p. 12). Defendants ignore the fact that the potential grandfathering 
in of the Properties was not addressed by Jefferson County until March of2008, three 
months after the closing failed to occur on the basis of the zoning issues. (See Affidavit 
of Naysha Foster, Ex.3). 
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specific performance of the contract and refund of its earnest monies and interest, pursuant to the 
terms of the Agreements, should be granted. 
B. Defendants' Cannot Rely OIl Part Performance or any Other Equitable remedy to 
Alter the Terms of tbe Clark and l>eterson Agreements. 
Defendants continue to argue that the parties entered into negotiations after the 
Agreements terminated and that those negotiations somehow bound Buku to purchase the 
Properties or forfeit its earnest monies. Defendants provide that they are "not trying to remove or 
change the clear language of the original contracts; but rather are trying to show to the ultimate 
fact-finder that they (defendants) were lead down a path to believe the original contract would be 
enforced and/or should be enforced as to the damages sustained by the Defendants." 
(Defendants' Memo., p. 13). Defendants cmIDot use equitable remedies to avoid the written 
agreements. See Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 776-77, 203 P.3d 702,706-07(2009). Even if 
promises were made, which Plaintiff denies, Defendmlts knew revisions to the Agreements had 
to be in writing. Defendants could not have relied on any statements under the circumstances. 
Defendants assert that these unwritten alleged oral agreements are enforceable and not barred by 
the statute of frauds through the doctrine of part performance. In support of this argument, 
Defendants state that "Buku continued to exeli control and domination [sic] over the real 
properties of both Clark and Peterson." 
Defendant's arguments regarding part performance are nonsensical. Pmi performance is 
an exception to the statue of frauds which would otherwise bar an oral agreement. See 
International Bus. Machines v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194, 198-99,677 P.2d 507, 511-12 (Ct. App. 
1984). Part performance has no application to a written contract. See Chapin v. Linden, 144 
Idaho 393, 396, 162 P.3d 772, 775 (2007); Bob Daniels and Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 542, 
681 P.2d 10 10, 10 17 (1984) ("[S] uch performance must relate to the oral agreement and may not 
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J '-,,' 
be referable to another cause, such as the rights and duties provide by a separate written 
contract.") Defendants have pled no cause of action for an oral agreement. To the extent 
Defendants are alleging part performance somehow alters the plain language of the Agreements, 
Defendants' arguments fail. 
In spite of their failure to plead an oral agreement, Defendants appear to be arguing that 
the later negotiations somehow created new oral agreements between the parties, that Defendants 
partially performed on those new oral agreements, and that therefore, enforcement of the alleged 
oral agreements is not barred by the statute of frauds based upon Defendants' part performance. 
The reality is that, although the parties engaged in negotiations to potentially enter into a later 
agreement to regarding the purchase and sale of the Propeliies, the parties never actually came to 
an agreement. (Magera Aff., ~ 25). However, assuming arguendo that the parties had reached 
some kind of agreement, Defendants' argument still fails. 
Part performance is predicated on the existence of an oral agreement. Bauchman-
Kingston Partnership, LP, v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87,233 P.3d 18,23 (2008) (citing Bear 
Island Water Ass 'n v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 723, 874 P.2d 528, 534 (1994». The agreement, 
however, must be complete, definite and certain in all its terms, or contain provisions which are 
capable of being reduced to certainty. Bauchman-Kingston, 233 P.3d at 23. For a land sale 
contract to be specifically enforced, the contract must typically contain the minimum provisions 
of the parties involved, the subject matter thereof, the price or consideration, a description of the 
property, and all the essential terms of the agreement. Chapin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 396, 
162 P.3d 772, 775 (2007) (citing Hoffman v. SV Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 190,628 P.2d 218, 221 
(1981». 
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Nowhere do Defendants provide the tenns of any alleged oral agreements. There are no 
allegations as to how the earnest money would be treated under the alleged oral agreements. Nor 
have Defendants provided any other tenns of the alleged oral agreements, such as a closing date, 
terms of financing, or treatment ofthe home located on the Peterson Property. In fact, the 
correspondence between the parties attached to the Affidavit of Jerry and Betty Peterson in 
Support of Defendants' Position Re: Summary Judgment as Exhibit BB clearly indicates that the 
tenns of any alleged later oral or written agreement were never finalized, and were significantly 
different from the tenns of the original Agreements. In the absence of the alleged terms of the 
alleged later oral agreements, it is impossible for the Court to even consider the application of 
past perfonnance. 
Even if it is assumed that there was a subsequent oral agreement regarding the purchase 
of the Properties and that agreement had the same tenns as the original Agreements, Defendants 
can point to no portion of the Agreements under which they have perfonned. Defendants claim 
that some alleged exercise of dominion and control over the Property by Buku is sufficient for 
part perfonnance on the part of Defendants. No where is this addressed as a tenn of the original 
Agreements. Moreover, as Buku previously explained in its Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Buku did not exercise dominion and control 
over either of the Properties. (See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p. 19-15). Buku will not repeat those arguments, but it clearly demonstrated 
the Petersons and Clarks retained control over their properties based on their straightforward 
admissions in their deposition testimony. Defendants have not partially perfonned on any 
agreements which existed between the parties. Therefore, partial perfonnance, cannot save any 
alleged subsequent oral agreement from being barred by the statute of frauds. Further, 
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Defendants reliance on any other equitable remedy to avoid the written agreements is not 
permissible. Buku is entitled to summary judgment. 
C. The Facts Before the Court Resolve the Question of Whether Buku Could 
Terminate the Agreements and was Entitled to a Return of Earnest Monies. 
Defendants argue that "[t]he controverted facts still do not solve the unresolved question 
of whether the Plaintiffs could unilaterally terminate a contract, partially performed, by the 
assumption of zoning issues." (Defendants' Memo., p 18). Again, partial performance has no 
relevance to a written agreement. The Court has in front of it all of the facts necessary to resolve 
this case as to the Agreements between the parties and the return of the earnest monies because 
nothing more is needed other than the plain language of the Agreements. The Agreements 
require any amendments or waivers modifying the Agreements to be in 'writing. The Agreements 
provide that: 
Prior to closing, it is Buyer's obligation to make sure that they are fully satisfied 
with the condition of the property, also any requirements, environmental 
requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer needs to make for its due 
diligence purposes. Buyer will have four months to perform the due diligence 
inspections to satisfy Buyer's interests and concerns regarding the purchase. 
(Magera Aff., Ex. A, ~ 3; Ex. B, ~ 3). Because of the zoning problems that arose, Buku was 
unable to obtain the necessary financing for the purchase. Buku gave Defendants that opportunity 
to cure the zoning defect, and offered to amend the Agreements, in writing, in order to allow 
Defendants sufficient time to cure. However, Defendants refused, the closing date passed 
without Defendants curing the zoning defect, and the contract terminated. As the Court has 
already recognized, "[p ]otential zoning changes and their impact on financing are precisely the 
types of issues typically dealt with during the due diligence phase of a real estate transaction." 
Contrary to Defendants' assertions, the zoning defect remained at the time of closing. (See 
Affidavit of Naysha Foster, Ex. 3, indicating that Jefferson County did not provide Buku with 
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correspondence regarding the potential grandfathering of the Properties in question as being 
zoned R-l until late March 2008, three months after closing would have occurred). After the 
closing date passed without Defendants curing the zoning defect, Buku was entitled to a return of 
its earnest monies, pursuant to the terms of the Agreements. (Magera Aff., Ex. A, ~ ~ 2,3; Ex. B 
~ ~ 2,3). No written amendments or waivers were executed. The parties did not enter into any 
later agreements. Consequently, specific performance of the Agreements requires the return of 
the earnest monies to Buku and summary judgment in Buku's favor. 
D. Defendants' Claim and Summary Judgment in Buku's Favor for Summary 
Judgment is Untimely and Improper, and Should Not Be Considered by the Court 
In Defendants' Memorandum they state: "[t]he defendants/counter-plaintiffs are entitled 
to summary judgment on the issue of liability on their counterclaims" and further provide, 
"[s]ince plaintiff breached the contract, the defendants are clearly entitled to liability on their 
counterclaim for breach of contract." (Defendants' Memo, p. 13). Defendants have not actually 
filed any motion for summary judgment, nor have Defendants served Buku with a Notice of 
Hearing indicating that its motion for summary judgment will be heard at the December 13, 
2010, hearing on Buku's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. Given Defendants' untimely 
and improper argument, Defendants claim for Summary Judgment should not be considered by 
the Court. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant its Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment and order the return of Plaintiff s earnest monies. 
Dated this 6TH day of December, 2010. 
- 1/ 
DeAnne Casperson V 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 6th day of December 2010, I served a copy of the following 
described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or 
by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY Judgment 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Robin D. Dunn 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
( v}First Class Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( b!Facsimile 
( ) Overnight Mail 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. ~ 
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RAOEL H. CLARK. and JANET C. CLARK, 
husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY 
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. CLARK, 
husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY 
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON, 
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Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company. 
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I - MOTION TO STRIKE 
Case No. CV-08-941 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
COMES NOW Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC ("Buku"), by and through its counsel of 
record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC, and move this Court to strike the portions of the 
Affidavit of Jerry and Betty Peterson in Support of Defendants' Positions Re: Summary 
Judgement, filed November 29,2010; the Affidavit of Jerry and Betty Peterson in Support of 
Defendants' Positions Re: Summary Judgement, filed November 13,2009; and the Affidavit of 
Raoel Clark in Support of Defendants' Positions Re: Summary Judgement, filed November 13, 
2009. This Motion is supported by Buku's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike and the 
Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson in Support of Motion to Strike, filed simultaneous herewith. 
Dated this 6TH day of December, 2010. 
2 - MOTION TO STRlKE 
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I hereby certify that on this 6th day of December 2010, I served a copy of the 
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand 
delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct 
copy thereof. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: MOTION TO STRIKE 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Robin D. Dunn 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
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husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY 
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON, 
husband and wife, 
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RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. CLARK, 
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liability company, 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
I 
COMES NOW Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC ("Buku"), by and through its counsel of 
record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC, and submits this Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Strike. 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants Raoel H. Clark and Janet C. Clark ("Clarks") and Angus Jerry Peterson and 
Betty Jean Peterson ("Petersons") (collectively "Defendants") submitted their Memorandum Re: 
Summary Judgement Plaintiffs Second Motion in response to Buku's Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment, on November 29,2010 ("Defendants' Memorandum"). Along with 
Defendants' Memorandum, Defendants submitted the Affidavit of Jerry and Betty Peterson in 
Support of Defendants' Positions Re: Summary Judgment ("Second Peterson Affidavit."). 
Defendants have also previously submitted to the Court the Afffidavit of Jerry and Betty Peterson 
in Support of Defendants' Positions Re: Summary Judgment ("Original Peterson Affidavit") and 
the Affidavit ofRaoel Clark in Support of Defendants' Positions Re: Summary Judgment 
("Original Clark Affidavit"). Portions of the such affidavits contain legal conclusions, hearsay, 
or lack foundation, and further, portions of such affidavits constitute a "sham" and are therefore 
inadmissible. Consequently, Buku objects to those portions of the affidavits and requests that the 
Court strike those portions of the affidavits from the record. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Second Peterson Affidavit 
Buku moves to strike the following portions of the Second Peterson Affidavit for the 
reasons specified below: 
1. Paragraph 9: 
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The Brad Foster affidavit states that Mr. Foster contacted Jerry Peterson 
concerning the farming of the Peterson property for the 2008 year. Mr. Foster 
indicated Jaramie Magera had sent him to me to inquire as to the status. As such, 
I believed Mr. Foster was acting on directions from Magera as his implied agent. 
I explained to Mr. Foster that Magera could do whatever he wanted with the real 
property if the final payments were made on the contract. If payments were not 
made, then I instructed Mr. Foster that my son was going to rent the ground for 
2008. Mr. Foster and myself were both unsure who "owned the ground" as stated 
in his affidavit. Your affiant believed that Magera was still in control of the real 
property. I had no further dealings with Brad Foster. 
(Second Peterson Aff., ~ 9). This testimony contradicts Mr. Peterson's testimony at his 
deposition. Mr. Peterson stated the following at his deposition: 
Q. (Ms. Casperson) You indicate that in March, you don't have a date, that Brad 
Foster called you; is that correct? 
A. (Mr. Peterson) That's correct. 
Q. And specifically tell me what you can recall Mr. Foster told you. 
A. Mr. Foster said that Jaramie called him and wanted him to rent the farm. 
He asked me if it was in pasture. I said yes, but Jaramie hadn't bought the 
place yet. He said, oh, he hasn't. He said I understand he's going to. I 
said, well, when he buys it, he can do what he wants, but ifhe don't buy it, 
why, I'm going to let Steve run it. 
Q. And that's what you did, correct? 
A. That's what I did. 
[ ... J 
Q. You specifically testified that you told Brad Foster that until Buku actually 
paid you the money they weren't going to get to use that pastureland, 
correct? 
A. Yeah, and Brad said he didn't want to get in - I said Magera hadn't bought 
it yet. When he bought it, he could do whatever he wanted with it, but 
until then Steve would run it. And he says, well, I don't want to get 
involved in it then. 
(Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson in Support of Motion to Strike ("Casperson Aff."), Ex. A 
("Peterson Depo."), p. 58,1. 7-18; p. 68, In. 11-20). Mr. Peterson's deposition testimony clearly 
indicates that he was well aware that he "owned the ground," and furthermore, that Mr. Magera 
was not "in control of the real property." Mr. Peterson's affidavit contradicts this sworn 
testimony. 
3 - MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE 
Statements in an affidavit which directly contradict deposition testimony may be 
disregarded on a summary judgment motion. (See Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. J. R. Simplot Co., 124 
Idaho 607, 610, 862 P.2d 299, 302 (1993) and Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (explaining the "sham affidavit" rule: "The general rule in the Ninth Circuit is that a 
party cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior deposition testimony." 
"[I]f a party who has been examined at length on deposition could raise an issue of fact simply by 
submitting an affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony, this would greatly diminish the 
utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact." (Internal 
citations omitted)). To the extent that the testimony in Mr. Peterson's affidavit contradicts his 
sworn deposition testimony, such testimony in Mr. Peterson's affidavit should be stricken from 
the record and should not be considered by the Court. 
2. Paragraph lO(excerpt): 
Kip [sic] Archibald, realtor, was not hired by the undersigned but was hired to sell 
real estate by laramie Magera ... 
(Second Peterson AfL, ~ 10). The above statement lacks foundation and, further, Mr. Peterson 
has demonstrated no personal knowledge as to this matter. Therefore, such statement should be 
stricken from the record and disregarded by the Court. 
3. Paragraph 8: 
4-
Your affiants allege that the plaintiff breached the written contract by non-
performance of the payment on the closing date and by continued exercise of 
dominion and control over the subject real property until as late as November, 
2008. 
Paragraph 14: 
Your affiants believed that the plaintiff breached the contract by not closing on 
December 21, 2007. 
Paragraph 17: 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE 
Your affiants believe and allege that the plaintiff is liable for damages and/or is 
requested to perform on the contract (Specific Performance). 
(Second Peterson Aff., "8, 14, 17). The above statements are legal conclusions. Defendants 
have brought causes of action against Buku for breach of contract and specific performance. 
Because Mr. Peterson's statements regarding whether Buku breached the contract or whether 
Defendants are entitled to specific performance are legal conclusions, and not statements of fact, 
those portions of Mr. Peterson's affidavit should not be considered by the Court. 
B. Original Peterson Affidavit 
Buku moves the Court to strike the following portions of the Original Peterson Affidavit: 
1. Paragraph 12: 
The purpose of the purchase by the buyers was never communicated to the undersigned 
affiants nor did the contract state any potential use of the real property being purchased by 
buyers. Both properties were historically used as farm operations. Your affiant did 
know, however, that plaintiffs were in the business of land speCUlation and development. 
Moreover, the sale of the real property by written contract never contained any language 
of speculative purposes or of development. 
(Original Peterson Aff., , 12). This testimony contradicts the deposition testimony of Mr. 
Peterson with regard to his knowledge of Buku's intention to develop the Peterson property: 
Q. (Ms. Casperson) So if! understand your testimony correctly is that you 
understood that Buku was purchasing the property for 
purposes of developing it. You just didn't have any 
knowledge about how they intended to develop it? 
A. (Mr. Peterson) No. I didn't know whether they were going to try to have 
half-acre lots or whatever. I didn't know. 
Q. But you did understand that they were purchasing it for purposes of 
developing it? 
A. Yes. 
(Peterson Depo., p. 18, In. 22 - p. 19, In. 7). Because Mr. Peterson's affidavit contradicts his 
deposition testimony, paragraph 12 of Mr. Peterson's affidavit constitutes a "sham." Clearly, Mr. 
5 - MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE 
Peterson was well aware that the Peterson property was being purchased for the purpose of 
development. (See argument above regarding the legal basis for striking "sham" affidavit 
testimony). Therefore, to the extent that Mr. Peterson's testimony in the Original Peterson 
Affidavit contradicts his deposition testimony, the Court should disregard the testimony in the 
Original Peterson Affidavit and such testimony should be stricken from the record. 
2. Paragraph 18 (excerpt): 
The plaintiff exercised dominion and control over the real properties contained in 
the written contracts of the defendants/counter-plaintiffs ... 
Paragraph 26: 
Your affiants allege that the plaintiff breached the written contract by non-
performance of the payment on the closing date and by continued exercise of 
dominion and control over the subject real property. 
Paragraph 28: 
Your affiants believe and allege that the plaintiff is liable for damages and/or is 
requested to perform on the contract (Specific Performance). 
(Original Peterson Aff., ~~ 18, 26, 28). The above statements are legal conclusions. Defendants 
have brought causes of action against Buku for breach of contract and specific performance. 
Because Mr. Peterson's statements regarding whether Buku breached the contract or whether 
Defendants are entitled to specific performance are legal conclusions, and not statements of fact, 
those portions of Mr. Peterson's affidavit should not be considered by the Court. 
C. Original Clark Affidavit 
Buku moves to strike the following portions of the Original Clark Affidavit: 
1. Paragraph 11: 
The purpose of the purchase by the buyers was never communicated to the undersigned 
affiants nor did the contract state any potential use of the real property being purchased by 
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buyers. Both properties were historically used as fann operations. Your affiant did 
know, however, that plaintiffs were in the business ofland speculation and development. 
Moreover, the sale of the real property by written contract never contained any language 
of speculative purposes or of development. 
2. Paragraph 16 (excerpt): 
... The real property of the undersigned was used for farming by the buyer 
throughout the 2008 fann year. 
(Original Clark Aff., ~ 11, 16). This testimony contradicts the deposition testimony of Mr. Clark 
with regard to his knowledge of Buku' s intention to develop the Peterson property and the fact 
that Buku did not fann the Clark Property in 2008: 
[ ... J 
Q. (Ms. Casperson) And in 2007 you began having negotiations with Mr. 
Magera and either Jab Construction or Buku with regard to 
the purchase of the property; is that correct? 
A. (Mr. Clark) Yes. 
Q. And isn't it true when Mr. Magera had those negotiations with you that he 
drove you to other developments that he had done? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you understood at the time that the purpose of purchasing that property was 
to develop it; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So how did Buku control that property after the agreement did not close in 
December? 
A. Well, I was hoping that it would continue on. But as to whether - I don't 
know who owned what. The property never left my ownership, and it 
wouldn't until it was paid for. 
Q. Okay. And you agreed to allow Mr. Foster to farm that land, correct? 
A. Sure. You know, if you let it go, it turns to weeds. Somebody had to 
make a call on it. 
Q. And you agreed you were the person that did that? 
A. I did. I mean, I was told by Brad that Mr. Magera asked him to call me 
and see if it was all right. 
Q. SO you're not alleging that Buku actually received any profits off of you 
property, correct? 
A. I don't know that they did. I don't see how they could. 
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(Casperson Aff., Ex. B ("Clark Depo."), p. 6, In. 22 - p.7, In. 9; p. 30, In. 17 - p. 31, In. 11). 
Because Mr. Clark's affidavit contradicts his deposition testimony, paragraphs 11 and 16 of his 
affidavit constitute a "sham." Clearly, Mr. Clark was well aware that the Clark Property was 
being purchased for the purpose of development. Additionally, it is clear that Mr. Clark's 
testimony is that Brad Foster farmed the land, not Buku. (See argument above regarding the 
legal basis for striking "sham" affidavit testimony). Therefore, to the extent that Mr. Clark's 
testimony in the Original Clark Affidavit contradicts his deposition testimony, the Court should 
disregard the testimony in the Original Clark Affidavit and such testimony should be stricken 
from the record. 
3. Paragraph 16 (excerpt): 
The plaintiff exercised dominion and control over the real properties contained in 
the written contracts of the defendants/counter-plaintiffs ... 
Paragraph 20: 
Your affiant alleges that the plaintiff breached the written contract by non-
performance of the payment on the closing date and by continued exercise of 
dominion and control over the subject real property. 
Paragraph 22: 
Your affiant believes and alleges that the plaintiff is liable for damages and/or is 
requested to perform on the contract (Specific Performance). 
(Original Clark Aff., "16, 20, 22). The above statements are legal conclusions. Defendants 
have brought causes of action against Buku for breach of contract and specific performance. 
Because Mr. Clark's statements regarding whether Buku breached the contract or whether 
Defendants are entitled to specific performance are legal conclusions, and not statements of fact, 
those portions of Mr. Clark's affidavit should not be considered by the Court. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Buku respectfully requests that the Court grant its Motion to Strike. 
Dated this ~f ...... ~ of December, 2010. 
G:IWPDATAICAHlI49181PIdgslStrike.MEMO.wpd:ah 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 6th day of December 2010, I served a copy of the following 
described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or 
by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
RobinD. Dunn 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
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( vr:;rst Class Mail 
( ) ]land Delivery 
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
DeAnne Casperson, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am an attorney with the firm of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and 
an attorney of record on behalf of Buku Properites, LLC. I submit this Affidavit 
based upon my own personal knowledge unless otherwise stated, and in support of 
the Motion to Strike. 
2. On April 13, 2010, I took the deposition of Defendant Angus Jerry Peterson. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit A are relevant portions of the transcript of such 
deposition. 
3. On April 13, 2010, I took the deposition of Defendant Raoel H. Clark. Attached 
hereto as Exhibit B are relevant portions of the transcript of such deposition. 
'h..." 
Dated this £ day of December, 2010. 
('~v' SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9 day of December, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 6TH day of December, 2010, I served a copy of the 
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand 
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1 selling, I have no idea how much it was. 1 they intended to develop it? 
2 Q. You indicated that you had received an 2 A. No. I didn't know whether they were 
3 offer to sell your property several years earlier, 3 going to try to have half-acre lots or whatever. I ; 
4 correct? 4 didn't know. ! 
5 A. That's right 5 Q. But you did understand that they were 
6 Q. And how much were they going to pay 6 purchasing it for purposes of developing it? 
7 you per acre? 7 A. Yes. 
8 A. They were gOing to pay me $5,000 an 8 Q. Now, in 2007 after you entered into 
9 acre for farming ground. 9 this agreement with Buku, tell me what your 
10 Q. And their purpose, was it to develop 10 understanding was as to the county's action with 
11 it? 11 regard to possibly changing the zoning? 
12 A. They were going to develop it. 12 A. Mr. Magera called me and said that 
13 Q. And you're not familiar with anyone 13 they was having a meeting on planning and zoning. 
14 else who has sold property for farming purposes and 14 They wanted to change it. Wanted us to come to the 
15 what the going rate was for that? 15 meeting. 
16 A. No. 16 Q. Had you heard from other people •• 
17 Q. Did you have an understanding of what 17 A. No. 
18 the going rate was for acreage for purposes of 18 Q. Can I finish the question? 
19 development? 19 A. Okay. 
20 A. I never paid any attention to that. 20 Q. Had you heard from other people that 
21 only just going by and saying they wanted 30,000, 21 the county was interested in possibly changing the 
22 40,000 by -- I think it was one of his properties 22 zoning? 
23 over there on the county line. It seemed to me. 23 A. Not until he told me. 
24 It might be wrong. It seemed like they wanted 24 Q. And did you attend that zoning 
25 $40,000 an acre for it. 25 meeting? 
r== PAGE 18 r== PAGE 20 
1 Q. And what was your understanding from 1 A. I attended that meeting. 
2 the contract that you entered into with Buku what 2 Q. Did Mr. Magera explain to you why he 
3 you were being paid per acre for your property? 3 wanted you to attend that meeting? 
4 A. Well, I was paid so much for the 4 A. He said to come in and have anybody 
5 acreage, and I was paid - and then I was paid so 5 else that was interested in coming. 
6 much for the house. 6 Q. Did he explain to you what Buku's 
7 ' Q. Did you have an understanding as to 7 concern was with regard to the county changing the 
8 what you were being paid per acre for the land? 8 zoning? 
9 A. I was being paid -I can look it up. 9 A. Well, he didn't want it changed. 
10 Q. You'd have to look at the purchase 10 Q. Why didn't he want it changed? 
11 agreement; is that what you're saying? 11 A. Well, I'm sure he didn't want it 
12 A. Yeah. 12 changed because he wanted either one-acre lots or 
13 Q. I think there's a copy of it right 13 less. 
14 here. I think that one is Mr. Clark's. You can go 14 Q. Did you go to that meeting for the 
15 ahead and take a look at Exhibit *-B. Do you have 15 purposes of contesting the county changing that 
16 a rough idea of what you were being paid per acre? 16 zoning? 
17 A. Okay. I was being paid $653,000. 17 A. I went to the meeting, but I never 
18 Q. And this was roughly for 73 acres; is 18 said a word. 
19 that correct? 19 Q. What was your purpose in attending the 
20 A. Approximately 73 acres. 72 acres it 20 meeting? 
21 says on the contract. 21 A. He asked me to come and go. 
22 Q. So if I understand your testimony 22 Q. That was the only reason you went? 
23 correctly is that you understood that Buku was 23 A. That was the only reason I knew about 
24 purchasing the property for purposes of developing 24 it. 
25 it. You just didn't have any know/edge about how 25 Q. And did you ever attend any other 
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1 that Mr. Archibald called you and asked you what 1 changed. 
2 you wanted to do with the house, correct? 2 Q. How did you know he still wanted it? 
3 A. Yes, he did. 3 A. He told me that. 
4 Q. And at that time you were still the 4 Q. When? 
5 owner of that property, correct? 5 A. Well, he told me here, and he told me 
6 A. That's right. 6 on that meeting, that meeting we went to. 
7 Q. And as the owner of the property, you 7 Q. Now, we've specifically been over your 
8 would be the only one who would have authority to 8 statement that you prepared for December 12th, and 
9 decide whether or not to sell that property, 9 during that meeting you had already testified that 
10 correct? 10 he specifically said that they wouldn't pay if the 
11 MR. DUNN: Objection. Legal conclusion. 11 zoning went to five-acre lots, correct? 
12 And leading again. 12 A. That's right. But it didn~ go to 
13 THE WITNESS: I was the owner of the 13 five-acre lots. Is that correct? 
14 property. But we were still figuring on selling 14 Q. And you didn't know that in December, 
15 it, because he said if it would - the zoning was 15 did you? 
16 changed. And the zoning wasn't changed. And so I 16 A. What? 
17 told him to get ahold of Mr. Magera and Mr. Dunn, 17 Q. You didn't know whether it had or had 
18 because it wasn~ up to me, because I had already 18 not in December of 2008, correct? 
19 had a thing that was supposed to be in place, and 19 A. I didn't know that it had. 
20 it was - still hadn't - completely hadn't gone, 20 Q. You didn't know that it hadn't either? 
21 because he had wanted to go to the 31st of March. 21 A. No. So thafs why we were waiting on 
22 Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: But this was past 22 this - it wouldn't make any difference. 
23 the 31st of March even --I'm sorry. You refused 23 Q. Mr. Peterson, you would agree with me 
24 to sign that document, correct, extending the 24 that at the time you made these notes your memory 
25 clOSing date? 25 would have been more accurate than it is today? 
r=== PAGE 50 r=== PAGE 52 
1 A. I didn't sign it, no. 1 A. It probably would. That's why I made 
2 Q. So as it existed that date, there was 2 these notes. 
3 no document extending the clOSing, correct? 3 Q. Prior to Mr. Archibald calling you on 
4 A. Only that he still wanted the 4 January 3rd, asking what you wanted to do with the 
5 property. 5 house, had you had prior discussions with 
6 Q. What document can you show me that he 6 Mr. Archibald? 
7 still wanted the property on that date? 7 A. None. He come out - him and 
8 A. I haven't got a document. 8 Mr. Magera come out before we moved, and they went 
9 Q. And you haven't indicated any kind of 9 through the house. He took him through the house, 
10 conversation during that time frame that indicated 10 and they put it up for sale. 
11 that Mr. Magera still wanted the property, correct? 11 Q. Were you there? 
12 A. Yes, I did. Because Brad Foster 12 A. I was there when they went through the 
13 called me, and he said that Jaramie wanted him to 13 house. I wasn't in any of their negotiations. I 
14 operate the farm this year. 14 didn't know how much they were going to get or 
15 Q. Lers back up. That happens in March, 15 anything like that. 
16 correct? 16 Q. You're saying that you never signed 
17 A. You're talking about March here too, 17 the listing agreement with Mr. Archibald? 
18 aren't you? 18 A. Never. Never talked to him about it. 
19 Q. I'm talking about January. 19 Never signed nothing. 
20 A. January. 20 Q. Did you approve the listing of the 
21 Q. Of2008. 21 house with Mr. Archibald? 
22 A. I don't recall anything about that 22 A. No. 
23 other than the thing was still in limbo, because I 23 Q. But you were there? 
24 knew -- I knew that he still wanted it if the 24 A. I was there when he brought it out. 
25 zoning didn't get changed, and it didn't get 25 And then there was no Signing done there. He 
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1 brought Mr. Archibald out, and they went through 1 went out there, found a cell phone in the master 
2 the house and looked it over. 2 bedroom of the house. And according to a neighbor, 
3 Q. How could Buku list a property that 3 Earl Coles, the house was still being shown. The 
4 they didn't own? 4 blinds in the front rooms were open, which I have 
5 A. I don't know. But when he called me 5 kept closed. The for-sale sign was still up. 
6 up, Jaramie said that he had the house up for sale, 6 Q. So you have no idea when that cell 
7 and he says would you sign it over, because he said 7 phone was left, correct? 
8 I need to --I need you to sign it. I said, yeah, 8 A. No. 
9 sure, I WOUld. 9 Q. You have no idea when the blinds were 
10 Q. That you would essentially give Buku 10 allegedly moved? 
11 Properties the authority to market the house? . 11 A. No. 
12 A. No. I never give authority to do 12 Q. Mr. Peterson, if Mr. Archibald had an 
13 anything until he asked me on early in December. 13 agreement with Buku Properties to sell the house, 
14 But this was before December that they come out the 14 why would he call you on January 3rd of 2008 and 
15 first time and put a sign out. 15 ask you what you wanted to do with the house --
16 Q. Did you ever tell Mr. Archibald to 16 MR. DUNN: Objection, speculation. 
17 take that sign down? 17 Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: -- to the extent 
18 A. Never told him to take the sign down. 18 that you can testify. 
19 Q. Did you ever tell him to remove the 19 MR. DUNN: Objection, speculation. How is 
20 lock box? 20 he supposed to know--
21 A. I never told him to remove the lock 21 THE WITNESS: I don't know but I'll tell 
22 box. But he called me and in -- he called me .- he 22 you what I thought. I thought Mr. Magera was 
23 called me August 6th. He called me on his cell 23 standing right there beside him wanting him to 
24 phone, asked about selling the house. I told him 24 call.' 
25 to talk with Jaramie and said we don't know what's 25 Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: But you have no 
~ PAGE 54 ===============j! r== PAGE 56 ===============jJ 
1 going on right now. We've turned everything over 1 evidence of that, correct? 
2 to our attorney, Rob Dunn. Kipp said Jaramie still 2 A. No. No, I don't. 
3 wanted the farms, ours and Clarks, and the bank had 3 Q. Did you ever ask Mr. Archibald who he 
4 cut down on the loaning percentages. 4 was taking his directions from for purposes of 
5 Q. Mr. Peterson, let me take you back to 5 selling the house? 
6 your January 3rd conversation that you had with 6 A. No. 
7 Mr. Archibald. When he asked you what you wanted 7 Q. And you never asked him to remove the 
8 to do with the house and you told him to go talk to 8 lock box, correct? 
9 your attorney, Mr. Dunn, do you have any know/edge 9 A. No. 
10 of whether Mr. Archibald had a conversation with 10 MR. DUNN: Objection. Asked and answered. 
11 your attorney? 11 Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: And you never asked 
12 A. I have no idea. 12 him to remove the sale sign? 
13 Q. So you have no idea what Mr. Archibald 13 MR. DUNN: Objection. Asked and answered. 
14 did after that? 14 Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: Correct? 
15 A. No. 15 A. No. I never asked him to remove it. 
16 Q. But you do know that he continued to 16 Q. And if Mr. Archibald had sold that 
17 have a Sign in front of the house? 17 property, who would you have expected to get the 
18 A. He had a sign in front of the house, 18 proceeds? 
19 yes. 19 A. Well, if the property was - if the 
20 Q. And he had a lock box on it? 20 farm and that would have sold, I would have 
21 A. He had a lock box on it. 21 expected him to get the proceeds. But the farm 
22 Q. And was he giving you notification of 22 wasn't sold, so the house wouldn't have been sold. 
23 any showings that took place? 23 To me, I wouldn't ·-1 wouldn't have got any 
24 A. No. He wasn't giving me any showings. 24 proceeds because I wouldn't --I didn't have it up 
25 But I went out there and - on June 27th, 2008, I 25 for sale. Jaramie is the one that put it up for 
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1 sale. 1 move in. If he didn't take it and we got it back, 
2 Q. Who would have had to sign the 2 why, then I would sell it. 
3 documents in order to transfer title to that 3 Q. So you were concerned that any renters 
4 property? 4 would damage the property? 
5 A. I would have. But if he wasn't going 5 A. Yes. 
6 to buy the farm, it wouldn't have been sold. I 6 Q. You indicated in your prior testimony 
7 didn't have anything to do with selling the 7 on August 6 of 2008 that Kipp Archibald again 
8 property - selling the house. I had nothing to do 8 called you and asked you about selling the house, 
9 with that. Never talked to Mr. Archibald. He 9 correct? 
10 called me twice. That's the only times that I 10 A. That's right. 
11 talked to him. 11 Q. And, again, you referred him to 
12 Q. So without any understanding as to why 12 Jaramie and Mr. Dunn, correct? 
13 Mr. Archibald was trying to sell it, you just 13 A. That's right. 
14 continued to let the sign stay there and the lock 14 Q. And, again, did you have an 
15 box stay on it? 15 understanding as to why Mr. Archibald would be 
16 A.. I thought that he was trying to sell 16 calling you as to what you wanted done with the 
17 it for Mr. Magera. 17 house? 
18 Q. But you never had a conversation with 18 A. He called me, and I told him 
19 him about that? 19 everything was turned over to our attorney, Robin 
20 A. No. No. 20 Dunn. And he said Jaramie still wanted the farm, 
21 Q. Now, during this time frame that the 21 along with the Clarks', but the bank had cut down 
22 property, you say, had the sign out front, you were 22 on the loaning percentage. 
23 taking care of the property, correct? 23 Q. Isn't it true that later in 2008 that 
24 A. Thafs right. 24 there were proposals gOing back and forth between 
25 Q. And, in fact, you leased the farmland 25 you and Buku Properties to come to a new agreement 
r== PAGE 58 r=== PAGE 60 
1 to your son for pasture, correct? Is that a yes? 1 with regard to the sale of the property? 
2 A. Yes. 2 MR. DUNN: Objection. Form of the 
3 Q. You indicate that in March, you don't 3 question. 
4 have a date, that Brad Foster called you; is that 4 THE WITNESS: There was a letter written to 
5 correct? 5 us, I guess, yes. 
6 A. That's correct. 6 Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: And isn't it true 
7 Q. And speCifically tell me what you can 7 that that contained different terms than the 
8 recall Mr. Foster told you. ·8 original terms in the purchase and sale agreement? 
9 A. Mr. Foster said that Jaramie called 9 MR. DUNN: Objection. Leading. 
10 him and wanted him to rent the farm. He asked me 10 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
11 if it was in pasture. I said yes, but Jaramie 11 Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: What did you 
12 hasnt bought the place yet. He said oh, he 12 understand was the difference between the terms 
13 hasn't. He said I understand he's going to. I 13 that were proposed in the letters as opposed to the 
14 said, well, when he buys it, he can do what he 14 terms in the original purchase and sale agreement? 
15 wants, but if he don't buy it, why, I'm going to 15 A. They wanted to make payments on it. 
16 let Steve run it. 16 Q. And was there ever any contract signed 
17 Q. And that's what you did, correct? 17 as a result of those negotiations? 
18 A. That's what I did. 18 A. Not with me. 
19 Q. So any profits that were made with 19 (Exhibit *-J marked.) 
20 regard to that farmland came to you, correct? 20 Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: "II hand you what 
21 A. That's right. 21 was previously marked as Exhibit *.J. Do you 
22 Q. Why didn't you take actions to lease 22 recognize that document? 
23 the house out if you were no longer Jiving there? 23 A. Yes. 
24 A. Because I didn't want to lease it out. 24 Q. Can you identify it for me? 
25 It was in good shape, and I didn~ want people to 25 A. Well, it's a letter for the " i r\ i ~i 
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Ii 1 never changed. 1 gave your son the right to use the pastureland? 
2 Q. What does that have to do with Buku 2 A. That's right. 
3 exercising dominion or control over the property'? 3 Q. So you're not asserting that Buku •• 
II 4 A. You mean I just go sell it and default 4 A. No. 5 the thing? 5 Q. •• had any kind of dominion or 
6 Q. No. I'm trying to ask you 6 control·· 
II 7 specifically how Buku was in control over your 7 A. No. 8 property'? 8 Q. •• over the pasture land ··Iet me 
9 A. Well, they were in control over the 9 finish. You're not asserting that Buku had any 
Ii 10 house. 10 kind of control over the pastureland, correct? 11 Q. How were they in control over the 11 A. Thafs right. 
12 house? 12 Q. And your only evidence that Buku was 
I 13 A. Had the house locked up. 13 controlling the house was your assumption that 14 Q. Did you have keys to the house? 14 Mr. Archibald was acting on behalf of Buku, 
15 A. I had a key to the house. 15 correct? 
I 
16 Q. Did Buku or Mr. Magera have keys to 16 A. That's right. 
17 the house? 17 Q. And any profits that were made with 
18 A. I gave him the keys. 18 regard to the pastureland came to you, correct? 
I 
19 Q. Do you know if he still had those keys 19 A. That's right. 
20 at that time? 20 Q. And you're not aware of any payments 
21 A. No. He might have gave them to 21 that Buku received as a result of having any kind 
I 
22 Archibald, but he had keys. He had keys and he had 22 of control or dominion over that property'? 
23 the door openers. And he's never returned the door 23 A. No. 
24 openers. 24 Q. And you never observed anyone actually 
I 
25 Q. Are you aware of any time when any 25 going through the property other than the cell 
r== PAGE 66 r== PAGE 68 
1 agent of Buku was on your property after this 1 phone that you found in there, the blinds being in 
I 2 purchase and sale agreement failed to close? 2 a different position, and then this statement that 3 A. Well, only Archibald. 3 you have from your neighbor that it was shown; is 
4 Q. And you never had any discussion with 4 that correct? 
I 5 Archibald as to who he understood he was 5 A. "ve never seen anybody in there 6 representing? 6 myself, no. 
7 A Well, I just assumed he was 7 Q. And it was true during this time that 
I 8 representing him because he brought him out to our 8 you and your wife were still maintaining and caring 9 place and went through the house. And they was 9 for the property, correct? 
10 taking notes down and size of the rooms and what 10 A That's right. 
t 
11 was done down in the basement and everything else. 11 Q. You specifically testified that you 
12 Q. And isn't it true that that all 12 told Brad Foster that until Buku actually paid you 
13 happened prior to the contract being closed, 13 the money they weren't going to get to use that 
14 correct? 14 pastureland, correct? 
15 A That's right. 15 A Yeah. And Brad said he didn't want to 
16 Q. And after that happened on January 16 get in --I said Magera hadn't bought it yet. When 
17 3rd, Mr. Archibald specifically called you and said 17 he bought it. he could do whatever he wanted with 
18 what do you want me to do with the property'? 18 it, but until then Steve would run it. And he 
19 A. Yes. He said - and I told him he had 19 says, well, I don't want to get involved in it 
20 to talk to Magera and to Rob Dunn. 20 then. 
21 Q. And you don't have any knowledge as to 21 Q. Why didn't you tell Mr. Archibald the 
22 whether he did any of those things? 22 same sort of thing? 
23 A No. 'talked to him twice is all I 23 A. Well, I didn't know Mr. Archibald was 
24 ever talked to him. 24 selling the ground. 
25 Q. Isn't it true that you specifically 25 Q. But you knew he was trying to sell the 
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1 afford, we bought it. And he knew that we were 1 a few questions. They walked through the house. 
2 buying it. 2 That's all. 
3 MS. CASPERSON: Why don't we take a break. 3 Q. When you looked at the document, I 
4 (A recess was taken from 12:33 p.m. to 4 think which was previously marked as Exhibit *.1, 
5 12:53 p.m.) 5 which was your notes that you prepared from your 
6 . Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: Mr. Peterson, you 6 handwritten notes, do any of those conversations 
7 had indicated that you had provided a key and a 7 reflect conversations that your wife had? 
8 garage door opener to the house. And you said that 8 A. No. 
g that was to Mr. Magera; is that correct? 9 Q. These are all your conversation; is 
10 A. Thars right. 10 that correct? 
11 Q. And isn't it true that when you 11 A. That's right. 
12 provided that was at the meeting that you and 12 Q. Did you ever receive any 
13 Mr. Archibald and Mr. Magera had at your house? 13 correspondence from your attorney regarding any 
14 A. No. 14 risks that you might face as a result of using the 
15 Q. When was it that you provided that? 15 earnest money prior to the closing of this purchase 
16 A. It was before that, I took the key 16 and sale agreement? 
17 over to his office. 17 A. No. 
18 Q. And the garage door opener at that 18 MS. CASPERSON: I have nothing further. 
19 time too? 19 
20 A. And two garage door openers at that 20 EXAMINATION 
21 time. 21 BY MR. DUNN: 
22 Q. During the time that you negotiated 22 Q. Can I have you look at Exhibit *.J, 
23 this purchase and sale agreement with Buku 23 paragraph No. 12. Counsel didn't have you read the 
24 Properties, was your wife ever present? 24 entire' paragraph, took only a portion of it. Could 
25 A. Yes - no. Not until we got the 25 you begin with that sentence where my finger is 
;-== PAGE 74 ;-== PAGE 76 
1 contracts, no. 1 pointing? 
2 Q. When you went to the meeting for the 2 A. Your affiants did know, however, that 
3 county zoning issues, was your wife present? 3 the plaintiffs were in the business of land 
4 A. No. 4 speculation and development. Moreover the sale of 
5 Q. And were you typically the one who was 5 the real property written by the contract never 
6 dealing with any of the issues that have arose as a 6 contained any language of speculative purposes or 
7 result ofthe purchase and sale agreement? 7 of development. 
8 A. We agreed on it. Yeah. We talked 8 Q. So you knew that the plaintiffs were 
9 back and forth, yes. .9 in the business of land speculation and 
10 Q. What I'm asking you is as between you 10 development? 
11 and your wire, were you the one that was handling 11 MS. CASPERSON: Objection. Leading and 
12 the issues that arose as a result of the purchase 12 suggestive. 
13 and sale agreement? 13 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
14 A. We talked it over. I talked it over 14 Q. BY MR. DUNN: And you also knew that 
15 with her before I done any of it. Yeah, she was -- 15 they were going to develop this, correct? 
16 I was the one that done it. 16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. But you were the one who having 17 MS. CASPERSON: Objection. Leading. 
18 discussions with Mr. Magera? 18 Q. BY MR. DUNN: But you did not know, 
19 A. That's right. 19 however, how they were going to develop it? 
20 Q. And you were the one who was having 20 MS. CASPERSON: Same objection. 
21 discussions with Mr. Archibald? 21 THE WITNESS: No, I didn't know how they 
22 A. I had - only when he called me those 22 were going to. 
23 two times, the only time I ever talked to 23 Q. BY MR. DUNN: And you didn't know if 
24 Mr. Archibald, other than the time that they come 24 it would be any type - what type of lots, correct? 
25 out and walked -I said hello to him, and he asked 25 MS. CASPERSON: Same objection. Can I have 
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1 taken before? 1 A. Yes. 
2 A. No. 2 Q. And isn't it true when Mr. Magera had 
3 Q. I just want to go over a few ground 3 those negotiations with you that he drove you to 
4 rules, and they're really for me and for you, and 4 other developments that he had done? 
5 they help us prepare an adequate transcript. The 5 A. Yes. 
6 first of which is I can tell you at some point 6 Q. And you understood at the time that 
7 throughout this deposition I'm going to ask a 7 the purpose for purchasing that property was to 
8 poorly worded question. If you don't understand 8 develop it; correct? 
9 what I'm asking, please just say will you repeat 9 A. Yes. 
10 that or have me rephrase, and I will do so. 10 Q. Isn't it true that you understood that 
11 A. Okay. 11 in order for Buku or Jab to pay you the amount of 
12 Q. Otherwise I'm going to assume that you 12 money that they offered, that they would need to 
13 understand the question. The second is that I need 13 develop that into one·acre lots? 
14 you to answer in a yes or a no or some kind of 14 A. I'm not sure initially I did but just 
15 explanation. We have a tendency to nod our head 15 developed. 
16 and say uh·huh. 16 Q. And when was it that you came to that 
17 A. Okay. 17 understanding? 
18 Q. And those are very difficult for the 18 A. I tell you, it really wasn't on my 
19 court reporter to take down. If you can remind me, 19 mind. I was dealing with Jab. And when this Buku 
20 I'll remind you, because I'm sure we'll both do it. 20 was - I don't know when this came about, but I 
21 The third thing is that at any time that you need 21 thought this thing was over. I didn't feel-- I 
22 to take a break, although I don't think it's going 22 didn't -/ really don't know what on that. It 
23 to be a very lengthy deposition, you're welcome to 23 bothered me anyway. Didn't feel right about it. 
24 do so, although I would ask that you answer the 24 But I trusted Jaramie. I had respect for him and I 
25 question that's currently on the table. 25 did. 
~ PAGE 6 ~ PAGE 8 
1 Is there any reason why you can't 1 Q. And you had indicated at some point 
2 testify truthfully today? 2 that you came to an understanding that the 
3 A. I don~ know of any. 3 development was going to be in one·acre lots. When 
4 Q. Thank you. Can you tell me what your 4 did that occur? 
5 current address is? 5 A. I didn't know that he had - well, it 
6 A. I live in Frisco, Texas. 6 really came to bear in my mind - I'd really not 
7 Q. And when did you move to Frisco, 7 give it a whole lot of thought. I knew that he 
8 Texas? 8 wanted to develop the property, and I knew that he 
9 A. I moved two days after Thanksgiving in 9 wanted it to be -- to zone with the one, with the 
10 '77, I think -- 2007. Criminy. 10 R-1. I knew that, yes. 
11 Q. And prior to living in Texas where did 11 Q. And was that before you entered into 
12 you live? 12 the contract that you knew that? 
13 A. We lived at 286 East 4100 North. Is 13 A. If I did, I mis - it really came to 
14 that right? Yes. 14 bear in my mind when we went to the hearing. I 
15 Q. And is that the property that is at 15 didn't know how significant that was gOing to be 
16 issue in this litigation? 16 for this. 
17 A. Nearby, yes. 17 Q. And you would agree with me that 
18 Q. And, in fact, you had a house and then 18 Mr. Magera's assessment of the value difference 
19 a substantial amount of farm property; is that 19 between R·5 property and R·1 is Significant? 
20 correct? 20 MR. DUNN: Objection. Leading. 
21 A. Yes. 21 THE WITNESS: The only thing I wondered 
22 Q. And in 2007 you began having 22 about, about that time this thing was starting to 
23 negotiations with Mr. Magera and either Jab 23 cool off, this whole sales thing. So - but I did 
24 Construction or Buku with regard to the purchase of 24 know that he wanted to make it R-1. I knew that. 
25 that property; is that correct? 25 Q. BY MS. CASPERSON: You knew that he 
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1 kind of control or dominion over the house? 1 turns to weeds. Somebody had to make a call on it. 
2 A. No. 2 Q. And you agreed you were the person 
3 Q. And who did have control and dominion 3 that did that? 
4 over the house? 4 A. I did. I mean, I was told by Brad 
5 A. Me. 5 that Mr. Magera asked him to call me and see if it 
6 Q. And isn't it true that it was your son 6 was all right. 
7 who was living in that property? 7 Q. So you're not alleging that Buku 
8 A. That's right. 8 actually received any profits off of your property, 
9 Q. Are you aware of any way then in which 9 correct? 
10 Buku controlled that property, your property •• 10 A. I don~ know that they did. I don't 
11 A. The house itself or the whole thing? 11 see how they could. 
12 Q. The whole thing. 12 Q. If you look at paragraph 21 of your 
13 A. I don~ know what to make of it. When 13 affidavit, it indicates that •• well, let me read 
14 I read the name on that after I got studying it a 14 it to you. It says your affiant has been damaged 
15 while, it was some kind of a shame. That's the way 15 monetarily in the remaining sum of the contract and 
16 I felt about it. 16 other miscellaneous costs and billings, including 
17 Q. The name on what? 17 but not limited to lost revenues on farming 
18 A. Buku. It sounded phony to me. That's 18 practices, lost interest, expenses of upkeep and 
19 all I'm going to say. 19 utilities, tax assessments, attorney fees and 
20 Q. Okay. I understand that But with 20 costs. 
21 regard to your allegation that Buku somehow 21 Now, you understand that the court has 
22 exercised dominion and control over your property, 22 already ruled on a portion of this litigation, 
23 what are you asserting that they did? 23 correct? 
24 A. The whole property? 24 A. Would you explain that to me, please. 
25 Q. The whole property. 25 What part? 
r= PAGE 30 r= PAGE 32 
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1 A. Well, maybe I assumed this, but I felt 1 Q. Well, you understand that we had cross 
2 that where he'd made an offer to buy my property, 2 motions for summary judgment? 
3 that that was so. I was going to sell it to him to 3 A. Yes. 
4 become his. 4 Q. And do you understand that the court 
5 Q. But you received the benefit of the 5 ruled that the contract was not ambiguous? 
6 tax assessment that was paid by Mr. Foster, 6 A. Legal terms are ambiguous in any way 
7 correct? 7 you look at it. 
8 A. Yes. 8 Q. But you do understand that there has 
9 Q. And you received the benefit of the 9 been a ruling from the court on this case? 
10 water assessment payment? 10 A. Some ruling. I don't know what it 
11 A. That's correct. 11 was, but yes. 
12 Q. And you received the benefit of 12 Q. Let me go to these miscellaneous costs 
13 whatever leasing arrangement you had with your son. 13 and billings that you claim to have lost. What 
14 I don't know whether you required him to pay you or 14 lost revenues on farming practices are you 
15 not, correct? 15 claiming? 
16 A. That's okay. I understand that. 16 A. None. 
17 Q. So how did Buku control that property 17 Q. What lost interest are you claiming? 
18 after the agreement did not close in December? 18 A. On the farm itself? Not the agreement 
19 A. Well, I was hoping that it would 19 to buy? 
20 continue on. But as to whether -I don't know who 20 Q. Yes. 
21 owned what. The property never left my ownership, 21 A. I don't know that I've lost anything. 
22 and it WOUldn't until it was paid for. 22 Q. So the lost interest that you're 
23 Q. Okay. And you agreed to allow 23 referring to in this paragraph is only associated 
24 Mr. Foster to farm that land, correct? 24 with the contract, correct? 
25 A. Sure. You know, if you let it go, it 25 A. With the farm. 
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~t _ ~ 
This matter came on for hearing on motion for summary judgment on January 24, 20tJ,at .:.--
.' t? /0' 
3:05 P.M., before the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr., District Judge, sitting in open court at Rig% 
Idaho. 
Court Reporter was not present. The parties waived the presence ofthe court reporter. 
Ms. Nancy Andersen, Deputy Court Clerk, was present. 
Ms. DeAnn Casperson appeared on behalf of the plaintiff 
Mr. Robin Dunn appeared on behalf of the defendant. 
Ms. Casperson presented argument in supporting the motion for summary judgment. 
Mr. Dunn presented argument in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 
Ms. Casperson responded. 
The Court will take the matter under advisement. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
c: DeAnn Casperson, Esq. District Judge 
Robin Dunn, Esq. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
















RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 

















Case No. CV-08-941 
This cause having come before this Court pursuant to a Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed by Buku Propeliies, LLC (hereafter "Buku") on November 16, 2010, and a Motion to Strike 
filed by Buku on December 6, 2010; this Court being fully advised in the premises, and good 
cause appearing; 
NOW, THEREFORE: 
Buku's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
JUDGMENT RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 1 
Buku's Motion to Strike is denied. 
DATED this ? day of February 2011. 
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Case No. CV-08-941 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On August 20, 2007, Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC (hereafter "Buku") entered into a 
Purchase and Sale Agreement (hereafter "Clark Agreement") with Defendants Raoel H. Clark 
and Janet C. Clark (hereafter collectively "Clarks") for the purchase of 80.17 acres of property 
located in Jefferson County, Idaho (hereafter "Clark Property"). The Clark Agreement denoted a 
purchase price of$I,044,075.18. The Clark Agreement specified that Buku would provide 
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Clarks with $25,000 in earnest money and that the entire amount was fully refundable until 
closing. The money was tendered on October 15,2007. 
On or about August 30, 2007, Buku entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement 
(hereafter "Peterson Agreement") with Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty Jean Peterson (hereafter 
collectively "Petersons") for the purchase of 73 acres (hereafter "Peterson Property") adjacent to 
the Clark Property. The Peterson Agreement denoted a purchase price of $980,000. The 
Peterson Agreement specified that Buku would provide Petersons with $327,000 in earnest 
money and that all but $10,000 was fully refundable until closing. The money was tendered on 
August 30, 2007. 
At the time the parties entered into each respective Purchase and Sale Agreement, both 
the Clark Property and the Peterson Property (hereafter collectively "Properties") were zoned 
Residential-l ("R-l "), which would allow a minimum density of one acre lots. 
Pursuant to both the Clark Agreement and the Peterson Agreement (hereafter collectively 
"Agreements"), closing was to take place on or before December 21,2007. 
Both Agreements provided Buku with a four month due diligence period to ensure Buku 
was satisfied with the condition of the Properties prior to closing. During the four-month 
diligence period, Buku learned of a proposed zoning change, which might have affected the 
Properties. 
Between August 30,2007 and December 18,2007, issues arose regarding the Jefferson 
County Planning and Zoning Commission's plans to possibly change the zoning categorization 
of the Properties to R-5. The change which would allow a minimum density of five acre lots 
could have potentially decreased the value of the Propeliies. 
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On December 18, 2007, Buku notified in writing the Clarks and Petersons of its objection 
to the condition of the Properties being zoned R-S. While the parties dispute the relevance of the 
zoning of the Properties, it was an issue that was discussed prior to the closing date. The 
December 18, 2007 letter contained an offer to move the closing "date back from December 21, 
2007, to March 1,2008." 
On December 19,2007, in response to Buku's offer to extend the closing date, counsel 
for Clarks and Petersons rejected the offer to extend the closing date by stating, "In the event you 
choose not to close, my clients would declare the contract in default." 
December 21, 2007, passed without closing on the Properties, and the Agreements were 
never modified or amended. 
On November 6, 2008, Buku filed suit against Clarks and Petersons seeking return of the 
earnest monies under the terms of the Agreements. 
On December 10,2008, Clarks and Petersons filed a Counterclaim seeking specific 
performance, breach of contract, and other equitable claims; and asking the Court to grant 
summary judgment in their favor. 
On October 6, 2009, Buku filed for Summary Judgment. 
On January 27,2010, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision (hereafter "First 
Memorandum Decision,,).l Among other things, the Court found the Agreements were 
unambiguous but that summary judgment was premature as to the issues surrounding 
enforcement of the Agreements.2 
On November 16,2010, Buku filed Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
1 This case was previously assigned to Seventh Judicial District Judge Moller who issued the 
January 27,2010 Memorandum Decision. 
2 The Court granted summary judgment in Buku's favor as to Defendant's counterclaim 
involving the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
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On November 29,2010, Clarks and Petersons filed Defendant's Memorandum Re: 
Summary Judgment Plaintiff's Second Motion (hereafter "Defendants' Brief in Opposition"). 
On December 6,2010, Buku filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment.3 
The Court heard oral argument on January 24,2010. 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
oflaw." LR.C.P. 56(c). See Grover v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105; Rockefeller v. 
Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 39 P.3d 577 (2002). The burden is, at all times, on the moving party to 
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21 
P.3d 908 (2001). 
The United States Supreme Court, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 
2548 (1986), stated: 
Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial 
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and 
identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which 
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. But unlike 
the Court of Appeals, we find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that 
the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials 
negating the opponent's claim. On the contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to "the 
3 On December 6,2010, Buku filed a Motion to strike portions of the following affidavits: 
Original Peterson Affidavit, Second Peterson Affidavit, and the Original Clark Affidavit. Buku 
argues that the objectionable portions of the affidavits contain legal conclusions, lack foundation, 
and that they are conflicting. The Court can sort through the affiants' statements that are 
conflicting, that lack foundation and contain legal conclusions and disregard them as appropriate. 
Buku's Motion to Strike should be denied. Moreover, the remaining portions of the affidavits 
provide the Court with the necessary evidence for its conclusions. 
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affidavits, if any" (emphasis added), suggests the absence of such a requirement. 
And if there were any doubt about the meaning of Rule 56( c) in this regard, such 
doubt is clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide the claimants and 
defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment "with or without 
supporting affidavits" (emphasis added). The import of these subsections is that, 
regardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary jUdgment 
motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be granted so long as 
whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of 
summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied. One of the principal 
purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually 
unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way 
that allows it to accomplish this purpose. 
Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (alterations in original). 
When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally 
construed in favor of the non-moving party. Dodge-Farrar v. American Cleaning Services, Co., 
137 Idaho 838, 54 P.3d 954 (Ct. App. 2002). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a 
court is not permitted to weigh the evidence to resolve controverted factual issues. Meyers v. 
Lott, 133 Idaho 846,993 P.2d 609 (2000). Liberal construction of the facts in favor of the non-
moving party requires the court to draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-
moving party. Farnworth v. Ratliff, 134 Idaho 237,999 P.2d 892 (2000); Madrid v. Roth, 134 
Idaho 802, 10 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2000). 
If the action will be tried by the court without a jury, an exception to this rule applies. In 
Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519-20, 650 P.2d 657, 661-62 (1982), our 
Supreme Court held that summary judgment is appropriate despite the possibility of conflicting 
inferences if the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the 
trier of facts. Moreover, in such a situation, the judge is not required to draw inferences in favor 
of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Id. "Conflicting evidentiary facts, 
however, must still be viewed in favor of the nonmoving pmiy." Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark 
Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 124,206 P.3d 481,488 (2009). 
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The Idaho appellate courts have followed the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Celotex, which stated: 
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural 
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are 
designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action." ., . Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of 
persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have 
those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons 
opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the 
Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis. 
Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 (citations omitted); see Win of Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc., 
137 Idaho 747, 53 P.3d 330 (2002); Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 
(2002). 
A party against whom a summary judgment is sought cmmot merely rest on his pleadings 
but, when faced with affidavits or depositions supporting the motion, must come forward by way 
of affidavit, deposition, admissions or other documentation to establish the existence of material 
issues of fact, which preclude the issuance of summary judgment. Anderson v. Hollingsworth, 
136 Idaho 800,41 P.3d 228 (2001); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000). The 
non-moving party's case, however, must be anchored in something more than speculation, and a 
mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, 
Inc., 136 Idaho 792,41 P.3d 220 (2001). 
The moving party is entitled to judgment when the non-moving party fails to make a 
sufficient showing as to the essential elements to which that party will bear the burden of proof 
attrial. Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Admin., 137 Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307 
(2002). Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the plaintiff fails to establish a prima 
facie case. Post Falls Trailer Park v. Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634, 962 P.2d 1018, (1998). In such 
a situation, there can be no genuine issue of material fact, since a complete failure of proof 
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concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other 
facts immaterial. Id 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. The Clark and Peterson Agreements are Unambiguous 
When construing a contract, this Court must decide as a matter of law whether the 
contract is ambiguous. Idaho Counties Risk Mgmt. Program Underwriters v. Northland Ins. 
Cos., 7 Idaho 84, 86, 205 P.3d 1220, 1222 (2009). A contract is ambiguous if, when considered 
in its entirety, it is "reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 
Idaho 292, 293, 612 P.2d 135,136 (1980); Murr v. Selag Corp., 113 Idaho 773, 781, 747 P.2d 
1302, 1310 (1987). If the contract does not appear ambiguous on its face, and if neither party 
asserts that it contains an ambiguity, then the meaning ofthe contract and the intent of the parties 
must be determined from the plain meaning ofthe words used. Lavey v. Regence BlueShield of 
Idaho, 139 Idaho 37,46, 72 P.3d 877, 886 (2003). Further, "courts do not possess the roving 
power to rewrite contracts in order to make them more equitable." Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 
219,223,220 P.3d 575, 579 (2009). 
Neither party asserts the Agreements are ambiguous. Clarks and Petersons assert Buku 
breached the Agreements by refusing to close on or before December 21, 2007. Buku argues, 
pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Agreements, it was not obligated to close, and that Clarks and 
Petersons breached the Agreements by failing to refund the earnest money. Paragraph 3 of the 
Agreements provides as follows: 
Buyers Obligations: 
Prior to closing, it is Buyer's obligation to make sure that they are fully satisfied 
with the condition of the property, also any requirements, environmental 
requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer needs to make for its due 
diligence purposes. Buyer will have four month to perform the due diligence 
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inspections to satisfy Buyer's interests and concerns regarding the purchase. Thus 
closing will be on or before December 21,2007. 
Clark and Peterson Agreements at 1-2 & 2 respectively. 
In its First Memorandum Decision, the Court stated the following in reference to 
paragraph 3: "The Court finds that the wording above is unambiguous and not so indefinite as to 
make the contract illusory." First Memorandum Decision at 8. 
Having reviewed Idaho authority and the Agreements, like the previous Court, this Court 
concludes the language in paragraph 3 of the Agreements is unambiguous and enforceable. 
B. Buyer's Diligence 
Clarks and Petersons assert that since the Agreements are unambiguous, the Agreements' 
provisions are enforceable; specifically that Buku was required to close on December 21, 2007. 
Buku argues that it performed the necessary diligence under paragraph 3 of the Agreements by 
providing notice of the zoning issue to the Clarks and Petersons and asking them to extend the 
closing date to cure the issue. 
In its First Memorandum Decision, the Court previously stated: 
Buku was given four months to conduct due diligence concerning the properties. 
Potential zoning changes and their impact on financing are precisely the type of 
issues typically dealt with during the due diligence phase of a real estate 
transaction. In short, under the facts of this case, it is reasonable that Buku would 
look into potential zoning problems, and that uncertainty regarding the properties' 
zoning would affect its "interests and concerns." 
First Memorandum Decision at 8. 
The language of the Agreements clearly allowed Buku to ensure it was "fully satisfied" 
with the condition of the Property and "all the requirements" it needed to satisfy its "interests and 
concerns. " 
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While the provisions, "fully satisfied" and "buyer's interests and concerns" are 
potentially broad, they are not ambiguous. During the four month due diligence period, Buku 
was authorized to satisfy its interests and concerns regarding purchasing the Propeliies. Thus, 
the Agreements permitted Buku to look into potential zoning changes that would affect its 
"interests and concerns." Buku's efforts to fully satisfy its interests and concerns were expressly 
permitted under the contract.4 
Reaffirming the Court's First Memorandum Decision, this Court concludes Buku's 
reason for declining to close on December 21,2007, was permitted under paragraph 3 of the 
Agreements. Therefore, Buku did not breach the Agreements by failing to close on December 
21,2007. 
C. Post Closing Date Agreements 
Clarks and Petersons argue they are entitled to "summary judgment on the issue of 
liability as there are no material facts to defeat the breach of contract by Buku." Defendants' 
Brief in Opposition at 18. They also assert that "Buku continued to seek to purchase the real 
property from Clark and Peterson and to seek advice from Jefferson County after the closing date 
of the transactions for the contracts." Defendants' Brief in Opposition at 8. 
In its First Memorandum Decision, the COUli stated: 
The Court finds that the wording above is unambiguous and not so indefinite as to 
make the contract illusory. "Ifthe language of a contract is unambiguous, then its 
meaning and legal effect must be determined from its words." However, despite the 
Court's finding that the contract is unambiguous, the Court cannot grant summary 
4 The issue sUlTounding the diligence provision involved the relationship between the properties' 
existing R-ldesignation and a proposed R-5 designation and Buku's ability to obtain financing. 
The record suggests that if the proposed change were approved, the properties in question would 
be "grandfathered." See Afjidavit ofNaysha Foster and Exhibit 3. While the court 
acknowledges the above facts, the record reflects that the "grand fathering" issue was not 
addressed by Jefferson County until March 2008, three months after the December 21,2007 
closing date. 
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judgment in Buleu's favor at this time. As will be explained below, there are issues of 
fact in the record, when construed in a light most favorable to Defendants, that suggest 
Buku may not be entitled to recover under the unambiguous contracts. 
All of these statements suggest that an agreement existed between Buku and the Clarks 
subsequent to the December 2007 closing date. Before the Court decides Buku's 
entitlement to earnest money under the Clark Agreement, the Court must understand the 
entire arrangement between the parties. 
Summary judgment is similarly premature on the Peterson Agreement. Buku and 
the Petersons had an arrangement similar to the arrangement between Buke and the 
Clarks. 
First Memorandum Decision at 8-9. 
Buku asserts the plain language of paragraph 21 of the Agreements requires that 
subsequent agreements be in writing. Buku argues the Court did not consider paragraph 21 when 
issuing its First Memorandum Decision. Paragraph 21 provides as follows: 
Amendments and Waivers. No amendment of any provisions of this agreement will be 
valid unless the same shall be in writing and signed by the parties. No waiver by any 
party of any default, misrepresentation or breach of warranty or covenant hereunder, 
whether intentional or not, shall be deemed to extend to any prior or subsequent default, 
misrepresentation, or breach of warranty or covenant hereunder or effect in anyway any 
rights arising by virtue of any prior or subsequent such occurrence. 
Clark and Peterson Agreements at 4 & 5 respectively. 
The above language specifically requires that no amendments to the Agreements would 
be valid unless "in writing and signed by the parties." While Buku attempted to amend the 
agreement by offering to extend the closing date, neither the Clarks nor the Petersons accepted 
the written offer. Rather, through counsel, they expressly rejected Buku's offer. 
Idaho Code § 9-503 states: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than for leases for a term not 
exceeding one (1) year, nor any trust power over or concerning it, or in any 
manner relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or 
declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a conveyance or other instrument 
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in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or 
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
The record contains no evidence that any written agreement subsequent to the December 
21, 2007 closing date was ever reached. 5 Furthermore, even if there were oral agreements or 
modifications, they would be prohibited by Idaho Code § 9-503. 
The terms of the Clark and Peterson Agreements must be enforced, including the 
requirement that subsequent amendments be in writing. 
In opposition to Buku's first motion for summary judgment, Clarks and Petersons argued 
that Buku exercised dominion and control over the Properties. They raise this issue again in 
opposition to Buku's second motion for summary judgment by stating, "Defendants, on the other 
hand, are not trying to remove or change the clear language of the original contracts; but rather 
are trying to show to the ultimate fact-finder that they (defendants) were lead down a path to 
believe the original contract would be enforced and/or should be enforced as to the damages 
sustained by the defendants." Defendant's Brief in Opposition at 13. 
In support of its claim that Buku exercised dominion and control over the Properties, 
Clarks and Petersons allege that Buku may have leased the Clark Property to a third party, that a 
Buku agent farmed the Clark Property, and that Buku controlled the home on the Peterson 
Property. While the record contains various interactions between the parties surrounding the 
above allegations, nothing indicates the parties ever reached a new agreement.6 Even if Buku 
had exercised dominion and control over either the Clark or the Peterson Property, the closing 
date passed, and no written amendments were ever executed. 
5 Moreover, counsel for Clarks and Petersons conceded at oral argument that there were no such 
subsequent written agreements. 
6 Based upon the affidavits and exhibits attached with Buku's submissions, the Court questions 
whether the "dominion and control" arguments asserted by Clarks and Petersons would be 
established. 
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Based upon the above authority and discussion, Buku is entitled to summary judgment 
under the terms of Agreements. Clarks' and Petersons' motions for summary judgment under 
their breach of contract claims should therefore be denied. 
D. Equitable Claims 
Clarks and Petersons assert that "the Court left in place the following without removing 
the counter-claims from consideration. . .. The counter-claims will not be re-hashed but are still 
in place and remain unaffected by the latest attempt by plaintiffs to avoid trial.,,7 Defendant's 
Brief in Opposition at 13-14. Further, Clarks and Petersons argue they are entitled to summary 
judgment on their counterclaims. 
In its First Memorandum Decision, the Court stated, "Although Clarks' and Petersons' 
pleadings and summary judgment brief are unclear as to how the legal and equitable principles 
they cite apply to these facts, the Court still finds that Defendants' have raised sufficient issues 
of fact to preclude summary judgment at this point." Id. at 10. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently stated, 
The existence of an express agreement does not prevent the application of 
the doctrine of unjust enrichment. Only when the express agreement is 
enforceable is a court precluded from applying the equitable doctrine of unjust 
enrichment in contravention of the express contract. Id. (citing Chandler v. 
Washington Toll Bridge Auth., 17 Wash.2d 591, 137 P.2d 97 (1943); Hixon, 
supra). Once the jury determined that the contract was not enforceable because 
Appellants had proved an affirmative defense, the jury properly considered 
Respondents' claim of unjust enrichment. 
Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 776-77, 203 P.3d 702, 706-07 (2009). 
"Equitable claims will not be considered when an adequate legal remedy is available. 
When parties enter into an express contract, a claim based in equity is not allowed because the 
7 The Clarks' and Petersons' Complaint alleges the following equitable causes of actions: 
Specific PerfOlmance, Unjust Enrichment, Estoppel, and Detrimental Reliance 
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express contract precludes enforcement of equitable claims." iron Eagle Dev., LLC v. Quality 
Design Systems, inc., 138 Idaho 487, 492, 65 P.3d 509, 514 (2003) (citing Thomas v. Campbell, 
107 Idaho 398, 404-05, 690 P.2d 333,339-40 (1984)). 
In iron Eagle, Iron Eagle and Heartland entered into an express contract with Quality 
Design Systems. Iron Eagle and Heartland sued Quality Design for breach of an express 
contract, breach of an intended third party beneficiary contract, and equitable claims including 
unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, implied contract, quasi estoppel, and equitable estoppel. 
The Idaho Supreme Court held that the Plaintiffs were precluded from seeking an equitable 
remedy against the Defendant because it had an adequate legal remedy under its express 
agreement with Iron Eagle. 
Because this Court has found the Agreements enforceable, Clarks and Petersons cannot 
rely on their equitable claims. Therefore, Buku's motion for summary judgment as to Clarks' 
and Petersons' equitable claims is granted. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above authority and discussion, Buku's motion for summary judgment 
should be granted. 
" 
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CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS ) 
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PETERSON, husband and wife, ) 




Case No. CV-08-941 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANTS; AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellants appeal against the above named Respondent to 
the Idaho Supreme Court from the Summary Judgment, entered in the above entided action 
on the 3rd day of February, 2011, the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, presiding. 
2. The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgment/ order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant 
to Rule 11(a)(1) I.A.R. 
3. The issues on appeal include, but are not limited, to the following: 
a. Did the court error in interpretation of the real estate contract between 
the parties? 
b. Did the court error in granting summary judgment which e:xcluded 
equitable remedies of the defendants? 
c. Were there ambiguous terms in the contract which allowed parol 
evidence? 
d. Did the court error in using information outside the "four comers" of 
the contract when the decision indicated the contract was not 
ambiguous? 
e. Were the defendants' equitable remedies precluded by the court's 
ruIing in Summary Judgment which required a return of earnest 
money? 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. A reporter's transcript is not requested. 
6. The Appellants request that the following documents be included in the 
clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
-Any minute entries-
-All pleadings by both parties-
-All affidavits of both parties-
-First Summary Judgment Decision (Denial) of Honorable Gregory 
Moeller 
-Second Summary Judgment Decision (Approval) of Honorable Dane 
Watkins 
7. The undersigned certifies: 
a. That a copy of the notice of appeal has NOT been served on the 
reporter since a transcript is not requested; 
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b. That the Appellants have made contact with the clerk of the district 
court and are in the process of obtaining the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's 
record; 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid or will be paid; 
d. That appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this 
-, 
I / .Ji~ 
~ L' l day of February 2011. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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xx Postage-prepaid mail 
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Jefferson County Clerk 
Jefferson County Courthouse 
210 Courthouse Way, Ste. 120 
Rigby,ID 83442 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Honorable Dane Watkins 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Idaho Supreme Court 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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P.O. Box 50130 .~ 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
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v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
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RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
. JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
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MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS SUPPORTED BY 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNE CASPERSON 
PlaintiffBuku Properties, LLC ("Buku"), by and through its counsel of record, 
DeAnne Casperson of Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., hereby submits this 
Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. By submitting this Memorandum, Buku is claiming the right, pursuant to 
.-
contract, Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to recover the costs and fees set forth in the Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson in 
Support of Memorandum of Costs and Fees from Defendants Raoel H. Clark and Janet C. 
Clark, and Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty Jean Peterson (collectively "Defendants"). 
Paragraph 23 of both the Peterson Agreement and the Clark Agreement provides 
as follows: 
23. Attorneys fees. The prevailing party in any action to enforce this agreement 
shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys fees and costs. 
(See Complaint, Ex. A, ,-r 23; Ex. B, 123). Consequently, Buku is entitled to its 
reasonable attorneys fees and costs pursuant to the Peterson Agreement and the Clark 
Agreement. Additionally, Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides for the award of attorney's 
fees to the prevailing party in any civil action to recover on "any commercial transaction." 
I.C. § 12-120(3). Idaho courts have recognized the applicability of this provision to 
commercial real estate transactions. See i.e. Dennettv. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21,31-32,936 
P.2d 219, 230 (Ct. App. 1997); Farm Credit Banko/Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 
270,274-75,869 P.2d 1365,1369-70 (1994); Herrickv. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293,306, 
900 P.2d 201, 214 (Ct. App. 1995). The current action is a civil action to recover on a 
commercial transaction. Buku entered into the Clark Agreement and Peterson Agreement 
with the intent that the properties be developed, as is denoted in paragraph 25 of each of 
the agreements. Consequently, Buku is entitled to an award of attorneys fees against 
Defendants pursuant to Idaho Cod § 12-120(3). Finally, Idaho Code § 12-121 and the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54, provide for the award of attorneys fees to the 
prevailing party where provided for by statute. The Judgment entered in this action 
clearly indicates that Buku prevailed on summary judgment and disposed of all other 
issues in the case, making Buku the prevailing party and entitling Buku to an award of 
attorney's fees and costs against Defendants. 
To the best of the knowledge and belief of DeAnne Casperson, the amounts set 
forth herein for costs and fees are correct and such costs and fees are claimed by Buku in 
compliance with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This Memorandum of 
Costs and Attorney's Fees is supported by the Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson in Support 
of Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's Fees filed simultaneously with this 
Memorandum and incorporated herein by reference. 
Buku has incurred attorney's fees in the above-entitled action in the amount of 
$27,093.61 and costs in the amount of$724.82, which fees and costs are specifically 
described and itemized in the Affidavit filed simultaneously with this Memorandum and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
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~ 
Dated thisf"Jd day of February, 2011. 
~h1 (lUoVl £ d UJt ~ 
~. ~ eAnne Caspe;son, Esq.'" 
~ - HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, 
P.L.L.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on thiSea~ of February, 2011, I served a copy of the following 
described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by 
mailing or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Robin D. Dunn 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
G:IWPDATAICAH\149181PIdgslFees.MEMO. wpd 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS SUPPORTED BY 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNE 
CASPERSON 
( ) First Class Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ~ Facsimile 
( ) Overnight Mail 
Q~B,~ 
~L-lJeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
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P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ill 83405 
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Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
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RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
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JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNE CASPERSON 
IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM 
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
DEANNE CASPERSON, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am a member of the law firm of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.c., 
counsel for Buku Properties,LLC ("Buku") in this matter. 
2. This Affidavit is made on my own personal knowledge, except to the extent of 
allegations made on information and belief, and in support of Buku's Memorandum of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs Supported by Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson. 
3. I have reviewed the time and cost records of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, 
P.L.L.C. maintained on the above matter, and represent that, to the best of my knowledge and 
belief, the following items of costs and expenses are claimed in compliance with the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d)(5) and Rule 54(e)(1), and were necessarily expended and incurred 
in the above entitled action on behalf of Buku: 
1. Costs of Right (Rule 54(d)(1)(c)); 
Date Item Cost 
10/15/08 Filing Fee (Jefferson County) $88.00 
04/26110 Copy of deposition - Jaramie Magera (T & T Reporting) $108.07 
04/26110 Depositions - Raoel Clark and Angus Peterson (T & T $528.75 
Reporting) 
TOTAL $724.82 
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4. The above-listed costs represent the entire costs incurred to date herein. 
5. The law firm of Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. has expended 
approximately 176.0 hours in prosecuting the above-entitled action for Buku. An itemization of 
the legal services provided by Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.c. in connection with such 
matters is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". The law firm of Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, 
P .L.L.C. has invoiced Buku for the legal services itemized on Exhibit "A" attached hereto the 
total amount of$27,093.61, which is allocated among the following attorneys at the following 
effective billing rates: 
Name Hours Effective Hourly Rate Total Fees 
Charles A. Homer 4.20 $227.03 $983.50 
DeAnne Casperson 85.80 $183.81 $15,770.30 
Amanda E. Ulrich 86.00 $112.84 $9,703.70 
TOTAL $26,427.50 
6. The following computer-aided legal research are claimed in compliance with the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(e)(3), and were reasonably and necessarily expended and 
incurred in the above entitled action on behalf of Buku: 
Date Item Cost 
09115/08 Computer research for August 2008 $42.46 
01113/09 Computer research for December 2008 $0.69 
07/14/09 Computer research for June 2009 $37.89 
08111/09 Computer research for July 2009 $414.86 
01118111 Computer research for December 2010 $170.21 
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I TOTAL $666.11 
TOTAL ATTORNEYS FEES PLUS COMPUTER RESEARCH: $27,093.61 
7. The sum of$27,093.61 represents a reasonable sum for the services provided by 
the law firm of Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. in prosecuting the above-entitled action 
on behalf of Buku. The sum of $724.82 represents a reasonable sum for the costs incurred in the 
above-entitled action, allocated for the benefit ofBuku. 
8. I have practiced law in Idaho continuously since April 24, 2003. I graduated from 
law school in 1999 and practiced law in both Missouri and Kansas before returning to Idaho. I am 
familiar with the prevailing charges in this community for legal work similar to that performed by 
the attorneys in this case. It is my opinion that the prevailing charges in this community for like 
work are equal to or higher than those indicated above, and that the attorney's fees are reasonable 
and necessary. 
9. Neither me nor anyone else at my firm was aware that the Court issued a Judgment 
Re: Motion for Summary Judgment ("Judgment") and Memorandum Decision Re: Motion for 
Summary Judgment ("Memorandum") in Judge Watkins' chambers on February 3, 2011, until the 
afternoon of February 18,2011. I learned that the Judgment and Memorandum had been filed 
because I received Defendants' Notice of Appeal at that time, in which it was mentioned that the 
Court had filed the Judgment on February 3, 2011. 
10. Upon learning that the Court had issued the Judgment on February 3,2011, I 
immediately checked the Idaho Court Repository website to see if the Judgment had been 
docketed. It still had not. Attached as "Exhibit B" is a copy of the docket from the Idaho Court 
Repository website dated February 18, 2011. I had periodically checked the Idaho Court 
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Repository since the oral argument and nothing ever appeared relating to the Judgment issued on 
February 3, 2011. 
11. After having received the Notice of Appeal on February 18,2011, I immediately 
telephoned Defendants' counsel's office to obtain a copy of the Judgment, and Defendants' 
counsel's receptionst informed me that she would have "Judy" fax me a copy of the decision. I 
never received a copy of the Memorandum or Judgment from Defendants' counsel's office. 
12. At approximately 1 :00 p.m., I telephoned Judge Watkins' clerk, Lettie Messick, to 
request a copy of the decision. Ms. Messick was not in her office at the time. I left her a 
voicemail explaining that I had not received a copy of the Memorandum or Judgment and asked 
her to return my call. 
13. At approximately 1 :00 p.m., Sandi Mueller, a secretary in my office, called the 
Jefferson County clerk's office to inquire as to whether I could obtain a copy of the Judgment 
from Jefferson County. Ms. Mueller informed me that the Jefferson County clerk stated Jefferson 
County did not have a copy of the Memorandum or Judgment either. 
14. Ms. Messick returned my call at approximately 2:00 p.m. I explained to her that I 
did not receive a copy ofthe Memorandum or Judgment. Ms. Messick immediately faxed a copy 
of the Judgment and Memorandum Decision to my office. The faxed copies of the Judgment and 
Memorandum Decision were the first copies of the Judgment and Memorandum decision my 
office received. Attached as "Exhibit C" are copies of the faxed Judgment and Memorandum I 
received from Ms. Messick on the afternoon of February 18, 2011. 
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Dated this~day of February, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
t 
I hereby certifY that on this2!L ~~y of February, 2011, I served a copy of the 
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand 




Robin D. Dunn 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
AFFIDA VIT OF DEANNE CASPERSON IN 
SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
( ) First Class Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
(XJ Facsimile 
( ) Overnight Mail 
"-
ldfutUuiA~ QA O!ue/c 
~ DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
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Date Attorney 
Jun 17/2008 CAH 
Jun 26/2008 CAH 
Jul 112008 CAH 
Aug 7/2008 AEU 
Sep 16/2008 DC 
Oct 10/2008 DC 
Oct 11/2008 CAH 
Oct 14/2008 DC 
Oct 15/2008 CAH 
Oct 15/2008 DC 
Dec 512008 DC 
Dec 12/2008 DC 
Dec 15/2008 AEU 
Dec 16/2008 AEU 
Dec 29/2008 AEU 
Dec 29/2008 DC 
Jan 912009 AEU 
Apr 13/2009 DC 
Apr 29/2009 DC 
Jun 16/2009 DC 
Jun 26/2009 AEU 
Jun 29/2009 AEU 
Jun 30/2009 AEU 
Jul 1/2009 AEU 
Jul 2/2009 AEU 
Jul 6/2009 AEU 
Jul 7/2009 AEU 
Jul 8/2009 AEU 
Jul30/2009 DC 
Sep 16/2009 DC 
Sep 17/2009 DC 
Sep 22/2009 DC 
Sep 23/2009 DC 
Sep 24/2009 DC 
Sep 25/2009 DC 
Oct 112009 DC 
Oct 2/2009 AEU 
Oct 2/2009 DC 
Oct 14/2009 DC 
Nov 612009 DC 
Nov 19/2009 AEU 
Nov 20/2009 AEU 
Nov 23/2009 AEU 
Nov 23/2009 DC 
Nov 24/2009 AEU 
Explanation 
Review purchase agreements and proposed correspondence to Robin Dunn prepared by Thel Casper; telephone conference with attorney 
Thel Casper 
Email to Thel Casper pertaining to follow-up on correspondence with attorney Robin Dunn w, 
Review email from Thel Casper pertaining to dispute with Peterson; review documentation and prepare for conference with Jaramie 
Magera 
Receive and review case file; begin drafting complaint 
Review documents and correspondence in file; edit and revise complaint. 
Edit and revise complaint for filing, 
Review and revise complaint against Peterson and Clark for refund of earnest money 
Edit and revise complaint; finalize complaint for review, 
Office conference with Jaramie Magera to review and execute Complaint on dispute with Peterson and Clark 
Finalize complaint; conference with Client regarding complaint and current status, 
E-mail correspondence to Mr. Magera. 
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera. 
Draft answer to counterclaim; research affirmative defenses 
Complete draft of Answer to Counterclaim 
Intraoffice conference regarding affirmative defenses 
Edit and revise draft answer to counterclaim; draft letter to Mr. Dunn regarding filing suit against Mr. Magera. 
Compose first set of discovery to Defendants Clarks and Defendants Petersons; Edit discovery 
Edit and revise discovery requests. 
Draft e-mail to Mr. Magera. 
Review answers to discovery and documents produced; E-mail Mr. Magera regarding status. 
Draft Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum 
Prepare documents for Summary Judgment 
Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; Research case law regarding legal issues for summary 
judgment 
Edit summary judgment documents; Research case law on termination on contracts 
Edit Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; Research case law regarding Defendants' causes of action and issues on 
summary judgment 
Research case law regarding termination of contracts 
Finish research regarding termination of contracts for Summary Judgment Memorandum 
Research implied termination of contracts 
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera 
Edit and revise summary judgment motion and supporting documentation. 
Continue editing and revising summary judgment motion and supporting documentation. 
Edit and revise summary judgment documentation; draft argument regarding frustration of purpose; research additional cases of defect 
and cure. 
Continue working on summary judgment motion and supporting documentation. 
Continue drafting summary judgment motion and supporting documentation. 
Finalize Mr. Magera's affidavitfor review; e-mail affidavit to Mr. Magera. 
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera. 
Meet with Jaramie Magera to review affidavit for Motion for Summary Judgment; Make edits to affidavit; Make edits to Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment to reflect changes in affidavit 
Finalize documents for filing; e-mail Mr. Magera regarding review of affidavit. 
Telephone conference with Mr. Dunn regarding rescheduling of summary judgment motion due to conflicts; telephone conference with 
court; review pleading regarding changed date of hearing. 
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera regarding summary judgment hearing and motion. 
Review Defendants' response to Buku's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike;Begin drafting brief in reply to Defendants' 
response to Buku's Motion for Summary Judgment and brief in reply toDefendants' Motion to Strike 
Continue drafting Memorandum in Reply to Defendants' Response to Motion for Summary Judgment 
Finish drafting memorandum in reply to Defendants' response memorandum regarding motion for summary judgment 
Conference regarding reply to summary judgment motion. 




















































Dec 6/2009 DC 
Dec 7/2009 AEU 
Dec 7/2009 DC 
Dec 14/2009 DC 
Dec 15/2009 AEU 
Dec 15/2009 DC 
Dec 22/2009 DC 
Jan 612010 DC 
Feb 1/2010 CAH 
Feb 2/2010 CAH 
Feb 2/2010 DC 
Feb 2/2010 DC 
Feb 3/2010 CAH 
Feb 3/2010 DC 
Feb 5/2010 DC 
Mar 1/2010 DC 
Mar 11/2010 AEU 
Marll/2010 DC 
Mar 12/2010 AEU 
Mar 12/2010 DC 
Mar 16/2010 AEU 
Apr 12/2010 DC 
Apr 13/2010 DC 
Jun 4/2010 DC 
Jul 6/2010 AEU 
Jul 7/2010 AEU 
Jul 7/2010 DC 






Aug 3/2010 AEU 
Aug 4/2010 AEU 
Aug 10/2010 AEU 
Aug 15/2010 DC 
Aug 16/2010 AEU 
Aug 17/2010 AEU 
Sep 7/2010 DC 
Sep S/2010 AEU 
Edit and revise summary judgment motion and supportinginformation. 
Finalize Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment; Conduct legal research regarding failure of a condition 
precedent and effect on contract 
Finalize pleadings and arrange for filing. 
Prepare outline for summary judgment argument; review caselaw in support of summary judgment; attend summary judgment argument; 
Review discovery responses from Petersons and affidavits from Petersons and Clarks; Draft Golden Rule letter to Robin Dunn regarding 
Clarks failure to respond to discovery requests; Draft additional Requests for Admissions 
E-mail correspondence regarding summary judgment hearing. 
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera. 
Finalize letter to Mr. Dunn regarding discovery responses;finalize additional discovery request. 
Telephone conference with Jaramie Magera to discuss pending receipt from court on summary judgment motion; review summary 
judgment order issued by court 
Telephone conference with Jaramie Magera to discuss summary judgment opinion 
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera regarding decision. 
Analyze decision as compared topleadings; prepare a discovery plan for purposes of moving forward with litigation. 
Telephone conference with Jaramie Magera to review summary judgment decision and prepare for on-going litigation 
Prepare for and conference withMr. Magera regarding summary judgment ruling and other discovery. 
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera regarding farming situation. 
Review information regarding depositions; draft letter to Mr. Dunn regarding depositions. 
Draft Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Objection to Notice of Deposition and Request for Permission to Take Testimony via 
Telephone; Draft affidavit for DC 
Intra-office conference regarding needed discovery from Mr. Archibald and Mr. Foster. 
Phone call to Dave Chapple; leave Message; Phone call to Kipp Archibald; Draft Affidavit of Kipp Archibald Affidavit; Conversation with 
Dave Chapple; Email to Dave Chapple regarding questions toask Brad Foster 
Prepare for and attend hearing regarding request for telephone deposition; e-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera; telephone conference 
regarding information from witnesses. 
Edit and revise Affidavit of Kipp Archibald 
Prepare outlines and exhibits for depositions; conference with Mr. Magera to prepare for depositions; 
Prepare for and take depositions of Mr. Clark and Mr. Peterson; defend deposition of Mr. Magera. 
Telephone conference with Mr. Magera regarding telephone number for Brad Foster. 
Review Magera deposition, Peterson depOSition and Clark deposition in preparation for second summary judgment memorandum 
regarding interactions with Kipp Archibald 
Continue reviewing depositions for second motion for summary judment; Begin drafting Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Conference regarding summary judgment motion and arguments. 
Continue drafting Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment; Prepare correspondence to Dave Chapple and Brad 
Foster 
Intra-office conference regarding status of summary judgment; e-mail correspondence to Mr. Magera regarding status. 
Continue drafting Memorandum inSupport of Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
Finish drafting Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment; Research case law regarding dominion and control 
over real property 
Finish reviewing and editing Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment; Make changes to Kipp Archibald Affidavit 
and prepare list of questions for Kipp Archibald; Email to Kipp Archibald 
Phone call with Kipp Archibald; Intraoffice conference 
Draft Kipp Archibald Affidavit 
Finish drafting Kipp Archibald Affidavit 
Phone call to Brad Foster; leave message 
E-mail correspondence regarding status. 
Draft Affidavit of Brad Foster 
Revise and edit Brad Foster and Kipp Archibald affidavits; Revise and edit memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment 
Begin editing and revising 2nd motion for summary judgment; conference regarding affidavits in support. 










































Sep 8/2010 DC 
Sep 9/2010 DC 
Sep 15/2010 DC 
Sep 16/2010 DC 
Sep 20/2010 AEU 
Sep 20/2010 DC 
Sep 21/2010 AEU 
Sep 21/2010 DC 
Sep 27/2010 AEU 
Oct 1/2010 AEU 
Oct 4/2010 DC 
Oct 6/2010 DC 
Oct 11/2010 DC 
Oct 13/2010 DC 
Oct 14/2010 DC 
Nov 1/2010 DC 
Nov 4/2010 DC 
Nov 8/2010 DC 
Nov 1212010 DC 
Nov 15/2010 DC 
Nov 29/2010 AEU 
Nov 30/2010 AEU 
Nov 30/2010 DC 
Dec 1/2010 AEU 
Dec 3/2010 AEU 
Dec 6/2010 AEU 
Dec 6/2010 DC 
Dec 13/2010 DC 











Continue editing and revising brief; research issue of equitable remedies when adequate recovery at law. 
Continue editing and revising second motion for summary judgment. 
E-mail Mr. Casper regarding settlement proceeds agreement; e-mail Mr. Meikle regarding Brad Foster's schedule for conference. 
Intra-office conference regarding proceeds control agreement; e-mail correspondence with Mr. Casper. 
Email to Dave Chapple regarding Brad Foster affidavit 
Review e-mail correspondence from Mr. Casper; e-mail correspondences with Mr. Magera and Mr. Ball regarding proceeds control 
agreement and status of second summary judgment. 
Intraoffice conference regarding affidavits for summary judgment 
Edit and revise affidavits of Kipp Archibald and Brad Foster; draft e-mail to Mr. Magera; review deposition testimony for affidavits. 
Send email to Dave Chapple regarding Brad Foster Affidavit 
Draft follow-up email to Dave Chappel regarding Brad Foster Affidavit; Draft email correspondence to GLM regarding Brad Foster Affidavit 
Conference with Mr. Foster to discuss events surrounding use of Clark property. 
Conference with Mr. Foster to review affidavit; edit and revise affidavit; finalize affidavit for Mr. Foster's Signature. 
Edit and revise brief, affidavits, etc. for second summary judgment. 
Edit and revise briefing to indude Foster Affidavit. 
Continue editing and revising memorandum in support of second summary judgment motion. 
Edit and revise Mr. Archibald's affidavit for review. 
Conference with Mr. Archibald to finalize affidavit; edit and revise affidavit; finalize affidavit for signing. 
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera regarding second summary judgment motion. 
Edit and revise Buku briefing and affidavits. 
Edit and revise briefing and affidavit; file all briefing related to second motion for summary judgment. 
Review Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Motion for Summary Judgment 
Begin drafting Reply Memorandumin Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
Intra-office conference regarding reply brief and status of prior ruling. 
Continue drafting Reply Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
Finish drafting Reply Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment; Draft Moion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit 
Finish drafting Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike; Draft Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson in Support of Motion to Strike; Draft 
Motion to Strike; Make final revisions and edits to Reply Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment; Review and 
edit Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike, Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson, Motion toStrike and Notice of Hearing on Motion to Strike 
Edit and revise reply brief; finalize reply brief in support of summary judgment. 
Prepare for oral argument on motion for summary judgment; travel to and from Jefferson County for hearing; conference with Client 
regarding outcome and new hearing schedule. 
Telephone conference with Mr. Magera regarding summary judgment and assignment to Judge Watkins. 
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera regarding hearing; conference with Mr. Decker regarding concern of being before Judge twice in 
one day. 
Prepare for and attend summary judgment hearing. 
E-mail correspondence regarding SJ decision. 
TOTAL HOURS 
Totals for CAH 
Totals for DC 
Totals for AEU 
Computer Research for August 2008 
Filing fee for Complaint - Jefferson County 
Computer Research for December 2008 















































Computer Research for July 2009 
Deposition of Jaramie Magera - T & T Reporting 
Deposition of Raoel Clark and Angus Petersen - T & T Reporting 
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Case History 
Jefferson 
1 Cases Found. 
BukuPropertiesLI .. 'C vs.Raoel H dark, eta!. ' 
, CV .. 2008.. Dane H . 
Case:0000941 District Filed: 11/07/2008Subtype: Other Claims Judge: Watkins Jr Status: Pending 
Defendants:Clark, Janet C Clark, Raoel H Peterson, Angus Jerry Peterson, Betty Jean 




11/06/2008 Complaint Filed 
11106/2008 Summons Issued Raoel Clark 
11/06/2008 Summons Issued Janet Clark 
11/06/2008 Summons Issued Angus Peterson 
11/06/2008 Summons Issued Betty Jean Peterson 
11/07/2008 New Case Filed .. Other Claims 
11/07/2008 Plaintiff: Buku Properties L L C, Attorney Retained Charles 
Homer 
11/07/2008 Notice Of Appearance 
Filing: A .. Civil Complaint for more than $1,000.00 Paid by: 
11/07/2008 Homer, Charles (attorney for Buku Properties L L C,) 
Receipt number: 0007034 Dated: 11/7/2008 Amount: 
$88.00 (Check) For: Buku Properties L L C, (plaintiff) 
11/25/2008 Acknowledgment of acceptance of service 
11/25/2008 Acknowledgment of acceptance of service 
12/08/2008 Defendant: Clark, Janet C Attorney Retained Robin D. Dunn 
12/10/2008 Answer and counterclaim 
Filing: 17 .. All Other Cases Paid by: Dunn, Robin D. 
12/11/2008 (attorney for Clark, Raoel H) Receipt number: 0007896 
Dated: 12/11/2008 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: Clark, 
Raoel H (defendant) 
12/30/2008 Answer to counterclaim by BUKU Properties, LLC 
04/14/2009 Def~~da~tfThird Party Plaintiff Burtenshaw's 2nd Amended 
Exhibit list 
04/15/2009 Notice of Service, Plaintiffs 1 st set of Discovery Requests to 
Defendant 
04/15/2009 Notice of Service, Plaintiffs 1st set of Discovery Requests 
06/0212009 Change Assigned Judge (batch process) 
06/03/2009 No!ic~ of Service of ~efendants Peterson answers to 
plaintiffs first set of discovery requests 
10105/2009 Hearing Sch~duled (Motions 11/09/200903:30 PM) motion 
for summary judgment 
10105/2009 Memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment 
10105/2009 Affidavit o~ Jaramie Magera in support of plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment 
10105/2009 Notice of hearing 
10106/2009 Motion for summary judgment 
10/14/2009 Continue~ (Motions 12/141200901:30 PM) motion for 
summary judgment 
10/15/2009 Noti.ce vacating hear~ng and resetting hearing on plaintiffs 
motion for summary judgment 
11 113/2009 D~nia~ of plaintiff~' req~est for summary judgment and 
objection to conSideration of summary judgment 
11113/2009 Motion to strike portions of magera affidavit 
11/13/2009 Defendant's requst for summary judgment 
11/13/2009 Affidavit of Jerry .and Betty Peterso.n in support of 
defendants positions re: summary judment 
Exhibit "B" 
if J 
https:llwww.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.do?roaDetail=yes&schema=JEFF ... 2/18/2011 
11113/2009 Affidavit . Clark in support of defendants postions re: 
summary Judgment 
11/13/2009 Affidavit of N~ysha Foster, Planning and Zoning Coordinator 
re: summary Judgment 
11/13/2009 Defendants memorandum re: summary judgment 
11/13/2009 Hear~ng notice of on defendants summary judgment; motion 
to strike 
12/07/2009 Reply mer:norandum in support of plaintiffs motion for 
summary Judgment 
12/07/2009 Me~orandum in oppositio~ to defendants motion to strike 
portions of magera affidaVit 
12/14/2009 He8:ring result fo: Motions held o~ 12/14/200901:30 PM: 
Motion Held motion for summary Judgment 
01/06/2010 Notice of Service of plaintiffs second set of discovery 
requests to defendants Raoel Clark and Janet Clark 
Notice of Service of plaintiffs second set of discovery 
01/06/2010 requests to defendants Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty 
Jean Peterson 
01/13/2010 Notice of Servi~e of defendant Clarks' answers to plaintiffs 
second set of discovery requests 
01/13/2010 Notice of Servi~e defendants Petersons answers to plaintiffs 
second set of discovery requests 
01/27/2010 ~emoran~um d~cision (BUKU motion for summary 
Judgment IS denied) 
02/25/2010 Notice of taking depostion duces tecum 
03/03/2010 Notice of deposition for Raoel H. Clark 
03/03/2010 Notice of deposition of Angus Jerry Peterson 
defendants objection to notice of de[psotopm pf raoel h. 
03/09/2010 clark and requst for permission to take testimony via 
telephone 
03/09/2010 Notice of telephonic hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 03/12/201010:00 AM) 
03/10/2010 objection to notice of deposition (to be heard in Madison 
county) 
Hearing result for Motions held on 03/12/2010 10:00 AM: 
03/12/2010 Motion Held objection to notice of deposition (to be heard in 
Madison county) 
03/12/2010 Notice of Vacating Deposition of Raoel H Clark 
03/12/2010 Notice of Vacating Depostition of Angus Jerry Peterson 
03/12/2010 Minute Entry 
03/15/2010 Minute Entry on objection to notice of deposition 
Memorandum in opposition to defendants objections to 
03/18/2010 notice of depositin fo Raoel H. Clark and request from 
permission to take testimony via telephonce 
Affidavit of deanne casperson in support of memorandum in 
03/18/2010 oppostion to defendants objection to notice of depostion fo 
raoel h. clark and request from permission to take testimony 
via telephone 
03/29/2010 Change Assigned Judge (batch process) 
04/01/2010 Amended Notice of Deposition of Angus Jerry Peterson 
04/01/2010 Amended Notice of Deposition of Raoel H. Clark 
04/01/2010 Amen~ed Notice to taking Deposition Duces Tecum of 
Jaramle Magara 
11/01/2010 Hearing Sch~duled (Motions 12/13/201002:00 PM) motion 
for summary Judgment 
11/16/2010 Notice of hearing 
11/16/201 0 Affi~avit of Kipp Ar~hibald in support of plaintiffs second 
motln for summary Judgment 
11/16/2010 Affidavit of B~ad Foster in support of plaintiffs second motion 
for summary Judgment 
11/16/2010 Affidavit of deanne casperson in support of plaintiffs second 
https:llwww.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.do?roaDetail=yes&schema=JEFF ... 
Page 1. 01 j 
2118/2011 
Ida1'lO Keposltory - Case 
motion for judgment 
11/16/2010 Plaintiffs second motion for summary judgment 
11/16/2010 Memoran~um in support of plaintiffs second motion for 
summary judgment 
11/29/2010 Defendants,memorandum re: summary jugdment plaintiffs 
second motion 
11/29/2010 Affidavit of jerry p:,terson and betty peterson in support of 
defendants prosltlons re: summary judgment 
12/06/2010 Reply memo~andum in support of plaintiffs second motion 
for summary judgment 
12/06/2010 Motion to strike 
12/06/2010 Memorandum in support of motion to strike 
12/06/2010 Affidavit of deanne casperson in support of motion to strike 
12/06/2010 Notice of Hearing 
12/16/2010 Continued (M,otions 01/24/2011 02:30 PM) second motion 
for summary judgment 
12/16/2010 Notice Of Hearing 
01/03/2011 Change Assigned Judge 
01/24/2011 Minute Entry on motion for summary judgment 
01/25/2011 Hearing result for Motions held on 01/24/2011 02:30 PM: 
Motion Held second motion for summary judgment 
Connection: Public 




p.o. B6x 83726: 
Clerk of the Courts 
(208) 334-2210 
Boise, Idaho 113720.:0101 
'~('. . -: -2 
CHRISTINE BOULTER, CLERK 
Attn: NANCY 
JEFFERSON COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
210 COURTHOUSE WAY STE 100 
RIGBY, ID 83442 
CLERK'S RECORD DUE DATE SUSPENDED 
--
Docket No. 38561-2011 BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC Jefferson County District Court 
v. RAOEL H. CLARK #2008-941 
The CLERK'S RECORD DUE DATE is SUSPENDED until further notification from this 
office. 
REASON FOR SUSPENSION: SUSPENDED FOR D.C. FINAL JUDGMENT. 
For the Court: 
Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of the Courts 03 /02/2011 DB 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idah9 




RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. CLARK, 
husband and wife; ANGUS JERRY 
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON, 

















ORDER SUSPENDING APPEAL -'+:J 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38561-2011 
Jefferson County Docket No. 2008-941 
On February 25, 2011 this Court received a Notice of Appeal filed by Appellant 
November 17, 2011 in District Court which appealed the Memorandum Decision re: motion for 
)ummary Judgment and the Judgment re: Motions for Summary Judgment entered by Honorable 
lane H. Watkins, Jr. filed February 3, 2011. It appears that a Judgment set forth on a separate 
ocument has yet to be entered as provided by LR.C.P. 58(a) as clarified by the Court's recent 
~cisions in Spokane Structures v. Equitable Investment, 148 Id 616, 226 P.3d 1263 (2010) and 
rr, Inc. v. Mori, 148 Id 825, 230 P.3d 435 (2010), and this appeal is premature. As provided by 
\.oR. 17(e)(2), this appeal shall be suspended until entry of judgment or order that on its face states 
.t the order is the final decision of the District Court and represents a final determination of the 
ltS of the parties. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the matter of entry of a judgment as required by 
C.P. 58(a) be, and hereby is, REMANDED to the District Court and proceedings in this appeal 
[ be SUSPENDED to allow for the entry of a judgment, at which time this appeal shall proceed . 
R SUSPENDING APPEAL - Docket No. 38561 
. ~/? 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P. O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho 










RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. ) 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS ) 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN ) 





RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho 
Limited liability company; and 


















Case No. CV-08-941 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST 
FOR FEES AND COSTS; 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF OBJECTION 
COMES NOW, Robin D. Dunn, Esq., attorney for the 
defendant/ counterc1aimants and object to the attorney fee and cost request of the 
plaintiff for the reasoning set forth hereafter: 
1. Justice Jesse Walters has written a primer on the award of attorney fees 
which was an update of the often quoted Lon Davis study. This Idaho Law Review 
Article, VoL 38 (2001) Number 1, requires three criteria as follows: 
A. A prevailing party; 
B. A statutory or contractual basis; and 
C. Reasonableness of award under Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. For the reasons stated hereafter, no basis exists for the award and the fee 
request is not reasonable. 
2. The plaintiff requested a rescission of the contracts (Clark and 
Peterson) which were for the sale of the real property. The plaintiff alleged and the 
court believed that the plaintiff could rescind the contract based upon a due 
diligence period contained in the contract notwithstanding no evidence was 
presented of any problems with the real property. In any event, the court granted 
summary judgment and the contract became a nullity. As such, there was no 
contract. Thus, no contractual basis exists for the award of fees since there was "no 
contract" according to the grant of summary judgment. 
having dismissed the contract claims, the action could not have been one "to 
recover on a contract." We affirmed the action of the trial court in Day, stating that 
"to recover attorney fees under the statute, the action must be one to recover on the 
contract, not merely an action arising from a transaction relating to the purchase or 
sale of goods." 115 Idaho at 1018, 772 P.2d at 225. Based upon the interpretation of 
the statute in Day, the trial court's grant of attorney fees against appellants must be 
reversed; there being no contract between appellants 
OBJECTION-2-
Management Catalysts v. Turbo West Corpac, Inc., 809 P.2d 487, 119 Idaho 
626, (Idaho 1991) 
------------ Excerpt from page 809 P.2d 491. 
3. The same logic holds true for the claim of a commercial transaction 
under Idaho Code Section 12-120. If there is "no transaction" between the parties 
because the parties are returned to the status quo, then there is no basis for the award 
of fees. If the "Agreement" is rescinded, then no transaction occurred. Thus, no 
basis exists statutorily for the award of fees. 
"there is a clear distinction between litigation arising from a commercial 
transaction and litigation on noncommercial issues that might have future 
commercial ramifications." > 117 Idaho at 424, 788 P.2d at 239. For reasons different 
from those given by the district judge, we conclude that an award of attorney fees in 
this case was not authorized under> I.e. § 12-120(3). 
Edwards v. Edwards, 842 P.2d 307,122 Idaho 971, (Idaho App. 1992) 
------------ Excerpt from page 842 P.2d 309. 
This action before the court involved the future purchase of the real property. 
Although the defendants' disagree with the court's ruling on summary judgment, the 
case as it stands rescinded the contract and made the future purchase of the real 
property problematic. Future commercial ramifications do not come under the 
definition of commercial transactions to be able to award fees and costs. 
4. The lack of a contract or a statutory basis prohibits the award of fees 
and costs. 
With respect to the provision allowing attorney fees in a commercial 
transaction, the statute defines a commercial transaction as all transactions 
except transactions for personal and household purposes. This Court has 
held that the test is whether the commercial transaction comprises the 
gravamen of the lawsuit. > Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 890 P.2d 714 
(1995); Brower v. [126 Idaho 900] E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117 
Idaho 780, 792 P.2d 345 (1990). The gravamen ofthe lawsuit refers to whether 
the commercial transaction is integral to the claim and constitutes the basis 
upon which the party is attempting to recover. > Brower, 117 Idaho at 784, 
OBJECTION-3-
792 P.2d at 349. 
Property Management West:, Inc. v. Hunt:, 894 P.2d 130, 126 Idaho 897, (Idaho 
1995) 
------------ Excerpt from pages 894 P.2d 132-894 P.2d 133. 
The claim for reimbursement by the plaintiff was by rescinding the contract. 
By rescinding the contract to recover the earnest money, no contract existed and 
could not be, by the court's ruling, the gravamen of the lawsuit since a contract no 
longer existed and a commercial transaction no longer existed. Thus, fees cannot be 
awarded. 
5. No argument, of a reasonable nature, is made for fees pursuant to any 
other statute including Idaho Code 12-121. If so, the court should be convinced that 
nothing done by the defendants was unreasonable, frivolous or without foundation. 
6. The request for attorney fees is untimely. The certificate of mailing by 
the clerk for Judge Watkins, Lettie Messick, indicates she mailed a copy of the 
memorandum decision and the judgment to plaintiffs counsel, DeAnne Casperson, 
on February 3, 2011. The memorandum was not filed within 14 days as required by 
rule. 
7. The summary judgment decision did not award fees. Thus, a request 
for fees should be made to the district court since plaintiff was the prevailing party. 
No motion was made by plaintiff to request fees. No request was timely made to the 
court for fees rather an affidavit of fees and memorandum was filed. This is a 
technical matter the court should consider. 
8. Assuming arguendo that the court determines fees should be awarded, 
reasonableness of fees is governed by Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The plaintiff should not be entitled to fees leading up to the ruling on summary 
OBJECTION-4-
judgment by this court. 
The defendants successfully defended the first summary judgment motion 
and all allegations until this "newest court" made its ruling. Thus, all fees prior to 
the briefing on the latest summary judgment motion (second motion for summary 
judgment) should be denied. 
The defendants prevailed on the first motion and the events leading up to that 
decision. Thus, the plaintiffs could not argue, in reasonable fashion, that it was 
entitled to fees until the date of July 8, 2010. (The date commencing the preparation 
for the second summary judgment motion.) Furthermore, the court did not accept 
the motions to strike, etc. and those matters should not be awarded for the 
unsuccessful attempt by plaintiff. The plaintiff is only entitled to 68.9 hours 
according to the affidavit of its attorney commencing July 8, 2010 until February 15, 
2011. (Deleting motions to strike, etc.) 
CONCLUSION 
Fees and costs are not awardable from defendants to the plaintiff for 
the reasons cited above. 
DATED this 8th day of March, 2011. 
r ",,~.;;.C~)C?~: .. ~ 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day of March, 2011, a true and correct copy of 
OBJECTION-S-
; 
the foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) by: 
__ Hand Delivery 
_ Postage-prepaid mail 
~ Facsimile Transmission (208) 523-9518 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Qc;,)0~ 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Courtesy Copy: Judge Dane Watkins (Chambers in Bonneville) 
OBJECTION-6-
Clerl<: of the Courts 
(208) 334·2210 
CIIRISTINI': nOULTER~ CLERK 
Attn: NANCY 
JEI{I/ERSON (X>UNTY COURTHOUSE 
210 COURTHOUSE WAY STE 100 
RlGBY~ ID 83442 
Docket No. 38561-2011 BlJKU PROPERT.l.ES. 
LLC y, RAOEL H, 
CLARK 
Jl~lll~rSOl1 COllnty District Court 
if20()~-941 
Endosed is a l~Opy of the CLERK'S CERTff<'1 CA' I 'I ': t"l·II' the !lbove-entitJr;d appt!~ll~ whic.;h 
was filed in this office Oil MARCil 7, 2011 . 
Plc..~asc.; <.~ardlilly examinc thc TITLE and the CElrT1FICATE and advise t:he Distriet Court. 
Clerk (or the Agency secretal'Y, if applicable) AND this (lniQr; of tiny ('!lTors dcll\l:·(ed on (his 
dncunlent. 
The TITLE in the Cb:I{,!'1 FICATE tl1llf>t apI)elll' fln fIJI nOCUM.ENTS lilc.;~d in lhis COllrl~ 
itlc/uding Ill! BRl.l':FS, An abbr~viatr;d v~rsion of the TITLE may be used if it cleal'ly identities 
the parties to tlus appeal when the title is extremely long. 
0.1108/2011 DB 
For the Comt: 
Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk ()fthe C'YLll't:'l 
b 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, and Idaho 
Limited Liability Company, 
PlaintifflRespondent 
-vs-
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. CLARK, 
husband and wife; AUGUS JERRY 
PETERSON and BETTY JEAN PETERSON, 
husband and wife, 
Defendantsl A ellants. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
SUMPREME COURT NO. !JD5~ ( 
Jefferson County Case No. CV -2008-941 
APPEAL FROM: 7'h Judicial District Jefferson County. The Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr. 
CASE NO. FROM COURT: CV-2008-941 
ORDER OF JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: Summary Judgment dated February 
3,2011. § '~'J2> 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Robin D. Dunn .. ' ._-
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT: DeAnne Casperson ~ ---~.'~~f.g 
APPELED BY: Raoel Clark, et al , .. <-';,; ("', 
APPEALED AGAINST: BUKU Properties, LLC -J.;.!;:;~t~ 
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: 2117/2011 »:;'~I::~ 
;1 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: nla -.9 ::~;;o 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL: nla N 
AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL FILED: nla 
APPELLATE FEE PAID: Yes 
RESPONDENT OR CROSS RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
RECORD: 
WAS DISTRICT COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT REQUESTED?: NO 
IF SO NAME OF REPORTER: NIA 
Dated this 23 rd day of February, 2011 
CHRlSTINE BOULTER 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
FILED· ORIGINAL 
MAR -12011 
Supreme Court_Court ~ala_ 
Entered on ATS by 
SE ICIAL DISTRICT COURT, S OF IDAHO 
Buku Properties L L C 
vs. 
Raoel H Clark, eta!' 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
210 Courthouse Way, Suite 120 







Case No: CV-2008-0000941 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Status Conference regarding Final Judgment 
Judge: 
Courtroom: 
Monday, March 28, 2011 
Dane H. Watkins, Jr. 
Large Courtroom #3 
1:30 PM 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Wednesday, 
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Case No. CV-08-941 
DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT 
RE: FINAL JUDGMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The above-entitled court entered its Memorandum Decision, dated February 
3, 2011, granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs; and, dismissing the counter-
claims ofthe defendants. On the same date, the court entered its "Judgment" 
completing the process. 
The defendants timely appealed the document entitled "Judgment" believing 
it to be the final position of the court. After that time, the Supreme Court of Idaho 
requested a final judgment of the court and offered no directions. It is assumed that 
all parties believed this was a final judgment. The only possible portion of the 
document that may have been in question was a "certification" pursuant to Rule 54 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The defendants can only assume when a document states "Judgment", it is 
the final opinion of the court. Since that time, the plaintiffs have submitted proposed 
final judgment documents to which the plaintiffs have objected since the judgment 
documents submitted to the court contain information never explained or elucidated 
by the court in its memorandum decision. 
If the court were now to "change" its judgment, it would be tantamount to a 
motion to reconsider which neither party requested. The time lines for requesting a 
new trial and/or reconsideration have expired. The judgment should contain its 
original language and add the certification pursuant to Rule 54. 
In the alternative and given the lack of direction by the Supreme Court, the 
complaint of the plaintiff should be the starting point to review what was originally 
requested by such party. The plaintiff requested that the "contract" between the 
parties be rescinded and the parties returned to the status quo. If so, and taking the 
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decision of this court into consideration, that is exactly what the court did. Not only 
did it grant the plaintiff summary judgment; but, it dismissed the counterclaims of 
the defendants-some of which were equitable in nature and did not depend upon 
the existence of a contract. Needless-to-say, the defendants disagree with the 
reasoning of the court and of the decision. However, that determination, at this 
point, is for another court to review. 
If the court now adds language to the "judgment" which was not discussed in 
the memorandum decision, how can either party defend or argue its position to the 
higher court. This court should remain consistent with its judgment as previously 
written and add the conforming language of Rule 54. To add otherwise would 
prejudice the defendants and have to argue positions never discussed by the district 
court. 
1. Sum certain on money judgment. The plaintiff requests a sum certain in the 
judgment for refund of earnest money. This position certainly is 
understandable but does not portray the offsets that the defendants used for 
the purchase ofthe "retirement homes" and the expenses (damages) that the 
court did not consider by virtue of the counterclaims denied by the court. 
These sums claimed by the defendants, at a minimum, would have required a 
finding of damages and any offsets. No fact finder has or had the opportunity 
to determine the damages to the defendants. The refunds that the plaintiff 
requests are as follows: Peterson $317,000; Clark $25,000. 
2. Prejudgment interest. A review of court cases indicates that prejudgment 
interest can be a discretionary decision by this court. 
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We apply an "abuse of discretion" standard of review in deciding whether 
prejudgment interest should have been awarded in the present case; it is a question 
of fairness that is to be answered by balancing the equities. > Wessel v. Buhler, 437 
F.2d 279 (9th Cir.1971). The district court's reasoning in following Rodgers is sound. 
838 P.2d 323, 122 Idaho 720, Stueve v. Northern Lights, Inc., (Idaho App. 1992) 
------------ Excerpt from page 838 P.2d 326. 
However, it should also be noted that prejudgment interest has other factors to 
consider and the following case considers many different matters to-wit: 
Idaho statutory law, > Idaho Code § 28-22-104, calls for the award of 
prejudgment interest on certain types of money claims, and case law likewise calls 
for prejudgment interest on damages awarded for unjust enrichment. > Jones v. 
Whiteley, 112 Idaho 886,889,736 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Ct.App.1987). Under either the 
statute or the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment, however, prejudgment interest 
is allowed only where the damages are liquidated or readily ascertainable by 
mathematical process. > Id.; > Child v. Blaser, 111 Idaho 702, 706, 727 P.2d 893, 897 
(Ct.App.1986). This limitation is based upon" equitable considerations," > Farm 
Dev. Corp. v. Hernandez, 93 Idaho 918, 920, 478 P.2d 298, 300 (1970), which 
presumably include the notion that a person who could not determine the amount 
owed should not be charged interest on the sum that is ultimately found to be due. 
See 22 AM.JUR.2D Damages § 654 (1988). However, "where the amount of liability 
is liquidated or capable of ascertainment by mere mathematical processes" interest 
is allowed from a time prior to judgment, "for in that event the interest in fully 
compensating the injured [145 Idaho 277] party predominates over other equitable 
considerations." > Farm Dev. Corp., 93 Idaho at 920, 478 P.2d at 300 (quoting> 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Clover Creek Catde Co., 92 Idaho 889, 900, 
452 P.2d 993, 1004 (1969». See also> Doolitde v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No.2, 128 
Idaho 805,814,919 P.2d 334, 343 (1996); > Davis v. Prof'l Bus. Serv., Inc., 109 Idaho 
810,817,712 P.2d 511, 518 (1985); > Child, 111 Idaho at 706-07, 727 P.2d at 897-98. 
The mere fact that a claim is disputed or litigated does not render damages 
"unascertainable," for if this were the case, a party could delay payment without 
incurring interest expense by disputing and litigating any claim, and prejudgment 
interest would never be awarded. > Ace Realty, Inc. v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742, 751, 
682 P.2d 1289, 1298 (Ct.App.1984). See also> Mitchell v. Flandro, 95 Idaho 228, 235, 
506 P.2d 455, 462 (1972). Rather, damages are unascertainable where some factor 
necessary to calculate the amount of damages must be determined by a trier of fact. 
Conversely: 
A claim is liquidated if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed, makes it 
possible to compute the amount with exactness, without reliance upon opinion or 
discretion. Examples are claims upon promises to pay a fixed sum, claims for 
money had and received, claims for money paid out, and claims for goods or services 
to be paid for at an agreed rate. 
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> Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 744, 750 n. 2, 874 P.2d 
555, 561 n. 2 (Ct.App.1993), aff'd, > 125 Idaho 409, 871 P.2d 826 (1994). There need be 
no prayer for interest contained in the complaint to justify the award of prejudgment 
interest. > Farm Dev. Corp., 93 Idaho at 920,478 P.2d at 300; > Stueve v. Northern 
Lights, Inc., 122 Idaho 720, 723, 838 P.2d 323,326 (Ct.App.1992). 
The parties disagree about the standard of appellate review applicable to a 
trial court's order regarding prejudgment interest. Idaho case law has been 
inconsistent on this point. In the past, the Idaho Supreme Court has suggested that 
the review is conducted de novo, saying that" [i]nterest should be allowed as a 
matter of law from the date the sum became due in cases where the amount claimed, 
even though not liquidated, is capable of mathematical computation." > Taylor v. 
Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 137, 483 P.2d 664, 668 (1971) (emphasis added). Many 
appellate opinions do not squarely address the level of deference to be given to the 
trial court in these matters, but seem to implicitly apply de novo review. See, e.g., > 
Magic Valley Foods, Inc. v. Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc., 134 Idaho 785, 792, 10 P.3d 734, 
741 (2000). More recently, however, the Supreme Court has articulated an abuse of 
discretion standard. > Dillon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614, 617, 67 P.3d 93, 96 
(2003); > Belkv. Martin, 136 Idaho 652,660,39 P.3d 592, 600 (2001). > (FN1) Our 
inquiry in this case, therefore, is whether the district court abused its discretion in 
finding that Rick's damages were not liquidated or ascertainable by mathematical 
process. A permissible exercise of discretion occurs if the trial court (1) correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
before it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. > Sun Valley Potato 
Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 768, 86 P.3d 475, 482 (2004). 
178 P.3d 639, 145 Idaho 274, Ross v. Ross, (Idaho App. 2007) 
------------ Excerpt from pages 178 P.3d 641-178 P.3d 642. 
Even more important, the plaintiffs did not timely prosecute this action. 
More than one year passed (1/27/2010 to 2/03/2011) between the successful 
defense by the defendants herein of the first summary judgment motion filed 
by the plaintiffs. In these economic times, who would not want to receive a 
12% return on money when financial institutions are anywhere between 1% 
and 3% return on money. The court would be compounding the prejudice to 
the defendants by allowing such sum (prejudgment interest). The court is 
supposed to do justice for the parties. The court is well aware that the 
plaintiffs paid $317,000 earnest money to the defendants, Petersons. This sum 
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was not by accident and more than the typical sum for earnest money. 
Certainly, the court is not blind to this fact which was included in the 
numerous affidavits on summary judgment. To add prejudgment interest to 
this summary would be inequitable and totally unfair to the defendants, 
Peterson. Likewise, even though the refundable sum is lower for the Clarks, 
prejudgment interest should not be allowed. 
3. Attorney fees have been addressed by separate document. Costs of right are 
not argued by these defendants. The reasoning for the objections to attorney 
fees are adequately set forth. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The court should not alter its original "judgment" and certify the judgment as 
final. If the court does add additionally language to the judgment, the plaintiffs do 
not have the reasoning of the court which should have been included in the original 
memorandum. 
If the court adds additional language, the only matter would be the amount to 
be returned to the plaintiff. Since a contract did not exist by virtue of the grant of 
summary judgment to the plaintiff, other items of interest should be rendered moot. 
DATED this /2., day of April, 2011. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the +1=- day of April, 2011, a true and correct 
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DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
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Judge Dane Watkins 
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Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
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v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
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PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
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REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
1- REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
I. ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC ("Buku"), by and through its counsel of record, 
Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., hereby submits this Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Attorney's Fees and Costs pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. By submitting this Memorandum, Buku is claiming the right, pursuant to 
contract, statutory authority, i.e., Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121, and Rule 54 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, to recover the costs and fees set forth in the Affidavit of 
DeAnne Casperson in Support of Memorandum of Costs and Fees from Defendants 
Raoel H. Clark and Janet C. Clark, and Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty Jean Peterson 
(collectively "Defendants"). 
A. Buku is Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs Pursuant to the Parties' 
Agreements 
Defendants argue in their Objection to Plaintiffs Request for Fees and Costs; 
Memorandum in Support of Objection ("Defendants' Objection") that no contractual 
basis for the award of attorneys fees exists. More specifically, Defendants argue: 
[T]he plaintiff alleged and the court believed that the plaintiff could rescind 
the contract based upon a due diligence period contained in the contract 
notwithstanding no evidence was presented of any problems with the real 
property. In any event, the court granted summary judgment and the 
contract became a nullity. As such, there was no contract. Thus, no 
contractual basis exists for the award of fees since there was 'no contract' 
according to the grant of summary judgment. 
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(Defendants' Objection, p. 2). Defendants' argument is without support for several 
reasons. First, Plaintiff did not seek rescission of either Agreement. In fact, Plaintiff 
sought enforcement of the Agreements, specifically the provisions requiring the return of 
the earnest monies. (Verified Complaint, ~~ 27-33). The Court has never ruled the 
Agreements were rescinded. The Court found the Agreements clear and unambiguous 
and interpreted the plain language to require the return of the earnest monies. 
Second, Defendants rely on case law where no contract relationship existed to 
support as award of attorney's fees. Defendants specifically cite to Management 
Catalysts v. Turbo West Cor pac, Inc., 809 P.2d 487, 119 Idaho 626 (1991), which appears 
as follows in Defendants' brief: 
[h Javing dismissed the contract claims, the action could not have 
been one "to recover on a contract." We affirmed the action of the trial 
court in Day, stating that "to recover attorney fees under the statute, the 
action must be one to recover on the contract, not merely and action arising 
from a transaction relating to the purchase or sale of goods." 115 Idaho at 
1018,772 P.2d at 224. Based upon the interpretation of the statute in Day, 
the trial court's grant of attorney fees against appellants must be reversed; 
there being no contract between appellants 
(Defendants' Objection, p. 2). Defendants' reliance upon Management Catalysts is 
misplaced. Here, in no way did the Court dismiss Buku's contract claims. In fact, the 
entire basis of the Court's decision was that Buku was entitled to have the Agreements 
between Buku and Defendants enforced, and pursuant to the terms of the contract, Buku 
was entitled to a return of its earnest monies. The Court specifically enforced the 
Agreements. 
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The attorney's fees provisions of both the Clark Agreement and the Peterson 
Agreement state as follows: 
23. Attorneys fees. The prevailing party in any action to enforce 
this agreement shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys fees and 
costs. 
(See Complaint, Ex. A, ,23; Ex. B, , 23). Nowhere in that provision is there any 
exception for a scenario where the sale does not close. It applies to "any action to enforce 
this agreement." Defendant's argument that the Agreements are a nullity beeause the sale 
of Defendants' property did not close completely contradicts the Court's decision, the 
terms of the contract itself, and the actual claims pled in this case. Based on the parties 
Agreements, Buku is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to contract. 
B. Buku is Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs as a result of a Commercial 
Transaction 
Defendants argue that Buku is not entitled to attorney's fees and costs because 
there was "no transaction" and that therefore Idaho Code § 12-120 cannot apply. Again, 
Defendants' arguments ignore the Court's order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Buku based upon the plain and unambiguous language of the Agreements. Defendants 
cite Edwards v. Edwards, 842 P.2d 307,122 Idaho 971 (Ct. App. 1992) in support of 
their argument. However, that case did not deal with a contract for the purchase and sale 
of property to be developed. Edwards v. Edwards involved an action for a declaratory 
judgment, in which the plaintiff requested a ruling as to the validity and enforceability of 
two written agreements to develop and sell property owned by the plaintiffs children and 




his mother's estate. Id., 842 P.2d at 307, 122 Idaho at 971. The agreements themselves 
were between plaintiff and his parents, and plaintiffs mother and the trust plaintiff 
managed on behalf of his mother and four of his children. Id. Both agreements provided 
that the plaintiff would develop and promote certain tracts of land owned by his parents 
and his children, and that he would receive 50% of the net profit. Id. Ultimately, the 
court found in favor of the children, and the children requested attorney's fees, in part, 
under § 12-120(3). Id., 842 P.2d at 308, 122 Idaho at 972. The court denied the request 
made under § 12-120(3), concluding that the statute did not authorize attorney's fees 
because the action sought declaratory relief, rather than a monetary award. Id. The Court 
of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, on the basis that neither party was 
attempting to recover against the other on the basis of any "integral" commercial 
transaction and that the purpose of the declaratory judgment action was to ascertain 
whether there existed a binding, contractual relationship between the parties under each 
of the two disputed agreements. 842 P.2d at 308-09, 122 Idaho at 972-73. There was no 
money or transaction involved in the agreements at issue in Edwards. Rather, they simply 
involved a promise between two parties to eventually develop some property. See 
generally, Id. 
The situation in Edwards is entirely different from the scenario in the current case, 
in which the contract involved a transaction for the sale of property, which, pursuant to 
the terms of the Agreements themselves, was to potentially be purchased for the purpose 
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of developing the property. No party sought a declaratory judgment, but enforcement of 
the Agreements. As Buku noted in its Memorandum of Costs and Fees, Idaho courts 
have, on numerous occasions, recognized the applicability of this provision to commercial 
real estate transactions such as the one at issue in the agreements here. See, i.e., Dennett 
v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21,31-32,936 P.2d 219,230 (Ct. App. 1997); Farm Credit Bank of 
Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 274-75, 869 P.2d 1365, 1369-70 (1994); Herrick v. 
Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293,306,900 P.2d 201,214 (Ct. App. 1995). Consequently, Buku 
is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
C. Buku's Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs is Timely 
Defendants also argue that Buku's request for attorney's fees and costs was 
untimely. This issue is moot at this point in time. No final judgment has been entered in 
this matter. This fact is confirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court, which suspended the 
proceedings in Defendants' appeal: 
On February 25,2011, this Court received a Notice of Appeal filed by 
Appellant November 17,2011 in District Court which appealed the 
Memorandum Decision re: Motion for Summary Judgment and the 
Judgment re: Motions for Summary Judgment entered by Honorable Dane 
H. Watkins. Jr. filed February 3, 2011. It appears that a Judgment set forth 
on a separate document has yet to be entered as provided by LR.C.P. 58(a) 
as clarified by the Court's recent decisions in Spokane Structures v. 
Equitable Investment, 148 Id 616, 226 P.3d 1263 (2010) and TJT, Inc. v. 
Mori, 148 Id 825, 230 P.3d 435 (2010), and this appeal is premature. As 
provided by LA.R. 17(e)(2), this appeal shall be suspended until entry of 
judgment or order that on its face states that the order is the final decision of 
the District Court and represents a final determination of the rights of the 
parties. Therefore, it good cause appearing, 
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IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the matter of entry of judgment as 
required by LR.C.P. 58(a) be, and hereby is, REMANDED to the District 
Court and proceedings in this appeal shall be SUSPENDED to allow for the 
entry of a judgment, at which time this appeal shall proceed. 
(Order Suspending Appeal, Docket No.3 8561). Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(d)(5), Buku was not required to submit its memorandum of costs and 
attorney's fees until fourteen days after entry of the Final Judgment. Because no Final 
Judgement has been entered, Buku's memorandum of costs and fees is timely. 
II. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Buku respectfully requests an award of attorney's fees in 
an amount of$27,093.61 and costs in an amount of$724.82. Buku further requests leave 
to file a supplemental memorandum for attorney's fees to recover fees incurred since the 
filing of the original memorandum of costs and fees. 
~ 
Dated this 18 day of April, 2011. 
~~~ 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, 
P.L.L.C. 
7- REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this lhay of April, 2011, I served a copy of the following 
described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by 
mailing or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Robin D. Dunn 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
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( ) First Class Mail 
( ) jiand Delivery 
( ./f Facsimile 
( ) Overnight Mail 
DeAnne Casperson, sq. 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
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v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
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ENTRY OF PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
1- MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ENTRY OF PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT 
On April 12, 2011, Defendants Raoel H. Clark and Janet C. Clark ("Clarks") and 
Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty Jean Peterson ("Petersons") filed a Defendants' 
Statement Re: Final Judgment ("Statement") and a proposed Final Judgment 
("Defendants' Final Judgment") in this matter. The Statement argued that Plaintiffs 
proposed Final Judgment should not be entered for various reasons and that Defendants' 
Final Judgment should be entered, rather than the proposed Final Judgment provided to 
the Court by Plaintiff. Plaintiff now provides this Memorandum in Support of Entry of 
Plaintiffs Proposed Final Judgment in response to the Statement and Defendants' Final 
Judgment. 
I. ARGUMENT 
A. No Final Judgment has been Entered 
Defendants' continual argument that the "Judgment re: Motion for Summary 
Judgment" was a "Final Judgment" has no support and contradicts the Idaho Supreme 
Court's explicit directives for the Court to enter a "final judgment." Defendants provide 
in their Statement that: 
[t]he defendants timely appealed the document entitled "Judgment" 
believing it to be the final position of the court. After that time, the 
Supreme Court of Idaho requested a final judgment of the court and offered 
no directions. It is assumed that all parties believed this was a final 
judgment. The only possible portion of the document that may have been in 
question was a "certification" pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
The defendants can only assume when a document states 
"Judgment", it is the final opinion of the court. 
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(Statement, p. 2). Defendants' position that the judgment resulting from Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment was the final judgment in this matter is incorrect and fails 
to apply Idaho Supreme Court authority. The Idaho Supreme Court has defined a final 
judgment as "an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject matter of 
the controversy, and represents a final determination of the right of the parties. It must be 
a separate document that on its face states the relief granted or denied." TJT, Inc. v. 
Mori, 148 Idaho 823,203 P. 3d 4325,436 (2010) (quoting Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., 137 Idaho 850, 867, 55 P. 3d 304, 327 (2002)). The judgment relating only to the 
summary judgment does not match that definition. Further, Defendants' assumption that 
when a document states "Judgment" it is the fmal opinion of the court in a matter has no 
basis. Again, Defendants fail to cite to the Court binding authority, which was cited in 
the Supreme Court's Order Suspending Appeal. The two cases provided in the Court's 
Order Suspending Appeal explain that the granting of a summary judgment is not a "Final 
Judgment" because it does not address the relief requested: 
Rule 54( c) states that "every fmal judgment shall grant the relief to which 
the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled. (Emphasis added). The 
relief to which a party is entitled is not the granting of a motion for 
summary judgment. The Rule refers to the relief to which the party is 
ultimately entitled in the lawsuit, or with respect to a claim in the lawsuit. 
The granting of a motion for summary judgment is simply procedural step 
towards the party obtaining that relief. 
Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inc., LLC, 148 Idaho 616,619,226 P. 3d 1263, 
1266 (2010). In other words, Plaintiff did not plead for the grant of summary judgment. 
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Plaintiff pled the return of the earnest monies and requested prejudgment interest. 
Summary judgment was simply a procedural step towards obtaining the relief. 
Moreover, the Judgment was not entitled "Judgment" but "Judgment re: Motions 
for Summary Judgment." Clearly, based upon this title alone, the Court was not 
disposing of all matters of the case by issuing the judgment. It only pertained to the 
Court's decision on the Motions for Summary Judgment. In addition, that Idaho Supreme 
Court has already affIrmatively stated that the Judgment entered by the Court on February 
3,2011, is not an appealable fmaljudgment. As such, the Supreme Court remanded 
Defendants' Appeal until a fmal, appealable judgment, which represents the Court's final 
determination of the rights of the parties, is entered. (See Order Suspending Appeal, 
Docket No. 38561). Consequently, no Final Judgment has been entered. 
B. The Relief Request by Plaintiff was the Return of the Earnest Monies with 
Interest 
Defendants argue that the Court cannot enter the proposed Final Judgment 
submitted by Plaintiff because ''the judgment documents submitted to the court contain 
information never explained or elucidated by the court in its memorandum decision." 
(Statement, p. 2). Further, Defendants argue "[i]fthe court were now to 'change' its 
judgment, it would be tantamount to a motion to reconsider which neither party 
requested." (Statement, p. 2). In order to make such an argument, Defendants again 
ignore Supreme Court authority and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. In Spokane 
4- MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ENTRY OF PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT 
Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Investment, LLC, the Idaho Supreme Court explained the 
information necessary in a fmal judgment based on the relief requested: 
The "relief to which the party ... is entitled" must be read in connection with 
other rules. Rule 8( a)( 1) provides, "A pleading which sets forth a claim for 
relief ... shall contain ... (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief, (3) a demand for judgment for the relief 
to which he deems himself entitled." The "demand for judgment for the 
relief to which he deems himself entitled" obviously refers to the relief that 
the party seeks in the lawsuit. 
148 Idaho at 619; 226 P. 3d at 1266. 
In order to determine what relief was requested, the Court must look to the 
Plaintiffs Complaint. See id. Plaintiff specifically requested the following relief: 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for Judgment against the above-named Defendants 
as follows: 
a. For a money judgment in the principal amount of$317,000.00 against 
Petersons and $25,000.00 against Clarks based on Plaintiffs' claim for 
refund of earnest money under contract or in any additional amount to be 
determined at the trial of this matter; 
b. For an award of prejudgment interest in an amount to be determined upon 
judgment; 
c. For an award of reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of$3,000.00 if this 
matter is concluded by default, and a greater amount should be awarded if 
this matter is contested; 
d. For an award of costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter; and 
e. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the 
premIses. 
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(Verified Complaint, p. 9-10). Consequently, the Final Judgment must then set forth the 
relief granted or denied based on the Court's ruling. 
Plaintiffs proposed Final Judgment does not contain information "never explained 
or elucidated by the court in its memorandum decision." The Judgment re: Motions for 
Summary Judgment entered by the Court specifically ruled that Plaintiff was entitled to 
the return of the earnest monies. This is a quantifiable amount, based upon the terms of 
the Agreements: $317,000 as against Defendants Petersons and $25,000 as against 
Defendants Clarks, as was pled by Plaintiff. Additionally, although unnecessary pursuant 
to Idaho case law (see, i.e, Rosecrans v. Intermountain Soap & Chemical Co., Inc., 100 
Idaho 785, 788, 605 P.2d 963, 966 (1980)), Plaintiff specifically pled pre-judgment 
interest on these amounts. (See Verified Complaint, ~ ~ 45-47, and Prayer for Relief). 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-104, a party is entitled to prejudgment interest at a rate of 
twelve percent per year in cases of money due on an express contract. I.C. § 28-22-104; 
see also Dillon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614,617,67 P.3d 93,96 (2003). Plaintiff is 
not asking the Court to "change" its judgment or reconsider its judgment. Rather, it is 
asking the Court to apply its decision regarding the Motions for Summary Judgment so 
that a Final Judgment, granting or denying the parties' requested relief, can be entered. 
Because the Court found Plaintiff is entitled to the return of its earnest monies, which are 
quantifiable amounts pursuant to express contracts, Plaintiff, by statute, is entitled to 
prejudgment interest on those amounts. 
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Regarding Defendants' alternative argument regarding the "lack of direction" by 
the Supreme Court, and looking to the complaint in this matter as the "starting point" to 
review what was originally requested, Defendants yet again have argued that Plaintiff had 
requested that the Agreements be rescinded and the parties returned to their status quo. 
(Statement, p. 2-3). Defendants fail to cite any pleading or brief wherein Plaintiff asked 
for rescission of the Agreements. Plaintiff specifically requested that Defendants be 
required to return the earnest monies, pursuant to the Agreements. (Verified Complaint, 
~~ 9-10 and Prayer for Relief ). The Agreements were not rescinded based upon the 
Court's decision, as Plaintiff discussed at length in its Memorandum in Support of Award 
of Costs and Fees. 
Finally, Defendants argue "[i]fthe court now adds language to the ''judgment'' 
which was not discussed in the memorandum decision, how can either party defend or 
argue its position to the higher court." Nothing in Plaintiffs proposed Final Judgment is 
inconsistent with the Court's Judgment Re: Motions for Summary Judgment. Again, as 
mentioned above, the Final Judgment proposed by Plaintiff simply puts into judgment 
form the relief requested. Further, if Defendants disagree with the terms of the Final 
Judgment, they can amend their notice of appeal to include whatever additional issues 
Defendants have with the contents of the Final Judgment. 
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c. Plaintiff is Entitled to Prejudgment Interest 
Defendants assert that the award of prejudgment interest is discretionary, and cite 
to Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho 274, 178 P.3d 639 (2007) in support of this argument. 
Defendants' reliance upon Ross is misplaced, in that it actually supports the award of 
prejudgment interest in the case at hand, where the amount due is clear pursuant to the 
terms of the Agreements. 
In Ross, the Idaho Court of Appeals specifically noted: 
Idaho statutory law, Idaho Code § 28-22-104, calls for the award of 
prejudgment interest on certain types of money claims, and case law 
likewise calls for prejudgment interest on damages awarded for unjust 
enrichment. Jones v. Whiteley, 112 Iaho 886, 889, 736 P.2d 1340, 1343, 
(Ct. App. 1987). Under either statute or the equitable remedy of unjust 
enrichment, however, prejudgment interest is allowed only where the 
damages are liquidated or readily ascertainable by mathematical process. 
Id; Child v. Blaser, 111 Idaho 702, 706, 727 P.2d 893, 897 (Ct. App. 
1986). This limitation is based upon "equitable considerations," Farm Dev. 
Corp. v. Hernandez, 93 Idaho 918, 920, 478 P.2d 298,300 (1970), which 
presumably include the notion that a person who could not determine the 
amount owed should not be charged interest on the sum that is ultimately 
found to be due. See 22 AmJur.2D Damages § 654 (1988). However, 
"where the amount of liability is liquidated or capable of ascertainment by 
mere mathematical processes" interest is allowed from a time prior to 
judgment, "for in that event the interest in fully compensating the injured 
party predominates over other equitable considerations." Farm Dev. Corp., 
93 Idaho at 920, 478 P.2d at 300 (quoting United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co. v. Clove Creek Cattle Co., 92 Idaho 889, 900, 452 P.2d 993, 
1004 (1969)). See also Doolittle v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No.2, 128 
Idaho 805, 814,919 P.2d 334, 343 (1996); Davis v. Pro!'l Bus Serv., Inc., 
109 Idaho 810,817,712 P.2d 511, 518 (1985); Child, 111 Idaho at 706-07, 
727 P.2d at 897-98. 
The mere fact that a claim is disputed or litigated does not render damages 
"unascertainable," for if this were the case, a party could delay payment 
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without incurring interest expense by disputing and litigating any claim, and 
prejudgment interest would never be awarded. Ace Realty, Inc. v. 
Anderson, 106 Idaho 742, 751, 682 P.2d 1289, 1298 (Ct. App. 1984). 
Rather, damages are unascertainable where some factor necessary to 
calculate the amount of damages must be determined by a trier of fact. 
Conversely: 
A claim is liquidated if the evidence furnishes data which, if 
believed, makes it possible to compute the amount with 
exactness, without reliance upon opinion or discretion. 
Examples are claims upon promises to pay a fixed sum, 
claims for money had and received, claims for money paid 
out, and claims for goods or services to be paid at an agreed 
rate. 
Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 744, 750 n. 2, 874 P.2d 
555,561 n.2 (Ct. App. 1993), ajJ'd, 125 Idaho 409, 871 P.2d 826 (1994). 
There need be no prayer for interest contained in the complaint to justifY the 
award of prejudgment interest. Farm Dev. Corp., 93 Idaho at 920,478 P.2d 
at 300; Stueve v. Northern Lights, Inc., 122 Idaho 720, 723, 838 P.2d 323, 
326 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Ross, 145 Idaho at 276-77, 178 P.3d at 641-42. Ross makes it clear that where the sum 
due is capable of mathematical computation, prejudgment interest should be awarded 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-104. Defendants seems to be confusing the court's 
discussion in Ross regarding the abuse of discretion standard applicable to a lower court's 
determination as to whether a there is a sum due capable of mathematical computation 
with the award of prejudgment interest being discretionary. See id., 145 Idaho at 277, 178 
P.3d at 642. This is simply not the case. When the amount due is capable of 
mathematical computation, as it obviously is here-in fact the Agreements specifically 
state the amounts due-the award of prejudgment interest is appropriate pursuant to 
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statute. From the time they signed the Agreements, Defendants were aware of the 
amounts they were required to return to Plaintiff in the event that the Agreements did not 
close. They cannot now claim that these amounts were not ascertainable and that they 
therefore do not have to pay prejudgment interest after keeping Plaintiffs money for 
several years. 
Defendants also complain that "plaintiffs [sic] did not timely prosecute this action. 
More than one year passed (1/27/2010 to 2103/2011) between the successful defense by 
the defendants here-in of the first summary judgment motion filed by the plaintiffs. In 
these economic times, who would not want to receive a 12% return on money when 
financial institutions are anywhere between 1 % and 3% return on money." (Statement, p. 
5). Defendants knew that they could be subject to paying prejudgment interest based 
upon Plaintiffs Verified Complaint, and the existence of Idaho Code § 28-22-104. 
Defendants could have requested a trial setting at any time in order to reduce the amount 
of time prejudgment interest could accrue. However, Defendants chose not to do so. 
Further, Defendant's response to Plaintiffs first summary judgment required additional 
discovery, which the parties conducted the year between each ruling on summary 
judgment. In that discovery, Plaintiff established Defendants' allegations as unsupported 
and irrelevant. Further, and more importantly, Defendants fail to acknowledge that this 
situation is one of their own doing. If they had returned the earnest monies in the first 
place, they would not now be in the position of having to pay interest on the funds which 
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should have been returned. They could have returned the funds under protest and still 
sought specific performance of the Agreements. The fact of the matter is, the question of 
prejudgment interest is not a matter of whether its application would be "fair" to 
Defendants or Plaintiff. Idaho Code § 28-22-104 specifically provides for the award of 
prejudgment interest in instances where the amount is readily ascertainable, as it is here. 
There is no consideration of "fairness." However, if "fairness" were truly a 
consideration, one has to consider the fairness of the fact that Defendants kept and 
benefitted from Plaintiff's earnest monies for a period of almost three and a half years. 
Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest because the dollar amount is spelled out by the 
contracts and was specifically pled. 
II. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter Plaintiff's proposed 
Final Judgment in this matter. 
DATED this 2k.. ifay of April, 2011. 
~L~~ 
DeAnne Casperson, E ~ = 
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Buku Properties L L C vs. Raoel H Clark, etal. 
Hearing type: Oral Argument 
Hearing date: 4/25/2011 
Time: 1:30 pm 
Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr 
Courtroom: Large Courtroom #3 
Minutes Clerk: Denise Criddle 
Party: Buku Properties L L C, Attorney: DeAnne Casperson 
Party: Angus Peterson, Attorney: Robin Dunn 
Party: Betty Peterson, Attorney: Robin Dunn 
Party: Janet Clark, Attorney: Robin Dunn 
Party: Raoel Clark, Attorney: Robin Dunn 
Case called and all parties are identified; Attorney: DeAnne Casperson, and 
client, Jeremy Magara, Attorney: Robin Dunn and his clients, 
No Court reporter in present. 
Mr. Dunn makes comments to the Court regarding the issue of not having a 
court reporter. 
Ms. Casperson begins to make her comments to the court regarding the 
Summary Judgment and Attorney's Fees. 
Judge Watkins makes inquiry and Ms. Casperson responds. 
Mr. Dunn beings his argument( s). 
Ms. Casperson makes further argument. 
The Court will issue a decision at a later time. 
Adjourned 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
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Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARI(, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
PETERSON, husband and wife, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Counter-Defendants. 
1- FINAL JUDGMENT 
Case No. CV-08-941 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
On February 3,2011, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision Re: Motions for 
Summary Judgment ("Memorandum") and a Judgment Re: Motions for Summary 
Judgment ("Judgment"). The Memorandum and Judgment granted Plaintiff Buku 
Properties, LLC's ("Buku") Second Motion for Summary Judgment and disposed of all 
remaining issues in the case in favor of Buku. Pursuant to the Memorandum and 
Judgment, Buku is entitled t6 the return of earnest money in the amount of $317,000.00 
from Defendants Angus Jerry Peterson and Betty Jean Peterson ("Petersons") and 
$25,000.00 from Defendants Raoel H. Clark and Janet C. Clark ("Clarks"), plus 
prejudgment interest at the legal rate of interest of 12% per annum from December 19, 
2007 through the date of entry of this Judgment, and post-judgment interest at the rate of 
judgment interest of 5.625% from and after the date of entry of this Final Judgment until 
such sums are satisfied. 
THE COURT HEREBY ENTERS FINAL JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE as 
follows: 
1. Judgment is entered on behalf of Buku against Petersons, jointly and 
severally, in the amount of $444,355.94, consisting of $317,000.00 in principal plus 
prejudgment interest accrued to April 25, 2011, in the amount of$127,355.94. Such 
judgment amount of$444,355.94 shall accrue interest from and after the date of entry of 
this Judgment at a rate of 5.625% per annum or $68.48 per day until such Judgment is 
satisfied. 
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2. Judgment is entered on behalf of Buku against Clarks, jointly and severally, 
in the amount of$35,043.94, consisting of$25,000.00 in principal plus prejudgment 
interest accrued to April 25, 2011, in the amount of$10,043.94. Such judgment amount 
of $35,043 .94 shall accrue interest from and after the date of entry of this Judgment at a 
rate of 5.625% per annum or $5.40 per day until such Judgment is satisfied. 
3. Petersons' and Clarks' counterclaims against Buku are DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE. 
DATED this ;J.'.S"" day of April, 2011. 
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copy thereof. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON. 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK, husband and wife; ANGUS 
JERRY PETERSON and BETTY JEAN 
















Case No. CV -2008-941 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On August 20, 2007, Buku Properties, LLC (hereafter, "Buku") entered into a Purchase 
and Sale Agreement with Raoel and Janet Clark (hereafter, "Clarks") for the purchase of 80.17 
acres of real property for the price of $1,044,075.18. Pursuant to the agreement with Clarks, 
Buku tendered $25,000 in earnest money to Clarks on October 15,2007. 
On August 30, 2007, Buku entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement with Jerry and 
Betty Peterson (hereafter, "Petersons") for the purchase of 73 acres of real property for the price 
of$980,000. Pursuant to the agreement with Petersons, Buku tendered $327,000 in earnest 
money to Petersons on August 30,2007. The purchase and sale agreements will hereinafter be 
referred to collectively as "Agreements." 
During a four month due diligence period provided for in the Agreements, Buku learned 
of a proposed zoning change that would have affected the value of the properties and hindered 
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Buku's intended use of the properties. As a result, Buku refused to close by the date specified in 
the Agreements, and Buku requested the Clarks and Petersons refund the earnest money. 
Clarks and Petersons both refused to refund the earnest money, so on November 6,2008, 
Buku filed suit. On December 10, 2008, Clarks and Petersons filed a Counterclaim seeking 
specific performance, alleging breach of contract and other equitable claims, and asking this 
Court to dismiss Buku's complaint with prejudice. 
On October 6,2009, Buku filed for Summary Judgment. On November 13,2009, Clarks 
and Petersons filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion to strike portions of an 
affidavit. 
On January 27,2010, the Court (Judge Moller) issued a memorandum decision which (1) 
granted summary judgment for Buku regarding Defendants' Idaho Consumer Protection Act 
counterclaim, (2) denied Buku's motions for summary judgment regarding issues surrounding 
enforcement of the Agreements, and (3) denied Defendants' motion to strike. Judge Moller's 
decision did not address Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
On November 16, 2010, Buku filed a second motion for summary judgment asking this 
Court to dismiss all of Defendants' counterclaims and rule in its favor on its claim for 
reimbursement of the earnest money. On February 3, 2011, this Court issued a memorandum 
decision and judgment granting Buku's motion for summary judgment. 
On February 24,2011, Buku filed a memorandum of attorney's fees and costs supported 
by the affidavit of Deanne Casperson. On March 8, 2011, Defendants filed an objection to 
Buku's request for fees and costs. On April 18, 2011, Buku filed a reply brief in support of its 
request for fees and costs. On April 25, 2011, this Court heard oral argument regarding Buku's 
request for fees and costs. 
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II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
An award of attorney fees must be supported by statutory or other authority. See Webb v. 
Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 526,148 P.3d 1267,1272 (2006). The amount of attorney fees and costs 
awarded is generally discretionary. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425,435, 111 P.3d 110, 
120 (2005). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Attorney Fees 
Buku claims it is entitled to reasonable attorney fees pursuant to the Agreements and 
pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121. Because this Court finds Buku is entitled to 
attorney fees pursuant to § 12-120(3), the Court need not address whether the Agreements or 
other statutes provide a basis for an award of attorney fees. 
Clarks and Petersons argue an award of attorney fees under § 12-120(3) is improper 
because the gravamen of this lawsuit did not arise out of a "commercial transaction." Moreover, 
Defendants argue the fees requested by Buku are unreasonable because Buku was not the 
prevailing party. I 
i. Commercial Transaction 
Section 12-120 provides for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in any 
civil action arising from a "commercial transaction." Clarks and Petersons cite Edwards v. 
Edwards, 122 Idaho 971,842 P.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1992) in support of their argument that this 
1 Clarks and Petersons also argue Buku's request for fees and costs should be denied because it was untimely and 
Buku did not file a "motion" for fees and costs. LR.C.P 54(d)(5) provides for a fourteen day window following the 
entry of judgment wherein the prevailing party may filed a "memorandum of costs." Whereas Buku filed a 
"Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs," which detailed Buku's claimed expenses, and whereas a final 
judgment is yet to be entered in this matter, Clarks' and Petersons' arguments are without merit. 
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case did not arise out of a commercial transaction. In Edwards, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
stated, 
As we stated in Idaho Newspaper [§ 12-120(3)] does not extend to all actions 
where a commercial relationship exists, but rather, "the lawsuit still must seek 
resolution of a dispute arising from a commercial transaction between the 
parties." 117 Idaho at 424, 788 P.2d at 239 (emphasis original). With respect to 
the statute, our Supreme Court recently observed: 
[T]he award of attorney's fees is not warranted every time a 
commercial transaction is remotely connected with the case. Rather, the 
test is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the 
lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.e. § 12-120(3) unless 
the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the 
basis upon which the party is attempting to recover. To hold otherwise 
would be to convert the award of attorney's fees from an exceptional 
remedy justified only by statutory authority to a matter of right in virtually 
every lawsuit filed. 
Brower v. E.1 DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 
349 (1990). 
Edwards, at 972,842 P.2d at 308. 
In a fairly recent decision, the Idaho Supreme Court commented on Edwards, stating as 
follows: 
First, the Edwards case has no application here because there was no 
commercial transaction which constituted the "gravamen" of the suit. Here, the 
gravamen of both Freiburger's declaratory judgment action and J-V-B's 
counterclaim was the enforceability of a covenant contained in an employment 
agreement. The term "commercial transaction" is defined in § 12-120(3) as "all 
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." Thus, 
"[wJhere a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a type 
embraced by section 12-120(3), ... that claim triggers the application of the 
statute. " Continental Cas. Co. v. Brady, 127 Idaho 830, 835, 907 P.2d 807, 812 
(1995). There must, however, be a nexus between the commercial transaction and 
the lawsuit. Id. There is no question that a "commercial transaction" as defmed in 
I.e. § 12-120(3) is involved here. Both parties entered into an employment 
agreement which contained a restrictive covenant. Freiburger brought this action 
seeking ajudicial declaration regarding his potential contractual obligations under 
the Covenant. This obligation is clearly grounded in a "commercial" contract. 
Freiburger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 141 Idaho 415, 111 P.3d 100 (2005). 
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In this case, Buku entered into the Agreements with Clarks and Petersons for the purpose 
of completing a commercial real estate transaction. The properties Buku contracted to buy from 
Clarks and Petersons was farm land. There is no evidence that Buku was buying the land for 
personal or household purposes. There is no evidence that Clarks or Petersons thought Buku was 
buying the land for personal or household purposes. To the contrary, the record indicates Clarks 
and Petersons knew that Buku intended to develop the property. Buku brought this action to 
enforce the provisions of the Agreements that provided for the return of earnest money if Buku 
was not satisfied with the condition ofthe properties. Thus, in bringing this action, Buku alleged 
the existence of a contractual relationship of the type contemplated by § 12-120(3) and Buku's 
claim for reimbursement of the earnest money triggers application of the statute. 
ii. Prevailing Party 
Defendants concede Buku prevailed on its second motion for summary judgment. 
However, Defendants assert Buku's request for fees is excessive and unreasonable because 
Defendants "prevailed on the first motion and the events leading up to that decision." 
Defendants' Brief at 5. Accordingly, Defendants assert Buku would only be entitled to the 68.9 
hours of work that were completed after July 8, 2010, the date Buku began preparing for is 
second motion for summary judgment. 
Rule 54(d)(1)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
(B) Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party 
and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final 
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective 
parties. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an 
action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may 
apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner 
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after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and the 
resultant judgment or judgments obtained.2 
The Idaho Supreme Court has identified three areas of inquiry that a court should 
consider when deciding whether a party "prevailed." 
(a) the final judgment or result obtained in the action in relation to the relief 
sought by the respective parties; (b) whether there were multiple claims or issues 
between the parties; and (c) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on 
each of the issues or claims. If the court determines that a party prevailed only in 
part, it may apportion the costs and attorney fees among the parties in a fair and 
equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the 
action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406, 411,659 P.2d 160,165 (Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added). 
In determining which party has prevailed, the Supreme Court of Idaho provided the 
following guidance: 
In determining which party prevailed in an action where there are claims and 
counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed "in 
the action." That is, the prevailing party question is examined and determined 
from an overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis. 
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 
130, 133 (2005). 
In this case, Buku prevailed on its claim of entitlement to reimbursement of the earnest 
money. All of Clarks' and Petersons' counterclaims were denied. This Court concludes Buku 
was the prevailing party when looking at the outcome of the case from an overall view. 
2 Rule 54(d)(1)(B) only speaks of costs. However, Rule 54(e)(1), which pertains to attorney 
fees, incorporates the Rule 54(d)(1)(B) definition of prevailing party. 
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iii. Clarks and Petersons did not Prevail in Part 
Clarks and Petersons argue this Court should reduce Buku's fee award because, while 
Buku prevailed on all substantive claims, they prevailed in all aspects of the case leading up to 
Buku's second motion for summary judgment. 
This Court disagrees with the assertion that Clarks and Petersons prevailed in the case 
prior to Buku's second motion for summary judgment. Prior the Buku's second motion for 
summary judgment, both parties filed motions for summary judgment and neither was granted. 
Additionally, Clarks and Petersons filed a motion to strike portions of an affidavit filed in 
support of Buku's first motion for summary judgment. That motion was denied. The blanket 
assertion by Clarks and Petersons that they prevailed in every aspect of the case prior to Buku' s 
second motion for summary judgment is inaccurate. 
As stated above, this Court in its sound discretion may determine that each party 
prevailed in part. Upon so finding, the Court may apportion the costs between and among the 
parties in a fair and equitable manner. See Prouse v. Ransom, 117 Idaho 734, 739, 791 P.2d 
1313,1318 (Ct. App. 1989). In Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 191 P.3d 1107 (et. App. 2008) 
Nguyen was found to be the prevailing party at trial and was awarded attorney fees. Bui asserted 
it was error to award attorney fees incurred by Nguyen for preparation and presentation of the 
claims that the Buis successfully defended against. In response to that argument, the Idaho Court 
of Appeals stated: 
This Court rejected a similar argument in Nalen v. Jenkins, 113 Idaho 79, 
741 P.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1987). In that case, the plaintiffs had contracted with the 
defendant for the construction of a home and advanced a sum of money. They 
elected not to proceed on the project and asked the defendant to return their 
money less his out-of-pocket expenses. Litigation ensued when the plaintiffs 
believed that the defendant did not return a sufficient sum. The plaintiffs' 
complaint alleged causes of action for violation of the Consumer Protection Act, 
fraud, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract. A jury found for the plaintiffs 
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upon their theories of unjust enrichment and violation of the Consumer Protection 
Act. The trial court determined that attorney fees were statutorily awardable only 
for the Consumer Protection Act violation, and awarded attorney fees that it 
calculated were attributable to the attorney's work on this theory only. We 
determined that this was an error. We noted that the plaintiffs had advanced four 
alternative theories of recovery in an attempt to obtain only one type of relief-the 
return of their pre-payment. We held that the trial judge improperly split the 
single "claim" upon which the plaintiffs had prevailed into prevailing and 
nonprevailing "theories." In a later case, Burns v. County of Boundary, 120 Idaho 
623, 818 P.2d 327 (Ct. App. 1990), we contrasted the circumstance where there 
truly are multiple claims for differing relief that can be parsed in awarding 
attorney fees, such as distinguishing between a successful claim for injunctive 
relief and an unsuccessful claim for damages. 
Even if Nguyen's various theories should be characterized as separate 
claims, apportionment of his attorney fees is not necessarily required. For 
example, in Decker v. Homeguard Systems, a Div. of Intermountain Gas Co., 105 
Idaho 158, 666 P.2d 1169 (Ct. App. 1983), the defendant argued that it was 
inappropriate to award attorney fees to the plaintiffs on all of their twenty-eight 
causes of action when all but six were dismissed before submission to jury. The 
district court noted that although the plaintiffs had failed on a number of causes of 
action, they "basically prevailed" on the principal complaints that they had 
pursued against the defendant. We determined that the district court acted within 
its discretion in deciding not to apportion attorney fees among the successful and 
unsuccessful claims. Similarly, in Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 
682 P.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1984), where the plaintiff argued that the district court 
should have awarded him attorney fees for successfully defending against a 
counterclaim, we said: 
[T]he mere fact that a party is successful in ... defeating a single claim 
does not mandate an award of fees to the prevailing party on that claim. 
The rule does not require that. It mandates an award of fees only to the 
party or parties who prevail "in the action." .... 
. . . [W]hile the judge in his sound discretion must consider "the final 
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the 
respective parties ... and the extent to which each party prevailed upon 
each of such issue or claims," [I.R.C.P. 54(d)(I)(B),] he is not compelled 
to make a discrete award of fees on each claim. 
Id. at 693, 682 P.2d at 646. The propriety of this approach was confirmed by the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, 
Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005), where the Court said: 
In determining which party prevailed in an action where there are claims 
and counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed 
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"in the action." That is, the prevailing party question is examined and detennined 
from an overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis. 
Id at 193-94, 191 P.3d at 1113-14. 
In this case, Buku's first motion for summary judgment was denied in part because of a 
perceived factual dispute. The fact that Clarks and Petersons survived that motion, however, 
does not equate to them having prevailed on any issue or claim. Even if Clarks and Petersons 
had prevailed on some claim or issue, this Court would not be obligated to apportion fees 
between the parties. As discussed above, Buku prevailed on its first cause of action seeking 
return of the earnest money, and all of Clarks' and Petersons' counterclaims were denied. 
This Court cannot conclude Clarks and Petersons prevailed "in the action" in any sense. 
iv. Reasonable Award 
Rule 54( e )(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires the Court to consider certain 
factors when determining the amount of attorney fees to award. Although this Court "is not 
required to make 'specific fmdings demonstrating how it employed any of the factors in Rule 
54(e)(3), it is required to consider those factors when detennining the amount of the fees to 
award." Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc., v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 769, 86 P.3d 
475,483 (2004); Perkins v. Us. Transformer West, 132 Idaho 427, 430,974 P.2d 73, 76 (1999). 
The Court may also "consider any other factor that the court deems appropriate." Hines v. 
Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 855, 934 P.2d 20, 28 (1997); see also Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 
425,435, 111 P.3d 110, 120 (2005). 
In Sun Valley, the Idaho Supreme Court quoted the Idaho Court of Appeals for the 
proposition that the district court may, when considering the Rule 54(e)(3) factors, draw from 
"the court's own knowledge and experience" and "the record of the case," but it is also 
"incumbent upon a party seeking attorney fees to present sufficient infonnation for the court to 
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consider factors as they specifically relate to the prevailing party or parties seeking fees." Sun 
Valley, 139 Idaho at 769,86 P.3d at 483 (quoting Hackett v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261, 264, 706 
P.2d 1372, 1375 (Ct. App. 1985)). 
Buku adequately documented its time and labor spent on this case and provided that 
information to this Court in an affidavit filed on February 24, 2011. Defendants do not object to 
Buku's manner of documentation, method of calculation, fee rate, or amount of work. 
As the prevailing party, Buku is entitled to reasonable attorney fees for time and labor 
spent in this case. This Court has reviewed Buku's memorandum of fees and costs with its 
supporting affidavit. In accordance with the above discussion regarding commercial transactions 
and prevailing parties, and considering the Rule 54(e)(3) factors, Buku should be awarded 
reasonable attorney fees in the amount of$27,093.61. 
B. Costs 
LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(A) states that "costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the 
prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court." 
Having concluded Buku is a prevailing party under LR.C,P, 54(d)(1)(B), costs as a matter 
of right should be awarded to Buku in the amount of $724.82. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Attorney's fees are awarded to Buku in the amount of $27,093.61. 
Costs as a matter of right are awarded to Buku in the amount of $724.82. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
"Q 
DATED this 4- \ day of April 2011. , 
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1- MEMORANDUM OF SUPPLEMENTAL ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
LJ { 
COMES NOW PlaintiffBuku Properties, LLC ("Plaintiff"), by and through its attorney 
of record Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and submits this Memorandum of 
Supplemental Attorney's Fees and Costs. Plaintiff is filing simultaneous with this Motion the 
Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson in Support of Memorandum of Supplemental Attorneys' Fees 
and Costs. 
I. ARGUMENT 
On February 3, 2011, this Court issued its decision, granting summary judgment to 
Plaintiff. Before a Final Judgment was entered, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal. On or 
about February 22,2011, Plaintiff filed its Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs. In 
addition, Plaintiff sent a proposed Final Judgment to the Court for consideration. On March 28, 
2011, the Court held a status conference to address the Final Judgment and appeal issues. As a 
result of that conference, the Court granted leave to Defendants to submit its objections to the 
proposed Final Judgment and ordered a hearing on April 25, 2011, to address the Memorandum 
for Attorneys' Fees and Costs and the Final Judgment. 
After the filing of Plaintiff's Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs and proposed 
Final Judgment, Defendant filed the following: 
a. Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Request for Fees and Costs; Memorandum in 
Support of Objection; 
b. Defendant's Statement Re: Final Judgment. 
"Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Request for Fees and Costs; Memorandum in 
Support of Objection" contained various arguments stating that Plaintiff was simply not entitled 
to attorneys' fees or costs, including that the contract upon which relief was granted to Plaintiff 
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had been nullified by the Court and no longer existed, that the sale of the property at issue was 
not a commercial transaction, and that it was simply not fair for Plaintiff to be awarded attorneys' 
fees in this matter, despite prevailing. Defendants also argued that they were the prevailing party 
in this matter, at least in part. Nowhere in Defendants' briefing did Defendants make any 
argument regarding the reasonableness of the amount Plaintiff requested in attorneys' fees and 
costs. Additionally, "Defendant's Statement Re: Final Judgment," essentially argued that the 
summary judgment entered by the Court in this matter was a Final Judgment, despite the fact that 
the Idaho Supreme Court had suspended the appeal filed by Defendants in this action due to the 
fact that no fmal judgment had been entered. (See Order Suspending Appeal, Supreme Court 
Docket No. 28561-2011). 
Because Defendants filed the above pleadings, Plaintiff had to file both a Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Attorneys Fees and Costs, as well as a Memorandum in Support of 
Entry of Final Judgment. Additionally, Plaintiff's counsel had to attend the hearings on those 
matters. Responding to Defendants' briefmg proved to be difficult and time intensive due to the 
nature of Defendants' briefmg. 
Plaintiffhas incurred additional costs and attorneys' fees in responding to Defendants' 
pleadings and arguments. Consequently, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of the additional costs 
and fees incurred in responding to these additional pleadings and arguments. Plaintiff has 
incurred an additional $ 4,638.00 in attorneys fees and $ 33.70 in costs from February 22,2011, 
to present, in this matter, as itemized and set forth in the Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson in 
Support of Memorandum of Supplemental Attorneys' Fees and Costs filed simultaneous 
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herewith. Plaintiff asserts it is entitled to a supplemental award as a result of briefing and 
arguments necessary to respond to Defendants' briefmg and objections. 
Because Plaintiff has already been determined the prevailing party, Plaintiff does not 
believe a hearing is necessary. Plaintiff asserts the Court could make a determination on the 
supplemental award of fees and costs based on the briefing. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant this 
Memorandum of Supplemental Attorneys' Fees and Costs so that Plaintiff may be compensated 
for the additional expense Defendants' actions have caused Plaintiff to incur, in the amount of 
$ 4,638.00. Plaintiff requests such sum in addition to the costs and attorneys' fees originally 
awarded by this Court in the amount of$27,818.43. 
Itv~ 
DATED this ~ day of May, 2011. 
't;kne Casper'So'n, Esq. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
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ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
DEANNE CASPERSON, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am a member of the law firm of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., 
counsel for Plaintiff Buku Properties, LLC ("Plaintiff'), in this matter. 
2. This Affidavit is made on my own personal knowledge, except to the extent of 
allegations made on information and belief, and in support of Plaintiff s Memorandum of 
Supplemental Attorneys' Fees and Costs. 
3. I have reviewed the time and cost records of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, 
P.L.L.C. maintained on the above matter, and represent that, to the best of my knowledge and 
belief, the following items of costs and expenses, in addition to those previously claimed, are 
claimed in compliance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d)(5) and Rule 54(e)(1), 
and were necessarily and exceptionally expended and incurred in the above entitled action on 
behalf of Plaintiff: 
Costs of Right (Rule 54(d)(1)(c))' 
Date Item Cost 
NIA NIA 
TOTAL $0.00 
11 Discretionru:y Costs (Rule 54( d)(1 )(c )). 
Date Item Cost 
03/28/11 Travel expense - Travel to Rigby, Idaho for hearing $16.85 
04/25/11 Travel expense - Travel to Rigby, Idaho for hearing $16.85 
TOTAL $33.70 
111. Total Costs of Right and Discretionary Costs: $33.70. 
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4. The above-listed costs represent the costs incurred from February 23,2011, to the 
date herein. 
5. Since February 23,2011, the law fIrm of Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
has expended approximately 27.8 hours in providing a defense to various pleadings fIled by 
Defendants. An itemization of the additional legal services incurred since February 23,2011, 
provided by Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. in connection with such matters is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A". The law fIrm of Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. has invoiced 
Plaintiff for the legal services itemized on Exhibit "A" attached hereto the total amount of 
$4,638.00, which is allocated among the following attorneys at the following effective billing 
rates: 
Name Hours Effective Rate Total Fees 
Charles A. Homer 0.50 $235.00 $117.50 
DeAnne Casperson 12.70 $195.00 $2,476.50 
Amanda E. Ulrich 14.60 $140.00 $2,044.00 
TOTAL $4,638.00 
6. The sum of $4,638.00 represents a reasonable sum for fees for additional services 
provided by the law fIrm of Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. in prosecuting the above-
entitled action on behalf of Plaintiff. The sum of $33.70 represents additional costs incurred in 
the above-entitled action allocated for the benefIt of Plaintiff. 
7. I have practiced law in Idaho continuously since April 24, 2003. I graduated from 
law school in 1999 and practiced law in both Missouri and Kansas before returning to Idaho. I 
am familiar with the prevailing charges in this community for legal work similar to that 
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perfonned by the attorneys in this case. It is my opinion that the prevailing charges in this 
community for like work are equal to or higher than those indicated above, and that the attorney's 
fees are reasonable and necessary. 
I"t'---' 
DATED this _ll_ day of May, 2011. 
DeAnne Caspers~ t 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this Iltv day of May, 2011. 
') 
Jt U\ /0 J.-Gij·',,-L'otA~·t-Vl!Jlh /) 
otary P1!tWic for Idaho ~ 
Residing at //tt;uw f;::t'/ u , If} 
• I 
My Commission Expires: 10 !,;;-;? II <I 
) 
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described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or 
by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: AFFIDA VIT OF DEANNE CASPERSON IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF SUPPLEMENTAL ATTORNEYS 
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ATTORNEYS SERVED: 
Robin D. Dunn 
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Date __ Attorney 
-----~-~~--
Feb 24/2011 AEU ----







Mar '-10/20{1-- "-~.--'"- --" DC ---.---. ---_.-.- .. -_._"--_. 
Mar 25/2011 AEU .-------
! 
Mar 28/2011 DC 
Mar 29/2011 DC--' ------
Apr 7/2011 AEU 
Apr 12/2611- AEU--
~pr 12/201J_= DC 
Apr 14/2011_ AEIT-----· 
Apr 18/2011 AEU ------
~r 18/2011 DC 
Apr 19/2011 AEU 
Apr 20/201.1.._ AEU-'-1-=----_. 
Apr~20!..!..... DC -------, 
Apr~1/2011 AEU 
Apr 25/2011 AEU 
~r 25/2011. ,DC 
M,!L.§/.2°1.! __ AEU 
.JII!ay 10/2911 AEU 
------_._-_._--- -_. 
----"---"- .. --- --. 
--------"-. 
---._----
--- .. ----- ._-_._---
-----_. -.------
---------_._._-------. 
---,-_ .. -.- "- - ...... -
---'''--''- '-.--r--




Apr.2~!.2Q.!l --. _ .. __ ... _---- ---_._---
Explanation 
Intraoffice conference with CAH; Revise and edit Final Judgment 
Interoffice conference to review and revise proposed Judgment to be issued in connection with Summary Judgment 
Edit and revise Final Judgment;e-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera about status. 
Review response to request for attorneys fees by Mr. Dunn. 
E-mail correspondence with Mr. Magera regarding status. 
Intraoffice conference with DC; Recalculate judgment amounts based upon April 25, 2011 hearing date; Draft 
correspondence to Robin Dunn; Revise Final Judgment to reflect judgment amounts for April 25, 2011 
Intra-office conference regarding status conference; Prepare for status conference by reviewing final judgment calculations 
and attorneys fee issues; travel to and from Jefferson County for status conference. 
Review letter to Mr. Dunn regarding Final Judgment. 
Draft Reply Memorandum in Support of Attorneys' Fees and Costs 
Review new pleadings from Defendants regarding final judgment 
Edit and revise reply brief in support of attorneys fees. 
Make final edits to Reply Memorandum in Support of Costs and Fees 
Draft Reply Memorandum in Support of Final Judgment 
.. -
Edit and revise brief in support of motion for attorneys' fees. 
Finish drafting Memorandum in Support of Entry of Final Judgment 
Revise and edit Memorandum in Support of Entry of Final judgment 
Edit and revise memorandum in support of final judgment; research cases cited in Stay Order; finalize brief for filing. 
Research application of prejudgment interest where funds have been deposited with the court; Revise and edit final draft of 
reply memorandum 
Update Final Judgment calculation; Research supersedeas bond issues; Pull research regarding "prevailing party" analysis 
E-mail correspondence with client regarding hearing; prepare for hearing on attorneys' fees and final judgment; attend and 
argue hearing on final judgment and attorneys' fees. 
Review time records to determine attorneys fees incurred subsequent to filing of motion for attorneys fees; Review 
Memorandum Decision and Order from the Court regarding attorneys fees; Review final judgment 
Draft Amended Final Judgment to Include Attorneys Fees; Draft Motion to Supplement and Increase Award of Attorneys 
Fees and Costs; Draft Affidavit of DeAnne Casperson in Support of Motion to Supplement and Increase Award of Attorneys 
Fees and Costs; Research recording of judgments . 
TOTAL HOURS 
Totals for CAH 
Totals for DC .-
Totals for AEU 
Costs 
Travel Expense 3/28111 to Rigby for hearing 
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Case No. CV-08-941 
OBJECTION TO SUPPLEMENTAL 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
OBJECTION TO SUPPLEMENTAL AnORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS -1-
COMES NOW, defendants, by and through the undersigned attorney, and objects to 
that Memorandum of Supplemental Attorneys' Fees and Costs for multiple reasons. Those 
reasons are as follows: 
1. Through no fault of the defendants, the Idaho Supreme Court remanded 
the "Judgment" for a determination of "Final Judgment". Both parties 
were forced to do additional briefing on various issues. 
2. The Memorandum of Supplemental Attorneys' Fees and Costs does not fall 
under any exceptions or rules allowing attorney fees. More specifically, 
Idaho Code §12-120(5), has a provision for additional attorney fees in 
collection of debt. This is not one of those instances. 
3. The supplemental attorneys' fees and costs were incurred by both sides for 
the benefit of final determination which might have been determined in the 
original judgment. Once again, through no fault of either side, additional 
fees were incurred to resolve the "Final Judgment" issue. 
4. The undersigned objects as the fees are not reasonable under Rule 54 and 
the subdivisions thereof. 
5. This objection is based upon the case law, statutory scheme and the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure 54. 
DATED this I & day of May, 2011. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
OBJECTION TO SUPPLEMENTAL ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS -2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of May, 2011 a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was delivered to the following persons(s) by: 
Hand Delivery to plaintiff 
~ Postage-prepaid mail to judge 
-2QL Facsimile Transmission 523 9518 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Courtesy Copy: Hon. Dane Watkins 
District Judge 
605 North Capital 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
OBJECTION TO SUPPLEMENTAL ATIORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS -3-
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Amelia A. Sheets, Esq., ISB #5899 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P. O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
rdunn@dllnnlawoffices.com 
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Robin D. Dunn, Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC an Idaho ) 
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Case No. CV-08-941 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Docket No. 38561-2011 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANTS; AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellants appeal against the above named Respondent to 
the Idaho Supreme Court from the Summary Judgment entered in the above entitled action 
on the 3rd day of February, 2011, the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, presiding. Upon 
remand, a second amended judgment entitled: "Final Judgment" was dated April 25, 2011 
with the hand-written notation below the date, "Nunc Pro Tunc" and a certificate of mailing 
dated April 29, 2011. The district court also entered a document entitled "Memorandum 
Decision and Order Re: Attorney's Fees and Costs" dated "49 day of April, 2011" [sic] with 
mailing, per the clerk, of 29 day of April, 2011. 
2. The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgment/ order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant 
to Rule 11(a)(l) I.A.R. 
3. The issues on appeal include, but are not limited, to the following: 
a. Did the court error in interpretation of the real estate contract between 
the parties? 
b. Did the court error in granting summary judgment which excluded 
equitable remedies of the defendants? 
c. Were there ambiguous terms in the contract which allowed parol 
evidence? 
d. Did the court error in using information outside the "four comers" of 
the contract when the decision indicated the contract was not 
ambiguous? 
e. Were the defendants' equitable remedies precluded by the court's 
ruling in Summary Judgment which required a return of earnest 
money? 
f. Was the court incorrect in awarding prejudgment interest along with 
fees and costs? 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. A reporter's transcript is not requested. 
6. The Appellants request that the following documents be included in the 
clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
-Any minute entries-
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 2 
-All pleadings by both parties-
-All affidavits of both parties-
-First Summary Judgment Decision (Denial) of Honorable Gregory 
Moeller 
-Second Summary Judgment Decision (Approval) of Honorable Dane 
Watkins 
-Final Judgment of Honorable Dane Watkins. 
7. The undersigned certifies: 
a. That a copy of the notice of appeal has NOT been served on the 
reporter since a transcript is not requested; 
b. That the Appellants have made contact with the clerk of the district 
court and are in the process of obtaining the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's 
record; 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid or will be paid; 
d. That appellate filing fee has been paid on the first notice of appeal 
prior to this Amended Notice of Appeal; and 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this 31st day of May, 2011. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL. 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of May, 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was delivered to the following persons(s) by: 
Hand Delivery 
xx Postage-prepaid mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Jefferson County Clerk 
Jefferson County Courthouse 
210 Courthouse Way, Ste. 120 
Rigby, ID 83442 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Honorable Dane Watkins 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Idaho Supreme Court 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
Attorney for the Defendants/Appellants 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 4 
P.O. Box 83720 Clerk of the Courts 
(208) 334-2210 2011 AUG -, PrJ 3: rf~ise, Idaho 83720-0101 
" DIS Ti~iCT GOUR T 
1t.FFE,QSON COUNT'f.IDAHO 
CHRISTINE BOULTER, CLERK 
Attn: NANCY 
JEFFERSON COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
210 COURTHOUSE WAY STE 100 
RIGBY, ID 83442 
CLERK'S RECORD DUE DATE SET 
Docket No. 38561-2011 BUKU PROPERTIES, 
LLC v. RAOEL H. 
CLARK 
Jefferson County District Court 
#2008-941 
The CLERK'S RECORD must be filed in this office by 09-29-11. 
For the Court: 
Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of the Courts 
07/28/2011 
BY: KML 
'r i ( 
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SUPREME COURT NO. 38561-2011 
.Jefferson County Case No. CV-2008-941 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
OF EXHIBITS 
I, Christine Boulter, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for Jefferson County, do hereby certifY that the following is a list of the exhibits, 
offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the Supreme Court or retained as indicated: 
NO. DESCRlPTION SENT/RETAINED 
None none 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 24th day of August, 2011. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES ,LLC, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
RAOEL H. CLARK and JANET C. 
CLARK,ANGUS.ffiRRYPETERSON 




) SUPREME COURT NO. 38561-2011 
) 
) Jefferson County Case No. CV-2008-941 
) 






I, Christine Boulter, Clerk of the District Court of the in Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Jefferson, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
Clerk's Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction 
and contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents and papers designated to 
be included under Rule 28, IAR, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross Appeal, and 
any additional documents requested to be included. 
I further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or admitted 
as exhibits in the above entitled cause, if any, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court with any Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record (except for 
exhibits, which are retained in the possession of the undersigned), as required by Rule 31 
of the Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court this 24th day of August, 2011. 
CHRISTINE BOULTER 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH .JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF .JEFFERSON 
BUKU PROPERTIES, LLC, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
RAOEL H. CLARK and .JANET C. 
CLARK,ANGUS.JERRYPETERSON 




) SUPREME COURT NO. 38561-2011 
) 
) .Jefferson County Case No. CV-2008-941 
) 






I, Christine Boulter, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Jefferson, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of 
Record as follows: 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Robin D. Dunn 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
DeAnne Casperson 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court this 24th day of August, 2011. 
CHRISTINE BOULTER 
Clerk of the Court 
Jefferson County, Idaho 
::J: 
